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PRIOR RESTRAINT AND THE PUBLIC HIGH SCHOOL
STUDENT PRESS: THE VALIDITY OF
ADMINISTRATIVE CENSORSHIP OF STUDENT
NEWSPAPERS UNDER THE FEDERAL AND
CALIFORNIA CONSTITUTIONS
As we approach the bicentennial of the Constitution in 1987,
some educators still feel that practicing the Bill of Rights in the
public schools is risky. But... our Constitution says we must
take this risk and our history says the risk is worth it. Thus,
there may be no better way for schools to observe the coming
bicentennial than by practicing what [they] teach about the
law-by risking on the side of the Constitution.1
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I. INTRODUCTION
Free and open communication, unfettered by government interven-
tion, is a fundamental and revered value; the freedom to express thoughts
and ideas is the cornerstone of the American and California constitu-
tional systems.2 Yet, there exists an area in which that freedom, as set
2. M. Simpson, The Rights and Responsibilities of the Student Press 29 (Aug. 1979)
(unpublished manuscript prepared for presentation to the S.I. Newhouse School of Public
Communications Super Conference on Scholastic Journalism). See generally J. NOWAK, R.
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forth in the first amendment to the United States Constitution3 and arti-
cle I, section 2(a) of the California Constitution,4 is rarely realized in full:
the public high school student press.' The censorship of student newspa-
pers is not peculiar to the small towns or little red schoolhouses in Cali-
fornia; on the contrary, censorship exists in even the most sophisticated
school districts.6 This is so despite the declaration by both the United
ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 858 (1984) (quoting Palko v. Connecticut,
302 U.S. 319, 327 (1937) (freedom of speech is "'the matrix, the indispensible condition, of
nearly every other form of freedom' ")) [hereinafter NOWAK].
3. The first amendment to the United States Constitution provides that "Congress shall
make no law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assem-
ble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
4. Article I, section 2(a) of the California Constitution provides that "[e]very person may
freely speak, write and publish his or her sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the
abuse of this right. A law may not restrain or abridge liberty of speech or press." CAL.
CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. a.
5. The extent of student press censorship in America's public high schools was docu-
mented in J. NELSON, CAPTIVE VOICES: THE REPORT OF THE COMMISSION OF INQUIRY
INTO HIGH SCHOOL JOURNALISM (1974). In 1973, a commission of students, teachers, jour-
nalists, school administrators, lawyers and community organizers conducted hearings in six
American cities and surveyed thousands of students, journalism teachers, faculty advisers and
professional editors. The Commission of Inquiry into High School Journalism (Commission)
concluded that "[c]ensorship and the systematic lack of freedom to engage in open, responsible
journalism characterize high school journalism. Unconstitutional and arbitrary restraints are
so deeply embedded in high school journalism as to overshadow its achievements, as well as its
other problems." Id. at 47. With regard to the effects of censorship on the creativity and
vibrancy of student journalism, the Commission reported that "[c]ensorship is the fundamen-
tal cause of the triviality, innocuousness, and uniformity that characterize the high school
press. It has created a high school press that in most places is no more than a house organ for
the school administration." Id. at 48. The Commission further found that "[c]ensorship per-
sists even where litigation or administrative action has destroyed the legal foundation of cen-
sorship; such decisions are either ignored or interpreted in such a way as to continue the
censorship policy." Id.
To help eliminate the legal ignorance exposed by its findings and, more generally, to im-
prove the quality of scholastic journalism, the Commission recommended the formation of a
national law center to advocate first amendment protections for student journalists. M. Simp-
son, supra note 2, at 1-2. In 1974, the Robert F. Kennedy Memorial (the convener of the
Commission), in conjunction with the Reporters' Committee for Freedom of the Press, estab-
lished the Student Press Law Center. Id. The Center, which is the only national organization
devoted exclusively to protecting student journalists' rights, is staffed by an attorney and stu-
dent interns and provides direct legal assistance to students and advisers facing administrative
censorship. Id. at 2. Inquiries may be made directly to the Student Press Law Center at 800-
18th Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20006, (202) 466-5242.
6. See infra note 18 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the censorship problems
in California during the early 1970's, see generally J. NELSON, supra note 5, at 11-16, 19-24,
25-26, 96; see also infra note 205.
An entire chapter in the Commission's report, J. NELSON, supra note 5, is devoted to a
Novato, California high school student's censorship experiences as editor of her high school
newspaper. Id. at 11-16. Her story is typical of the student press controversies in California
and throughout the nation. The controversy arose when Janice Fuhrman, the editor of the
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States Supreme Court and the California Supreme Court that" '[t]he vig-
ilant protection of constitutional freedoms is nowhere more vital than in
the community of American schools.' ""
Novato High School student newspaper, criticized the principal for banning a county-wide
student publication, Free Youth, from campus. Id. at I1. She wrote that:
"[The principal] objected to the use of the words chicken ---- and bull ---- (words
he called obscene), and an article about the Viet Nam war which suggested a violent
act (burning a school building down), and the fact that the author of the article was
not named. Principals of San Rafael, Drake, Terra Linda, Redwood and Tamalpais
high schools did not see it necessary to forbid distribution and because of the objec-
tions by Novato ... the Free Youth committee decided to censor out the objectiona-
ble article. Novato seems to be some kind of puritanical community and I guess [the
principal] wants to keep it that way."
Id. at 11-12 (quoting Janice Fuhrman in the Hornet's Buzz). The principal suspended Janice.
Janice later reported to the Commission that the principal told her that the article was libelous
and made him look like a "bad guy." Id. at 12.
Unlike most students, Janice was aware of her legal rights and contacted an attorney
regarding her suspension. Instead of filing suit against the principal, however, the attorney
went to the San Francisco Chronicle with the facts of Janice's case. Id. at 14. According to
Janice, the minute the story came out, the principal contacted Janice's father claiming that the
suspension was "all a big misunderstanding." Id. Although Janice was able to return to
school, the censorship persisted. Janice told the Commission that upon her return to school,
the principal informed her that she "'was not the owner of the school paper, that the school
district was, and they had the right to determine editorial policy, and that as long as the
district was giving [the students] the money to write the paper, [the students] weren't ... to
criticize the district.'" Id. (quoting Janice Fuhrman). Janice also informed the Commission
that "'every time [the students] came out with something the least bit controversial [the
County Board of Supervisors] would threaten to cut off [the newspaper's] funds, and [the
students] had to answer to them, because [the Board of Supervisors was] paying for it ....'"
Id. at 12 (quoting Janice Fuhrman); see infra notes 272-321 for a discussion regarding the
unconstitutionality of the principal's actions.
The controversy arose during Janice's junior year of high school. She observed during her
senior year that students were "avoiding" controversial topics and that the adviser had ap-
pointed a new editor who would "steer the paper clear of articles critical of school policy." Id.
at 15.
The Commission also reported on cases involving the dismissal or censuring of California
journalism advisers for advocating their students' first amendment rights. In one case, the
adviser of the Los Alamitos High School newspaper, the Crusader, lost her position as adviser
after opposing the principal's policies of prior review and censorship of student articles that he
"considered offensive or unworthy of publication." Id. at 25. In another case, the adviser of
the Torrance High School student newspaper, was fired by the board of education for "insub-
ordination." Id. at 23. The insubordination consisted mainly of the adviser's refusal to submit
student articles to the principal for prior review. Id. The adviser later filed suit in federal
court alleging that his employment was wrongfully terminated as a result of constitutionally
protected actions that he took as the school's newspaper adviser. Nicholson v. Board of Educ.
Torrance Unified School Dist., 682 F.2d 858, 861 (9th Cir. 1982). The court of appeals ulti-
mately held that Nicholson's first amendment rights were not violated when he was discharged
for failure to submit articles on sensitive topics to school officials. Id. at 865.
7. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 512 (1969) (quot-
ing Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967)); Adcock v. Board of Educ., 10
Cal. 3d 60, 67, 513 P.2d 900, 905, 109 Cal. Rptr. 676, 681 (1973) (quoting Shelton v. Tucker,
364 U.S. 479, 487 (1960)); Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 608 n.25, 487 P.2d 1241, 1258 n.25,
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Judicial recognition of students' first amendment rights came in
1969 with the landmark United States Supreme Court ruling in Tinker v.
Des Moines Independent School District.' There, the Court proclaimed
that "it can hardly be argued that... students ... shed their constitu-
tional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.
First Amendment rights, applied in light of the special characteristics of
the school environment, are available to ... students."9
In the wake of Tinker, the California Legislature enacted California
Education Code section 1061110 in a bold move to officially recognize
students' rights of free expression. 1 In doing so, the legislature enacted
the nation's first statutory scheme for protecting students' free expression
on school campuses. Section 10611 evolved into its present form: Cali-
fornia Education Code section 48907. Section 48907 provides that
"[t]here shall be no prior restraint of material prepared for official school
publications."12 The section does allow, however, for prior restraints of
certain categories of expression specified in the statute, such as obscenity
and libel. 3 In addition, section 48907 requires that each school district
governing board and each county board of education adopt written pub-
lication guidelines. 4
Great hopes were placed on California's legislative effort to define
the parameters of student expression in official student publications. 5
Other states watched the California experiment for guidance in develop-
ing their own systems of student publication regulation. 16 Unfortu-
nately, the California experiment has yet to yield significant results.
96 Cal. Rptr. 601, 618 n.25 (1971) (quoting Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 487 (1960)). See
also M. Simpson, supra note 2, at 1.
8. 393 U.S. 503 (1969); see infra notes 87-100 and accompanying text.
9. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506.
10. See infra note 167.
11. See infra notes 166-70 and accompanying text.
12. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 48907 (West Supp. 1987). See infra Appendix A for the full text
of § 48907.
13. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 48907.
14. Id.
15. The scope of this Comment is limited to the discussion of "official school publica-
tions," specifically school newspapers. Education Code § 48907 defines official school publica-
tions as "material produced by students in the journalism, newspaper... or writing classes
and distributed to the student body either free or for a fee." CAL. EDUC. CODE § 48907.
Thus, unofficial or "underground" student newspapers will not be specifically addressed. For
a discussion of "underground" newspapers in California's schools, see Letwin, Regulation of
Underground Newspapers on Public School Campuses in California, 22 UCLA L. REV. 141
(1974).
16. See generally Eveslage, Can Students Acquire Press Freedom Through Grass Roots Ef-
forts? Are Model Guidelines Possible Through State?, COMMUNICATION: JOURNALISM EDUC.
TODAY, Fall 1982, at 16, 17.
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Surveys indicate that many school districts are not aware of the legisla-
tion and/or they have not established student publications guidelines.1
7
Furthermore, reports of censorship still emerge throughout the state. 8
17. See infra notes 524-26 and accompanying text.
18. Id. One might presume that censorship has not been a problem in California high
schools since no cases have been reported challenging Education Code § 48907 and since many
school districts have not drafted publications guidelines. But see infra note 216. On the con-
trary-incidences of censorship still appear throughout the state.
For example, a controversy arose in Palo Alto over whether the Palo Alto High School
newspaper should run an advertisement from a gay and lesbian support group. Wright, P.A.
Gay Ad Sparks Dispute: School Paper's Right to Run It At Issue, San Jose Mercury News, Oct.
23, 1985, (copy on file at Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review). The controversy arose when a
local teacher objected to the advertisement claiming that it might induce students to engage in
homosexual activity. Id. In Oakland, the managing editor of Green and Gold, the award-
winning Fremont High School newspaper, was suspended for trying to photograph the after-
math of the shooting of a fellow student. Brydolt, Censorship of School Newspapers Isn't New,
Tribune, Nov. 10, 1985, at 1, col. 1; see also United Press Int'l (UPI), Suspension Lifted for
School Editor, Nov. 1, 1985 (NEXIS, UPI file). The faculty adviser believed that "student
journalists have a legal right under California law to cover a legitimate story." UPI, supra.
The adviser added that " 'I see this as a prior restraint .... At what point can an administra-
tor step in and say "You can't cover this?" '" Id. (quoting adviser Stephen O'Donoghue). In
1982, the principal of Hoover High School, in Fresno, confiscated copies of a lampoon issue of
the school newspaper. School Paper's Lampoon Issue Confiscated, Stockton Record, June 6,
1982, at 7, col. 4. The principal reportedly even collected one copy from a student's home. Id.
The principal objected to a number of photographs, including one of the newspaper staff stand-
ing in front of an adult bookstore named "House of Erotica." Id. He also objected to another
photograph showing the backs of students pretending to urinate. Id.
High school students in Southern California have also had their share of censorship
problems. In September 1984, students at Fallbrook High School in San Diego published The
Hatchet Job, an unofficial student newspaper. San Diego Chapter Report, Open Forum, Apr.
1986, at 1, col. 3 (monthly newspaper of the American Civil Liberties Union of Southern
California). The principal adjudged some of the material in the newspaper obscene and
libelous and, thus, seized copies of the paper. He then suspended two of the paper's reporters.
Id. The Fallbrook Unified School District later filed suit for a declaration that the suspension
was lawful. Id. The superior court judge ruled in favor of the students and held that under
state law, the principal did not have the authority to suspend the students. Id. at 3, col. 1. In
February 1986, the parties settled; the students to receive $22,000 and a letter of apology from
the district. Id. In addition, the district must sponsor a training program for teachers and
administrators in the area of students' free speech and free press rights. Id.
In 1985, a high school student in Huntington Beach wrote an editorial in the school
newspaper criticizing Reverend Jerry Falwell and a congressman for allegedly misinforming
the public about acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS). Kossen, Orange Co. Students
at Cutting Edge of Censorship Law, L.A. Daily J., Jan. 30, 1986, § 2, at 1, col. 3. School
district officials believed that the editorial was potentially libelous and, thus, banned its publi-
cation. Id. The student claimed that his first amendment rights had been violated. The school
district, on the other hand, maintained that constitutional rights were not at issue, claiming
instead that standards of journalism were the issue. Id. In December 1985, a superior court
judge ordered the Huntington Beach Union High School District to allow publication of the
editorial. Id. at cols. 3-4. The school district appealed, but subsequently decided not to pursue
the appeal because the "controversy and expense that surrounded the situation approached an
unreasonable level." Id. at col. 4 (quoting Huntington Beach Union High School District
spokeswoman Catharine McGough). See also Leeb v. DeLong, appeal docketed, 4 Civ. No. G
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Hence, it appears that section 48907 has failed to impact school officials'
regulation of student publications in a recognizable way.
Nevertheless, section 48907 has not been completely ignored. Some
school districts have established publication guidelines pursuant to sec-
tion 48907.19 The majority of these district guidelines, however, simply
mimic the broad language of the statute and offer no further guidance as
to the meaning of the legal "terms of art" contained in the statute.'0
Since school districts rely on the statute for guidance, it is vitally impor-
tant that the statute be a clear, comprehensive and constitutional model.
What constitutes a clear, comprehensive and constitutional statutory
model is the subject of this Comment.21
To fully understand the dynamics of Education Code section 48907
and the relationship between student press rights and administrative cen-
sorship, one first must appreciate the deep-rooted national and state com-
mitments to the freedoms of expression and press. Thus, the inquiry into
what constitutes a constitutional model begins with a discussion, in Part
II, of the historical foundations for these freedoms as held by both adults
and young persons.
002587 (4th Dist. Aug. 1986), a case involving another Orange County high school student,
discussed infra at note 216. In addition, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit recently
decided a student press case involving the publication policies of the Grossmont Union High
School District in San Diego. San Diego Committee Against Registration and the Draft
(CARD) v. Governing Bd., 790 F.2d 1471 (9th Cir. 1986); see infra notes 275-97 for a discus-
sion of this case.
Furthermore, students are not the only parties who feel the effects of administrative cen-
sorship. In 1981, a journalism adviser at Redwood High School in Larkspur, California un-
successfully attempted to have the courts order a letter of reprimand removed from her
personnel file. See Brydolt, supra. The adviser had allowed her student reporters to reveal
that they had been sold alcohol illegally at a number of local liquor stores. The student report-
ers had written permission from their parents to participate in the investigative activities. In
addition, the adviser hired a private attorney to review the article before publication. Id. Nev-
ertheless, the adviser's role in the publication of the article was deemed "unprofessional" and
the letter of reprimand remains in her file. The adviser remarked that she is still technically
required to submit all potentially controversial stories to her superiors. She, however, ignores
the rule. Id. Other advisers in similar predicaments have been transferred, demoted or had
their classes eliminated or their newspaper budgets cut. Id.
19. See infra notes 524-26 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 450-54 and accompanying text & notes 464-70 and accompanying text
for a discussion of the constitutional problems arising from the use of legal "terms of art."
21. A further, and perhaps more difficult problem concerns how to inform and educate the
school boards, school district officials, teachers and students about students' press rights under
the United States and California Constitutions. Obviously, even if Education Code § 48907 is
reconstructed to conform with constitutional standards, it will hardly serve its purpose of es-
tablishing students' free expression guarantees if school officials and students are not made
aware of it. For a discussion of how this problem might be solved, see infra notes 527-48 and
accompanying text.
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In the context of public secondary education, however, the govern-
ment's interest in promoting free expression and a free press must be
balanced against the competing governmental interest in providing an
orderly environment in which the process of education may take place.
The California Legislature attempted to strike this balance in enacting
section 48907. How the legislature arrived at this balance is discussed in
Part III. Part IV examines whether the balance struck by the California
Legislature is constitutional and sets forth the recommended approach
that California courts should take in addressing this issue. Finally, Part
V provides an amendment to section 48907 which will bring the statute
within constitutional bounds and enable the statute to better suit the
needs of California public school educators and students.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
California journalists' right to be free from governmental censorship
is derived from the free expression and press provisions of the United
States and California Constitutions. Thus, the inquiry into whether Cali-
fornia's student journalists enjoy this same freedom necessarily begins
with these provisions.
A. The First Amendment
"Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom.., of the
press .... ,"22 These few but potent words in the first amendment estab-
lish some of the most fundamental freedoms held by Americans: the
freedom to write, print and distribute one's thoughts, ideas and opinions
without governmental interference.23 This freedom protects not only ex-
pression which conforms with the majority viewpoint, but, more impor-
tantly, that expression which may offend the general public or criticize
those in power.24
Historically, governments suppressed and censored disagreeable ex-
pression prior to its dissemination to the public. 25 Thus, to prevent the
22. U.S. CONST. amend. I; see supra note 4.
23. See J. LIEBERMAN, FREE SPEECH, FREE PRESS, AND THE LAW 9 (1980).
24. Id. at 12. In other words:
[Freedom of speech and the press means freedom not merely for the people whom
you admire and agree with; more importantly, it means freedom for the people you
hate and distrust. It can mean freedom for people who are saying mean and ugly
things, who are advocating dangerous policies, or who are willing to tell things that
many people believe ought to be kept secret.
Id. Furthermore, "[a]s a result, many people in the heat of the moment forget or ignore the
fundamental importance of free speech and a free press in order to shut up someone whom
they find obnoxious." Id.
25. See generally NOWAK, supra note 2, at 858-61.
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new American government from exercising prior restraints26 on publica-
tions with which it disagreed, the first amendment was ratified in 1791 to
constitutionalize the press' right to operate freely without the threat of
governmental censorship of the ideas and viewpoints published.
2 7
26. In general, "prior restraint" is the prohibition by the federal, state or local government
of the publication, distribution and/or production of objectionable expression. See generally
D. PEMBER, MASS MEDIA LAW 73 (1977). Stated another way, "[p]rior restraint is a matter
not of punishing someone after he speaks or publishes, but of stopping him before he has the
chance to do so." Id. (emphasis added). One should not be mislead by the simplicity of this
definition of prior restraint---commentators commonly agree that the doctrine of prior re-
straint is anything but clear and simple. See, e.g., L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONsTrrUTIONAL
LAW 725 n.12 (1978) (quoting Emerson, The Doctrine of Prior Restraint, 20 L. & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 648, 649 (1955) ("Despite an ancient and celebrated history, the doctrine of prior
restraints remains curiously confused and unformed.")).
27. See L. TRIBE, supra note 26, at 724 (citing Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 713
(1931)); see also New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 723-24 (1971) (per
curiam) (Douglas, J., concurring); Organization For A Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415,
419 (1971); Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963); Patterson v. Colorado, 205
U.S. 454, 462 (1907). Cf. Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 451-52 (1938) (prevention of
prior restraint a "leading purpose," not chief purpose in the adoption of the first amendment).
In Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931), the seminal prior restraint decision, the de-
fendant newspaper published articles charging that city officials were dishonest and had en-
gaged in racketeering. These officials subsequently sought to enjoin further publication of the
newspaper. Pursuant to a state statute which authorized the abatement as a public nuisance of
publications deemed "malicious, scandalous or defamatory," the trial court perpetually en-
joined the publishers from "producing, editing, publishing, circulating, having in their posses-
sion, selling or giving away" such publications. Id. at 706.
Under the statute, once an official brought the publisher to court, the burden rested on
the publisher to prove that the charges in the paper were true and were "published with good
motives and for justifiable ends." Id. at 713. If the publisher failed to meet this burden, then
the newspaper was suppressed and further publication constituted contempt of court. Id. The
government argued that the statute was not an unconstitutional prior restraint because the
publisher could stop an injunction by meeting the burden. Id. at 721. The Court flatly
responded:
If such a statute, authorizing suppression and injunction on such a basis, is constitu-
tionally valid, it would be equally permissible for the Legislature to provide that at
any time the publisher of any newspaper could be brought before a court, or even an
administrative officer... ,and required to produce proof of the truth of his publica-
tion, or of what he intended to publish and of his motive, or stand enjoined. If this
can be done, the Legislature may provide machineryfor determining in the complete
exercise of its discretion what are justifiable ends and restrain publication accord-
ingly. And it would be but a step to a complete system of censorship.
Id. The Court ultimately found the state's statutory system unconstitutional as it was philo-
sophically incompatible with the first amendment and constituted the "essence of censorship."
Id. at 713.
The Court relied heavily on the historical notions of press freedom in formulating its
ruling and adopted the view that the first amendment's guarantee of a free press was a mere
extension of the English common law ban on prior restraints. Id. at 713-17. In recognizing
"liberty of the press" as a constitutional right, the Court adopted English political theorist Sir
William Blackstone's view that the "liberty of the press is... essential to the nature of a free
state" and "consists in laying no previous restraints upon publications." Id. at 713 (quoting 4
W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *151-52) (emphasis in original). Accordingly, freedom of
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The freedom of the press, however, is not without limits. Despite
the United States Supreme Court's regard of prior restraints as "the most
serious and least tolerable infringement on First Amendment rights,"28 it
has nevertheless refused to apply an absolute ban on such restraints.2 9
The Court allows the imposition of prior restraint in extreme circum-
stances,30 such as obscenity31 or when national security is threatened.32
the press would be destroyed if free persons were denied their "undoubted right to lay what
sentiments [they] please before the public." Id. at 714 (quoting 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMEN-
TARIES *151-52).
Most legal scholars also regard the English common law as the foundation for the Ameri-
can prior restraint doctrine. See, eg., C. PRITCHETr, THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 333
(1977); L. TRIBE, supra note 26, at 724. According to Tribe, the First Congress' approval of
the first amendment "was undoubtedly intended to prevent government's imposition of any
system of prior restraints similar to the English licensing system under which nothing could be
printed without the approval of the state or church authorities." L. TRIBE, supra note 26, at
724 (footnote omitted).
28. Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 559 (1976).
29. The first amendment commands that "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the
freedom.., of the press. . . ." See supra note 3. Thus, if the first amendment is interpreted
as an absolute then any prior restraint on the press by Congress would be a violation of the first
amendment and, thus, unconstitutional. See generally NOWAK, supra note 2, at 865-67; D.
PEMBER, supra note 26, at 52-53. The majority of the Supreme Court has not adopted this
absolutist interpretation, however, and has stated repeatedly that the first amendment guaran-
tee is not absolute. See, Near, 283 U.S. at 708, 716; see also Nebraska Press Ass'n, 427 U.S. at
570; New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 726 (1971) (per curiam) (Brennan,
J., concurring); id. at 748 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). See generally K. DEVOL, MASS MEDIA
AND THE SUPREME COURT: THE LEGACY OF THE WARREN YEARS 34 (1976); NOWAK,
supra note 2, at 865-67; D. PEMBER, supra note 26, at 52-53.
30. Near, 283 U.S. at 716. The Near Court explained:
[T]he protection even as to previous restraint is not absolutely unlimited. But the
limitation has been recognized only in exceptional cases. "When a nation is at war
many things that might be said in time of peace are such a hindrance to its effort that
their utterance will not be endured so long as men fight and that no Court could
regard them as protected by any constitutional right." No one would question but
that a government might prevent actual obstruction to its recruiting service or the
publication of the sailing dates of transports or the number and location of troops.
On similar grounds, the primary requirements of decency may be enforced against
obscene publications. The security of the community life may be protected against
incitements to acts of violence and the overthrow by force of orderly government.
Id. (quoting Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919)) (citations and footnotes
omitted).
31. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973); see also infra note 371.
32. See New York Times Co., 403 U.S. 713 (Pentagon Papers case). In the Pentagon Pa-
pers case, the federal government sought to enjoin the New York Times from publishing ex-
cerpts of a top secret Vietnam military policy statement. The government argued that the
release of the papers might pose a threat to national security and should thus be restrained.
Most of the justices agreed that publication may be harmful to the nation, but reasoned that
"the First Amendment tolerates absolutely no prior judicial restraints of the press predicated
upon surmise or conjecture that untoward consequences may result from the publication of
material [which] 'could,' or 'might,' or 'may' prejudice the national interest in various ways."
Id. at 725-26 (Brennan, J., concurring); see also id. at 731 (White, J., concurring).
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But if the government attempts to impose a prior restraint, it must grant
the publisher access to the courts to challenge the restraint.33 Further-
more, the government must institute judicial proceedings against those
who wish to express themselves to assure that there will be prompt judi-
cial review of the censorship system.34
When any prior restraint does come before the courts, it comes with
a "heavy presumption against its constitutional validity"" and the gov-
ernment censor "carries [the] heavy burden of showing justification for
the imposition of such a restraint., 31 While this burden amounts to an
almost "blanket prohibition" against prior restraints, 7 the Court has not
foreclosed the ability of the government or private parties to obtain sanc-
tions against the press subsequent to the publication and distribution of
certain categories of expression which are not protected by the first
amendment 8 or which are protected but are outbalanced by some over-
33. See Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546 (1975); Blount v. Rizzi,
400 U.S. 410 (1971); Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965). Summarizing Freedman v.
Maryland, Professor Tribe stated that the following procedures are required by the first
amendment:
(1) The burden of proof must rest on the government to justify any restraint on free
expression prior to its judicial review and on government to demonstrate the particu-
lar facts necessary to sustain a limitation on expressive behavior; (2) The administra-
tor of a censorship of licensing scheme regulating speech activities must act within a
specified brief period of time; (3) The administrator of a censorship of licensing
scheme must be required, by statute or authoritative judicial construction, either to
issue a license or to go to court to restrain unlicensed expressive acts; mere denial
cannot create an enforceable legal bar to expressive activities; (4) No ex parte court
order is valid if an adversary hearing on the question of interim relief is practicable;
(5) "Any restraint imposed in advance of a final judicial determination on the merits
must be... limited to preservation of the status quo for the shortest fixed period
compatible with sound judicial resolution;" (6) A scheme of censorship or licensing
must assure a "prompt final judicial decision" reviewing any "interim and possibly
erroneous denial of a license;" (7) If a prior restraint is ordered by a court, the state
must either stay the order pending its appeal or provide immediate appellate review.
L. TRIBE, supra note 26, at 734-36 (citing and quoting in part Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S.
51, 58-59 (1968)) (footnotes omitted).
34. See supra note 33.
35. New York Times Co., 403 U.S. at 714 (quoting Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372
U.S. 58, 70 (1963)). Prior restraints are presumptively unconstitutional because of the "chil-
ling" effect that they have on the freedoms of speech and of the press. As the Court has noted,
"[i]f it can be said that a threat of criminal or civil sanctions after publication 'chills' speech,
prior restraint 'freezes' it at least for the time." Nebraska Press Ass'n, 427 U.S. at 559 (footnote
omitted). Accordingly, the Court has held that "[tihe loss of First Amendment freedoms, even
for minimal periods of time, unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury." Elrod v. Burns,
427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976). See also infra note 39.
36. New York Times Co., 403 U.S. at 714 (quoting Organization for a Better Austin v.
Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419 (1971)).
37. Nebraska Press Ass'n, 427 U.S. at 594 (Brennan, J., concurring).
38. See Near, 283 U.S. at 715, 717. See generally New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376
U.S. 254 (1964).
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riding governmental interest. The Supreme Court, in comparing prior
restraint and subsequent punishment, determined that punishment after
the publication of the speech is to be preferred over the extinguishment
of speech before it is heard or read. The Court reasoned:
Behind the distinction is a theory deeply etched in our law: a
free society prefers to punish the few who abuse the rights of
speech after they break the law than to throttle them and all
others beforehand. It is always difficult to know in advance
what an individual will say, and the line between legitimate and
illegitimate speech is often so finely drawn that the risks of free
wheeling censorship are formidable.39
While the government may not prohibit expression outright, it may
reasonably regulate the time, place or manner of expression occurring on
public property if it does so without regard to the content of the expres-
sion." To prevent governmental abuse of this regulatory power and to
assure that a regulation is reasonable, the courts will independently de-
termine if the regulation was drawn with "narrow specificity."', In other
words, the regulation must be the narrowest means of protecting the in-
terests involved; it must not be overbroad,42 and it must not be so vague
as to include protected speech within the prohibition or leave an individ-
ual without clear guidance as to the type of speech for which the speaker
39. Southeastern Promotions, 420 U.S. at 559 (citation omitted) (emphasis in original).
The Supreme Court also noted:
A system of prior restraint is in many ways more inhibiting than a system of subse-
quent punishment: It is likely to bring under government scrutiny a far wider range
of expression; it shuts off communication before it takes place; suppression by a
stroke of the pen is more likely to be applied than suppression through a criminal
process; the procedures do not require attention to the safeguards of the criminal
process; the system allows less opportunity for public appraisal and criticism; the
dynamics of the system drive toward excesses, as the history of all censorship shows.
Nebraska Press Ass'n, 427 U.S. at 589-90 (quoting T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF
EXPRESSION 506 (1970) (footnote omitted)).
40. NOWAK, supra note 2, at 977. See, eg., Madison Joint School Dist. v. Wisconsin
Employment Relations Comm'n, 429 U.S. 167, 176 (1976) ("when the [school] board sits in
public meetings to conduct public business and hear the views of citizens, it may not be re-
quired to discriminate between speakers on the basis of ... the content of their speech").
41. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963) (citing Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S.
296, 311 (1940)). The actual degree of specificity required is determined by the nature of the
"forum" in which the speech in question is to take place. The Supreme Court recently identi-
fied three types of "forums": (1) a traditional public forum; (2) a limited public forum; and (3)
a nonpublic forum. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and Educ. Fund, 105 S. Ct. 3439,
3449 (1985); Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45-46 (1983).
See infra notes 277-89 and accompanying text for a general discussion of the forum theory; see
also infra notes 290-321 and accompanying text for a discussion of decisions catagorizing pub-
lic high school publications as limited public forums.
42. See infra note 458 and accompanying text.
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or publisher can be punished.43
Although the first amendment originally served only as a limitation
on actions taken by the federal government, the Supreme Court deter-
mined that since the freedoms of expression and press are fundamental to
the well-being of the American system of democracy, the first amend-
ment should also limit the actions of state and local governments.'
Thus, through the fourteenth amendment, citizens' first amendment
guarantees of free speech and press are protected against infringment by
state and local governments.45 Therefore, state legislators, school board
members, public school officials and teachers, as agents of the state or
local government, should not be able to make or enforce any law abridg-
ing the first amendment free expression and press rights of the nation's
young citizens.46
43. See Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566 (1974). In Goguen, the defendant sewed a small
United States flag to the seat of his pants and was convicted of violating a state flag-misuse
statute. Id. at 568-70. The Court overturned the conviction on the grounds that the statute
was vague. The Court explained that
[the void for vagueness doctrine] incorporates notions of fair notice or warning....
[I]t requires legislatures to set reasonably clear guidelines for law enforcement offi-
cials and triers of fact in order to prevent "arbitrary and discriminatory enforce-
ment." Where a statute's literal scope, unaided by a narrowing state court
interpretation, is capable of reaching expression sheltered by the First Amendment,
the doctrine demands a greater degree of specificity than in other contexts.
Id. at 572-73 (footnotes omitted).
44. In Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925), the United States Supreme Court de-
clared that "freedom of speech and of the press-which are protected by the First Amendment
from abridgment by Congress-are among the fundamental personal rights and 'liberties' pro-
tected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from impairment by the
States." Id. at 666.
45. See id.
46. See infra text accompanying note 80. As a general rule, the United States Constitution
only limits the power of the government in its dealings with individuals-the first amendment
protections from government and its agents do not apply to actions by individuals acting in a
purely private capacity. Therefore, students attending private schools do not enjoy the same
federal constitutional protections from private school officials and teachers as do their public
school counterparts. Generally speaking, private school officials may restrict student expres-
sion to any extent that they desire without violating the Constitution. See generally R. TRA-
GER & D. DICKERSON, COLLEGE STUDENT PRESS LAW 11-13 (1976); 1 J. RAPP, EDUCATION
LAW § 3.05(4)(b)(iii)(A)(C) (1985).
In order for actions by purely private individuals or entities to be limited by the federal
constitution, a court must find that the actor's conduct constituted governmental or "state
action" of a type regulated by a constitutional provision. See NOWAK, supra note 2, at 497.
See generally Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961) (private action
may become state action when "to some significant extent the State in any of its manifestations
has been found to have become involved").
In the private school context, the courts have rejected the argument that "private" action
becomes "state" action when the school receives substantial public funding. Rendell-Baker v.
Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 832 (1982) (public funds constituted 90-99% of the private high school's
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B. California Constitution, Article I, Section 2(a)
In addition to the protection afforded by the first amendment to the
United States Constitution, California citizens' free expression and press
rights are also protected by the California Constitution. Article I, sec-
tion 2(a) of the California Constitution guarantees that "[e]very person
may freely speak, write and publish his or her sentiments on all subjects,
being responsible for the abuse of this right. A law may not restrain or
abridge liberty of speech or press."47
Like the first amendment, the purpose of article I, section 2(a) was
to abolish governmental censorship48 and to constitutionalize society's
substantial interest in vigorously protecting the right to comment on is-
sues of public concern.49 Article I, section 2(a) is not, however, merely an
operating budget); Grossner v. Trustees of Columbia Univ., 287 F. Supp. 535, 546 (S.D.N.Y.
1968) (public funds constituted 40-45% of the private university's income).
The courts also have rejected the argument that private schools are state actors because
they are performing a "public function," i.e., education. Rendell-Baker, 457 U.S. at 842;
Grossner, 287 F. Supp. at 549. The Supreme Court in Rendell-Baker also was not persuaded
by the fact that the school was heavily regulated and closely supervised by the state and pro-
vided a substitute for required public education. 457 U.S. at 848 (Marshall, J., dissenting),
While private school students may have difficulty bringing a federal constitutional claim,
they may have a claim under the California Constitution. In Gay Law Students Association v.
Pacific Telephone & Telegraph Co., 24 Cal. 3d 458, 595 P.2d 592, 156 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1979), the
California Supreme Court extended the "state action" doctrine and held that a private business
could not constitutionally discriminate against private parties in making its employment deci-
sions. The court pointed out that "Article I, section 7, subdivision (a) of the California Consti-
tution provides simply that: 'A person may not be deprived of life, liberty or property without
due process of law or denied equal protection of the laws."' Id. at 468, 595 P.2d at 598, 156
Cal. Rptr. at 20 (emphasis added by court). The court noted that the "explicit language" of
the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution operated as "restrictions on the
actions of states." Id. (footnote omitted) (emphasis added). By contrast, the court found that
"the California Constitutional provision contains no such explicit 'state action' requirement."
Id. at 468, 595 P.2d at 598, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 20.
By a parity of reasoning, California's private school students may argue that private
school administrators are constitutionally proscribed from interfering with the students' free
expression and press rights since article I, § 2(a) provides that "[e]very person may freely
speak, write and publish," and does not mention the state. See infra note 52 for a discussion of
the various clauses of article I, § 2(a) and how they interact.
47. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. a. See supra note 4.
48. Dailey v. Superior Court, 112 Cal. 94, 97, 44 P. 458, 459 (1896) (man on trial for
murder sought and received from trial court an injunction prohibiting performance of play
based upon facts of his case). The Dailey court relied on Blackstone, see supra note 27, and
other legal commentators in overturning the injunction as an unconstitutional prior restraint.
Id. at 98, 44 P. at 459-60.
49. Wilson v. Superior Court, 13 Cal. 3d 652, 658, 532 P.2d 116, 120, 119 Cal. Rptr. 468,
472 (1975) ("In this state [the courts] have consistently viewed with great solicitude the right
to uninhibited comment on public issues."). The California Supreme Court recognized a
"'profound national commitment'" to the principle that debate on public issues be " 'uninhib-
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analog to the first amendment- ° Early California courts indicated that
the drafters of the California Constitution could have adopted the federal
standard, 1 yet chose instead to create a standard "more definitive and
inclusive than the First Amendment." 2 This broad protection afforded
by the California provision signifies the "special dignity accorded the
fights of free speech and free press under the California Constitution."53
The California Supreme Court has interpreted article I, section 2(a)
of the California Constitution to mean that the "fight of the citizen[s] to
freely speak, write, and publish [their] sentiments is unlimited," and that
citizens "shall have no censor over [them] to whom [they] must apply for
permission to speak, write, or publish."5 4 In other words, "[a]lthough
ited, robust, and wide-open."' Id. (quoting New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80
(1964)).
50. U.C. Nuclear Weapons Labs Conversion Project v. Lawrence Livermore Laboratory,
154 Cal. App. 3d 1157, 1163, 201 Cal. Rptr. 837, 843 (1984). There, the court noted that "the
California Constitution does not mirror the First Amendment either in form or content." Id.
(emphasis in original). Instead, the court "draw[s] on both provisions for the analysis required
in this state." Id. When the California courts undertake a state constitutional analysis,
"[federal principles are relevant but not conclusive so long as federal rights are protected." Id.
(quoting Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Center, 23 Cal. 3d 899, 909, 592 P.2d 341, 346, 153
Cal. Rptr. 854, 863 (1979), aff'd, 447 U.S. 74 (1980)).
51. Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Center, 23 Cal. 3d 899, 908, 592 P.2d 341, 346, 153
Cal. Rptr. 854, 859 (1979), aff'd, 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
52. Id. (quoting Wilson v. Superior Court, 13 Cal. 3d 652, 658, 532 P.2d 116, 120, 119 Cal.
Rptr. 468, 472 (1975)); Pines v. Tomson, 160 Cal. App. 3d 370, 394, 206 Cal. Rptr. 866, 881
(1984) (quoting Wilson v. Superior Court, 13 Cal. 3d 652, 658, 532 P.2d 116, 120, 119 Cal.
Rptr. 468, 472 (1975)); see also Dailey, 112 Cal. at 98, 44 P. at 460.
The court in Pines v. Tomson determined that the section is "comprised of three subparts:
(1) an affirmation that all persons may freely speak, write and publish their 'sentiments,' (2) a
provision allowing for liablility once that right is abused and (3) a prohibition against laws
which infringe freedom of speech or the press." 160 Cal. App. 3d at 393, 206 Cal. Rptr. at
880-81. The court concluded that "[o]nly the third subpart is paralleled, more or less in the
federal constitution ('Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom of speech or of the
press . . . .')." Id., 206 Cal. Rptr. at 881.
According to the court the "first subpart of the section, '[e]very person may freely speak,
write and publish his or her sentiments on all subjects,' is qualified only by the second subpart
which provides for responsibility after the fact if that right is abused." Id. (emphasis in
original).
53. Laguna Publishing Co. v. Golden Rain Found., 131 Cal. App. 3d 816, 853, 182 Cal.
Rptr. 813, 835 (1982) (emphasis in original).
54. Pines, 160 Cal. App. 3d at 394, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 881 (quoting Dailey v. Superior
Court, 112 Cal. 94, 97, 44 P. 458, 459 (1896)). The Dailey court, in an often quoted passage,
declared that:
The wording of [article I, section 2(a)] is terse and vigorous, and its meaning so plain
that construction is not needed. The right of the citizen to freely speak, write, and
publish his sentiments is unlimited, but he is responsible at the hands of the law for
an abuse of that right. He shall have no censor over him to whom he must apply for
permission to speak, write, or publish, but he shall be held accountable to the law for
what he speaks, what he writes, and what he publishes. It is patent that this right to
speak, write, and publish, cannot be abused until it is exercised, and before it is exer-
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the section does not use the term 'prior restraint,' the plain meaning of
the first sentence of article I, section 2(a) is that 'sentiments' are pro-
tected from any pre-publication sanctions, that is, from all prior re-
straints."55 Therefore, unlike the first amendment, article I, section 2(a)
creates an absolute ban on prior restraints. 6 If the rights are abused,
however, the abuser will be held "accountable to the law for what he
speaks, what he writes, and what he publishes," but only after the exer-
cise of those rights. 7
The California Supreme Court has determined, however, that the
California government may impose reasonable time, place and manner
restrictions on expression occurring on state property.58 As under the
federal standard, the state or local regulations may not be vague or
overbroad.59
C. Recognizing Students' Free Expression Rights in Public Schools
Under a literal interpretation of the first amendment to the United
States Constitution and article I, section 2(a) of the California Constitu-
tion, state legislators, school board members, public school officials and
cised there can be no responsibility. The purpose of this provision of the constitution
was the abolishment of censorship, and for courts to act as censors is directly violative
of that purpose. This provision of the constitution as to freedom of speech varies
somewhat from that of the constitution of the United States, and also more or less
from the provisions of many state constitutions treating of this question; but, if there
is a material difference in the various provisions, it works no harm to this petitioner,
for the provision here considered is the broader, and gives him greater liberty in the
exercise of the right granted.
Dailey, 112 Cal. at 97-98, 44 P.2d at 459 (emphasis added).
55. Pines, 160 Cal. App. 3d at 393, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 881 (citing Dailey v. Superior Court,
112 Cal. 94, 97, 44 P. 457, 459 (1896)).
56. See Dailey, 112 Cal. at 97, 44 P. at 459.
57. Pines, 160 Cal. App. 3d at 394, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 881 (quoting Dailey v. Superior
Court, 112 Cal. 94, 97, 44 P. 457, 459 (1896)).
58. See Robins, 23 Cal. 3d at 909, 592 P.2d at 347, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 860. In Robins v.
Pruneyard Shopping Center, the private owners of a shopping center denied high school stu-
dents use of the shopping center premises to solicit signatures for a petition to the state govern-
ment. Id. at 902, 592 P.2d at 342, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 855. The students sought to enjoin that
denial of access. Id. The California Supreme Court held that "the California Constitution
protect[s] speech and petitioning, reasonably exercised, in shopping centers even when the
centers are privately owned." Id. at 910, 592 P.2d at 347, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 860. The court
added that in so holding, they did not mean to "imply that those who wish to disseminate ideas
have free rein." Id. Accordingly, the court held that private "property owners as well as
government may regulate speech as to time, place, and manner." Id.
59. Id.; see also supra notes 40-44 and accompanying text. See generally Morrison v. State
Bd. of Educ., 1 Cal. 3d 214, 231, 461 P.2d 375, 392, 82 Cal. Rptr. 175, 192 (1969) ("[c]ivil as
well as criminal statutes must be sufficiently clear to give a fair warning of the conduct prohib-
ited and they must provide a standard or guide against which conduct can be uniformly judged
by courts and administrative agencies.").
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teachers may not exercise prior restraint over student publications.6 °
The courts, however, did not apply any semblance of that idea for nearly
a half century after their rejection of prior restraints of the adult press.61
During this period, students did not have any recognized constitutional
rights, let alone free speech and press rights.6" Instead, it was generally
accepted that school officials stood in the stead of parents, i.e., in loco
parentis, and thus had parent-like authority to control all student con-
duct and expression.63
1. Early developments
In 1915, a California court allowed a school board to expel a high
school student for making disrespectful remarks about school authorities
during a school assembly." The student criticized the school adminis-
tration for compelling the student body to hold its meetings, social events
and class productions in an unsafe and potentially fire hazardous
building.6
There, the student's constitutional right to freely express himself
was neither argued by the student nor discussed by the court. The court
simply stated what was then the obvious: students in school, as in their
families, have an "obligation of obedience to lawful commands, subordi-
nation and civil deportment, respect for the rights of others and fidelity
to duty."66 The court determined that these obligations were "inherent
in any proper school system" and constituted the "common law of the
school."67 Relying on this "common law of the school" concept, the
60. See infra notes 242-43 and accompanying text; see also STUDENT PRESS LAW
CENTER, LAW OF THE STUDENT PRESS 8 (1985) [hereinafter LAW OF THE STUDENT PRESS].
The LAW OF THE STUDENT PRESS booklet is available from Quill and Scroll, School of Jour-
nalism and Mass Communication, University of Iowa, Iowa City, IA 52242.
61. See generally R. FREEMAN, PUBLIC EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES: FROM
REVOLUTION TO REFORM 79 (1978).
62. Id. at 81.
63. The term "in loco parents" means "[iln the place of a parent, instead of a parent;
charged, factitiously, with a parent's rights, duties, and responsibilities." BLACK'S LAW DIC-
TIONARY 708 (5th ed. 1979). See generally In re Donaldson, 292 Cal. App. 2d 509, 513, 75
Cal. Rptr. 220, 223 (1969). In validating the search of a student's locker, the court reasoned
that the school stands in loco parentis and shares, in matters of discipline, the parent's right to
use force in obtaining obedience. See infra notes 70-73 and accompanying text.
64. Wooster v. Sunderland, 27 Cal. App. 51, 148 P. 959 (1915).
65. Id. at 52-53, 148 P. at 959. The student also denounced the school officials' prohibi-
tion of an annual student event known as a "donkey fight." Id. at 53-54, 148 P. at 959. Dur-
ing his address to the student body, the student declared that it "was not fair of the board of
education to forbid a donkey fight, in which the boys took their own chances of being injured,
and force them to take chances of being injured in a fire trap." Id.
66. Id. at 55, 148 P. at 960.
67. Id.
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court found that the student's conduct amounted to "insubordination to
constituted authority.""8 Accordingly, the court held that the school of-
ficials had full authority to expel the student to assure that "the discipline
of the school... be maintained unimpaired by anything that was said
and done by the [student]."69
The position adopted by this early California court, that school offi-
cials possess almost absolute authority over students, exemplifies the ju-
dicially created in loco parentis doctrine.7 0 By rationalizing that during
the school day school officials acted in loco parentis,7 the courts found
constitutional nearly all school actions imposing regulations designed to
protect the morals, welfare and safety of students72 or punishing students
for misconduct, irrespective of the actions' connection to or impact on
student expression. 73  Consequently, any attempt at that time to chal-
lenge the school's broad regulatory authority over students on the
ground that students possessed constitutional rights of free expression
would have been met by the courts with incredulity.
It was not until 1940 that students' rights were judicially recog-
nized. In West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette,4 the
United States Supreme Court struck down a compulsory flag salute stat-
68. Id.
69. Id. at 56, 148 P. at 961.
70. See generally Mawdsley, In Loco Parentis: A Balancing of Interests, 61 ILL. B.J. 638
(1973); see also Project, Education and the Law: State Interests and Individual Rights, 74
MICH. L. REv. 1373, 1455-56 (1977).
71. See supra note 63.
72. See generally W. WADLINGTON, C. WHITEBREAD & S. DAVIS, CHILDREN IN THE
LEGAL SYSTEM 277-80 (1982).
73. Id. In recent decisions, the United States Supreme Court appears to be taking a more
conservative view of students' rights and, in fact, regressing back to the days when the in loco
parentis doctrine ruled. See, e.g., Bethel School Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 106 S. Ct. 3159
(1986), discussed infra notes 376-95 and accompanying text. But see New Jersey v. T.L.O.,
469 U.S. 325 (1985). In T.L.O., the Court determined that school officials need only satisfy a
"reasonableness" test instead of the stricter adult standard of "probable cause" to justify the
search of a student's purse. Id. at 341-42. The Court nevertheless rejected the argument that
"[t]eachers and school administrators ... act in loco parentis in their dealings with students:
their authority is that of the parent, not the State, and is therefore not subject to the limits of
the Fourth Amendment." Id. at 336 (citations omitted). The Court instead held that "[s]uch
reasoning is in tension with contemporary reality and the teachings of [the] Court." Id. The
majority pointed out that the Court had "held school officials subject to the commands of the
First Amendment [in Tinker] and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment [in
Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975)]." Id. The Court further noted that "'the concept of
parental delegation' as a source of school authority is not entirely 'consonant with the compul-
sory education laws.'" Id. (quoting Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 666 (1977)). As such,
the Court concluded that "[tioday's public school officials do not merely exercise authority
voluntarily conferred on them by individual parents; rather, they act in furtherance of publicly
mandated educational and disciplinary policies." Id.; see also infra note 382.
74. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
1072
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ute and ruled that elementary and secondary public school students have
the right under the first amendment to refuse to salute the flag and recite
the Pledge of Allegience.75
The West Virginia statute regarded a student's refusal to salute the
flag as an act of insubordination and treated it accordingly-with expul-
sion."6 By this time the persuasiveness of the in loco parentis doctrine
had waned somewhat and the courts were instead espousing a new the-
ory of education: the "indoctrination" theory. Under this theory, a
school's function is to "indoctrinate" school children with American val-
ues and morals.77
The West Virginia State Board of Education argued that since the
compulsory flag salute law was enacted "'for the purpose of teaching,
fostering and perpetuating the ideals, principles and spirit of American-
75. Id. at 642.
76. Id. at 626, 629.
77. The two rationales are not necessarily mutually exclusive. The Court has recently
applied both theories. See supra note 73 for a recent discussion of the in locoparentis rationale.
The indoctrination of American values rationale was recently espoused by the Court in Bethel
School District No. 403 v. Fraser, 106 S. Ct. 3159. In Fraser, the Supreme Court examined the
role and purpose of the American public school system and determined that "'public educa-
tion must prepare pupils for citizenship in the Republic.... It must inculcate the habits and
manners of civility as values in themselves conducive to happiness and as indispensable to the
practice of self-government in the community and the nation.'" Id. at 3164 (quoting C.
BEARD & M. BEARD, NEW BASIC HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 228 (1968)). The Fraser
Court noted that the Court inAmbach v. Norwick made a similar determination in finding that
"the objectives of public education [are] the 'inculcat[ion of] fundamental values necessary to
the maintenance of a democratic political system."' Id. at 3164 (quoting Ambach v. Norwick,
441 U.S. 68, 76-77 (1979)). See infra note 382 for the Fraser Court's discussion of the in loco
parentis doctrine.
Similarly, in addressing the constitutionality of library book removals from public high
schools, a plurality of the United States Supreme Court determined that a primary function of
the school is to inculcate society's values and help children to become fully adjusted adults.
Board of Educ., Island Trees Union Free School Dist. No. 26 v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 864 (1982)
(plurality opinion). According to the Court, schools are responsible for both transmitting the
necessary information and techniques of learning and instilling citizenship, discipline and ac-
ceptable morals. Id.
The different theories of education have been discussed extensively in connection with the
controversy surrounding book removals from public school libraries. See F. DUTILE, SEX,
SCHOOLS AND THE LAW 3-34, 71-89, 186-97 (1986), for a discussion of the theories of educa-
tion and how the courts have applied them with regard to library censorship and student press
censorship; see also Freeman, The Supreme Court and First Amendment Rights of Students in
the Public School Classroom: A Proposed Model of Analysis, 12 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1
(1984); Comment, School Library Censorship: First Amendment Guarantees and the Student's
Right to Know, 57 J. URB. L. 523 (1980); Comment, Not on Our Shelves: A First Amendment
Analysis of Library Censorship in the Public Schools, 61 NEB. L. REv. 98 (1982); Comment,
What Will We Tell the Children? A Discussion of Current Judicial Opinion on the Scope of
Ideas Acceptable for Presentation in Primary and Secondary Education, 56 TUL. L. REv. 960
(1982).
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ism, and increasing the knowledge of the organization and machinery of
the government,' "the law was constitutional.7" The Supreme Court dis-
agreed, reasoning that compelling school children to participate in the
flag ceremony infringed on the constitutional rights of students because it
coerced them to accept and orally affirm political beliefs and ideas with
which they might not agree.7 9 The Court declared that the Constitution
"protects the citizen against the State itself and all of its creatures-
Boards of Education not excepted." 0 The local boards of education have
"important, delicate, and highly discretionary functions," but, according
to the Court, "none that they may not perform within the limits of the
Bill of Rights.""1 The Court reasoned that since schools are "educating
the young for citizenship" there is ample reason for "scrupulous protec-
tion" of the constitutional freedoms of the students so as not to "strangle
the free mind at its source and teach youth to discount important princi-
ples of our government as mere platitudes." 2
The Barnette decision is significant not only because it is the first
case in which the Supreme Court recognized that school children have
first amendment rights, but also because it specifically overruled the ear-
lier decision in Minersville School District v. Gobitis. 3 The Gobitis Court
had erroneously held that the states and school officials had absolute au-
thority to regulate student expression regarding the flag salute and
Pledge of Allegience. 4 That Court justified its "hands off" position by
declaring that "the courtroom is not the arena for debating issues of edu-
cational policy," and, moreover, that the Court should not be the "school
board for the country."85
In overruling the Gobitis decision, the Barnette Court began eroding
the notion that the states and school officials were immune from judicial
scrutiny regarding the enactment and enforcement of educational poli-
cies and regulations. Setting the stage for the future development of stu-
dents' rights, the Court proclaimed:
If there is any fixed star in our constellation, it is that no
78. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 625 (quoting W. VA. CODE § 1734 (Supp. 1941)).
79. Id. at 642.
80. Id. at 637, cited with approval in Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School
Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 507 (1969) (emphasis added).
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. 310 U.S. 586 (1939), rev'd, West Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642
(1942). See Comment, Tinker's Legacy: Freedom of the Press in Public High Schools, 28
DEPAUL L. REV. 387, 388-401 (1979), for a more detailed discussion of the development of
students' constitutional rights.
84. Id. at 597-98.
85. Id. at 598.
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official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in
politics, nationalism, religion or other matters of opinion or
force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein. If
there are any circumstances which permit an exception, they do
not now occur to us.
8 6
2. The Tinker decision
Although the Barnette Court took the first step toward acknowledg-
ing students' first amendment rights, the Supreme Court did not specifi-
cally recognize students' free expression rights until 1969, when it
decided Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District."7
The question before the Court was whether public school administrators
could stifle on-campus student expression with which they disagreed or
thought might be controversial. 8 The Court declared that school offi-
cials possessed no such power, as students have first amendment rights to
express themselves peacefully on school grounds.8 9
The Tinker action arose after school administrators punished junior
and senior high school students for wearing black armbands to school in
protest of the Vietnam war.90 The principals in the Des Moines school
district learned of the planned protest and adopted a policy prohibiting
any student from wearing an armband to school. When the students re-
fused to remove their armbands, they were suspended.91 The students
then sued the school officials claiming a violation of their first amend-
ment right to freely express themselves.92
In ruling, the Supreme Court recognized that school officials had
86. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642 (footnote omitted).
87. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
88. Id. at 504-05, 507-08, 510.
89. Id. at 511.
90. Id. at 504.
91. Id.
92. Id. The students brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. They prayed for an injunction
restraining the school officials and school district board of directors from disciplining the stu-
dents. The students also sought nominal damages. Id.
The district court acknowledged that "the wearing of an armband for the purpose of
expressing certain views is the type of symbolic act that is within the Free Speech Clause of the
First Amendment." Id. at 505 (discussing the district court's findings). Nevertheless, the dis-
trict court dismissed the complaint and upheld the constitutionality of the school officials'
actions. Id. at 504-05. The district court reasoned that the officials' actions were justified
because they were taken to prevent disturbance of the school discipline. Id. (discussing the
district court's ruling).
On appeal, the court of appeals affirmed the decision of the district court without opinion.
Id. at 505 (citing Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 383 F.2d 988 (8th
Cir. 1967)).
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generally been given comprehensive authority to prescribe and control
conduct in the schools.9 3 The Court nevertheless declared that this au-
thority does not extend to administrative censorship of public school stu-
dents' nondisruptive expression.94 Students, according to the Court,
possess first amendment rights and do not "shed their constitutional
rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate." 95
The Court cautioned that although students' first amendment rights are
to be "applied in light of the special characteristics of the school environ-
ment," 96 the "state-operated schools may not be enclaves of totalitarian-
ism" where students are "confined to the expression of those sentiments
that are officially approved." 97
The Court rejected the lower court's findings that the school admin-
istrators' actions were justified since they were based on fears of distur-
bance from the wearing of the armbands. 98 Instead, the Court found that
"undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance is not enough to
overcome the right to freedom of expression." 99 A prohibition against
student expression or conduct will not stand unless the administrators
show that "engaging in the forbidden conduct would 'materially and sub-
stantially interfere with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the
operation of the school.' "o
93. Id. at 507.
94. Id. at 511.
95. Id. at 506.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 511.
98. Id. at 508; see supra note 92. In explaining its rejection of the district court's holding,
the Supreme Court noted that:
Any departure from absolute regimentation may cause trouble. Any variation from
the majority's opinion may inspire fear. Any word spoken, in class, in the lunch-
room, or on the campus, that deviates from the views of another person may start an
argument or cause a disturbance. But our Constitution says we must take'this risk,
... and our history says that it is this sort of hazardous freedom-this kind of open-
ness-that is the basis of our national strength and of the independence and vigor of
Americans who grow up and live in this relatively permissive, often disputatious,
society.
Id. at 508-09 (citations omitted).
99. Id. at 508.
100. Id. at 509 (quoting Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (5th Cir. 1966)). In Burnside
v. Byars, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit ruled that high school au-
thorities could not enforce a regulation forbidding students to wear "freedom buttons." 363
F.2d 744, 748-49 (5th Cir. 1966). The Tinker Court found it instructive that on the same day,
the same Fifth Circuit panel reached the opposite result on different facts. The Fifth Circuit
refused to enjoin enforcement of a similar regulation in another school where the students
wearing freedom buttons harassed students who did not wear the buttons and thereby created
a disturbance. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 505 n.1 (construing Blackwell v. Issaquena County Bd. of
Educ., 363 F.2d 749 (5th Cir. 1966)).
In focusing on these two seemingly inconsistent holdings, the Supreme Court demon-
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Although Tinker vitalized students' freedom to express themselves
on campus, it left unanswered an important question: whether adminis-
trative censorship of student publications, i.e., prior review and prior re-
straint,10 is constitutional in the public school setting.1
0 2
Since 1969, a number of lower federal courts have developed a sig-
nificant body of student press law in trying to decide this issue and, in
doing so, have applied and refined the Tinker Court's broad pronounce-
ments to fit within this unsettled area of the law.'0 3 Most of the nation's
public school officials and students are bound by this federal student
press case law. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
has decided several student expression cases, but all were based on the
first amendment; I°4 none considered the California Constitution or Cali-
strated that whether certain expression is potentially disruptive will almost always depend on
the environment or atmosphere of the school and not the specific language used by the stu-
dents or their intent. In Blackwell v. Issaquena County Board of Education, the court upheld
the ban after school authorities showed that the buttons were forced on unwilling students and
thrown through school windows, thus creating a substantial disturbance. 363 F.2d 749, 751-
53, 754 (5th Cir. 1966) (footnote omitted). On the other hand, in Burnside, the school officials
did not adequately show a disturbance. Instead, their only evidence was "a showing of mild
curiosity on the part of the other school children." Burnside, 363 F.2d at 748.
101. Prior restraint as it applies to the student press has been defined as any official interfer-
ence with student expression before that expression actually occurs or is published. C. Fager,
Ownership and Control of the Student Press: A First Amendment Analysis 15 (1976) (unpub-
lished manuscript prepared for the Student Press Law Center). Accordingly, school regula-
tions requiring or allowing official approval of student press copy before it is distributed
constitute prior restraint. Id. Also, any administrative censorship before distribution consti-
tutes a prior restraint. Id.
102. The United States Supreme Court will soon render the first decision regarding the
extent to which school administrators may constitutionally control student expression in offi-
cial student newspapers. See Kuhlmeier v. Hazelwood School Dist., 795 F.2d 1368 (8th Cir.
1986), cert. granted, 55 U.S.L.W. 3493 (U.S. Jan. 20, 1987) (No. 86-836). See infra note 299
for a discussion of the Kuhlmeier case.
103. For a discussion of these cases see L. INGELHART, PRESS LAW AND PRESS FREEDOM
FOR HIGH SCHOOL PUBLICATIONS: COURT CASES AND RELATED DECISIONS DISCUSSING
FREE EXPRESSION GUARANTEES AND LIMITATIONS FOR HIGH SCHOOL STUDENTS AND
JOURNALISTS (1986); LAW OF THE STUDENT PRESS, supra note 60, at 10-54 (1985); Annota-
tion, Validity Under Federal Constitution, of Public School or State College Regulation of Stu-
dent Newspapers, Magazines, or Other Publications-Federal Cases, 16 A.L.R. FED. 182 (1973
& Supp. 1986).
104. When compared with the decisions of other federal courts (except the Seventh Circuit
courts), see supra note 103, the Ninth Circuit and the district courts in the Ninth Circuit
appear to have taken an approach somewhat more protective of students' first amendment
rights. See San Diego Comm. Against Registration and the Draft (CARD) v. Governing Bd.,
790 F.2d 1471 (9th Cir. 1986) (school board violated first amendment when it excluded an-
tidraft advertisement from official school publication after creating limited public forum by
accepting military recruitment advertisements in publication); Fraser v. Bethel School Dist.
No. 403, 755 F.2d 1356 (9th Cir. 1985), rev'd, 106 S. Ct. 3159 (1986) (court of appeals held
that school district violated first amendment when it suspended a student without showing that
the student's use of sexual innuendo substantially disrupted educational process); Nicholson v.
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fornia Education Code section 48907.1°5 Furthermore, the California
courts have yet to develop sufficient student press law to meaningfully
guide administrators, teachers and students.10 6 But the public school dis-
tricts, officials and students in California do have another source of gui-
dance-the California Education Code.
III. THE CALIFORNIA SCHEME: LEGISLATING STUDENT
PRESS FREEDOM
A. Legislative History
In theory, the Tinker Court's broad pronouncements of students'
free expression rights also established free press rights for the nation's
students, including California's students. In practice, however, few
school districts in California altered their student publication policies to
reflect what was then an expansive interpretation of Tinker.107 School
Board of Educ. Torrance Unified School Dist., 682 F.2d 858 (9th Cir. 1982) (writers on high
school newspaper do not have unfettered constitutional right to be free from administrative
prepublication review-review of sensitive articles for accuracy rather than for possible censor-
ship does not implicate first amendment rights); Hatter v. Los Angeles City High School Dist.,
452 F.2d 673 (9th Cir. 1971) (students have right to hand out leaflets and wear buttons urging
fellow students to boycott school's annual chocolate drive as long as school not disrupted);
Pliscou v. Holtville Unified School Dist., 411 F. Supp. 842 (S.D. Cal. 1976) (prior restraint on
publications distributed on school premises cannot stand in absence of any criteria to be fol-
lowed by school authorities in determining whether to allow distribution and in absence of any
safeguard providing for expeditious review of school authorities' decisions); Poxon v. Board of
Educ., 341 F. Supp. 256 (E.D. Cal. 1971) (school rule requiring prior submission of non-school
sponsored publication for approval by school officials is unconstitutional prior restraint). But
see Baker v. Downey City Bd. of Educ., 307 F. Supp. 517 (C.D. Cal. 1969) (temporary suspen-
sion of high school students for use of profanity or vulgarity appearing in off-campus student
newspaper published by them and distributed to students outside main campus gate did not
violate suspended students' first amendment rights of freedom of speech).
105. Traditionally, students have brought suit in the federal courts to vindicate their rights
under the first amendment. Hence, questions regarding the applicability of state law to free
expression and press cases have been neither raised nor addressed. As a result, there may be
some inconsistencies between what school officials and students may do under the federal law
and what they may or may not do under California law. The Ninth Circuit decisions may,
however, serve as a guage to determine the extent to which student press rights in California
will be recognized.
106. Like the federal courts, the California courts also have not addressed student press
rights since the enactment of Education Code § 48907. But see supra note 102 & infra note
216.
107. Wiener, The Right to Make Waves: Free Press in the High Schools, NATION, Jan. 28,
1978, at 83; School Board to Weigh 'Free Press' Censorship: Principal's Right to Dictate Con-
tents of Newspaper at Stake, L.A. Times, Apr. 8, 1974, pt. II, at 1, col. 2 [hereinafter School
Board]. The Times article was written prior to the school board meeting at which the validity
of administrative censorship of student publications was to be discussed. The article focused
on the state of the student press in the Los Angeles public schools. According to a member of
the Commission of Inquiry Into High School Journalism, see supra note 5, Los Angeles ap-
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districts opposed to recognizing student press freedom argued that
Tinker applied only to student expression occurring outside the class-
room. Since the school-sponsored newspapers were produced inside the
classroom, many educators believed that the in-class activity and its
product-the newspaper-should be under the absolute control of school
officials.108 Although the Tinker decision did not seem to affect student
press rights at the local level, the California courts were not long in
adopting the Tinker rationale to reshape the California law governing
student expression.
1. An invitation to legislate: Rowe v. Campbell
Union High School District
Prior to Tinker, California public school students' publications were
regulated by sections 9012 and 9013 of the California Education Code.
Those statutes banned "partisan" and "propoganda" publications on
campuses. 109
peared to be "the only big-city district to balk at conforming to new court interpretations on
newspaper censorship." See School Board, supra, at 1, cols. 2-3. For example, the Times
writer reported that "[a]t one junior high school in Los Angeles ... the principal reads all the
stories for the student newspaper and he 'censors two and passes one' as a matter of routine."
Id. at col. 1. The writer also described the situation at an inner-city high school where approx-
imately 10% of the female students were mothers. There, the principal banned articles on
venereal disease, pregnancy and unwed motherhood. Id.
108. School Board, supra note 107, at 1, col. 2. According to the school board's legal coun-
sel, principals should retain censorship powers because "as part of the school curriculum news-
papers are subject to complete control by the board and its administrators." Id. This attitude
is still evident with today's administrators. See infra notes 134 & 176.
109. Former California Education Code § 9012 provided:
Except with respect to junior colleges, no publication of a sectarian, partisan, or
denominational character, shall be distributed, displayed, or used for sectarian, parti-
san, or denominational purposes on school premises, but such publications may be
used in school library collections and for legitimate instructional purposes.
Publications of a sectarian, partisan, or denominational character may be issued
and distributed for sectarian, partisan, or denominational purposes on the grounds
and premises of a junior college; provided, that such activity is carried on in a man-
ner which does not impede the orderly conduct of school classes and programs, and
shall be subject to rules and regulations of the governing board. Such rules and regu-
lations shall include a provision specifying that no publication which advocates the
commission of an unlawful act may be issued or distributed under this section.
CAL. EDUC. CODE § 9012 (1969) (repealed 1971), reprinted in STATE OF CALIFORNIA, CALI-
FORNIA LAWS, STATUTES, ETC. 531 (1969).
Former California Education Code § 9013 provided:
No bulletin, circular, publication, or article of any character, whose purpose is
to spread propaganda, shall be distributed or displayed to anyone, or suffered to be
distributed or displayed to anyone, for propaganda purposes on the school premises
during school hours or within one hour before the time of opening or within one
hour after the time of closing of the school, but such bulletin, circular, publication, or
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In Rowe v. Campbell Union High School District, '10 a case decided
shortly after Tinker, a three-judge court in the Northern District of Cali-
fornia found sections 9012 and 9013 unconstitutional. III The constitu-
tional challenge to the Education Code sections was brought by a public
high school student, David Rowe, whose principal denied him permis-
sion to distribute on campus a student newspaper dealing with student
activities, affairs and opinions. 12 The principal informed Rowe that
state law-sections 9012 and 9013-as well as school policy, 113 "prohib-
ited on-campus distribution without prior approval of form and content
by school officials." ' 14 Rowe was also informed that any attempt to dis-
article may be used in school library collections and for legitimate instructional pur-
poses.
During school hours or within one hour before the time of opening or within
one hour after the time of closing of the school, no bulletin, circular, publication, or
article of any character, the purpose of which is to foster membership in or subscrip-
tions to the funds of any organization not directly under the control of the school
authorities, shall be distributed or displayed to anyone or suffered to be distributed or
displayed to anyone on the school premises unless the organization is a nonpartisan
organization, the purpose of such distribution or display is a nonpartisan purpose,
and such distribution or display has been approved by the state board, or by the
county board of education, or by the governing board of the school district in which
the school is located.
The prohibition of this section shall not apply to bulletins or circulars concern-
ing the meetings of organizations issued by any parent-teacher association or by any
organization of parents formed for the purpose of cooperating with the school au-
thorities in improving school conditions in the district.
The prohibitions of this section shall not apply with respect to junior colleges;
provided that any such otherwise prohibited activity is carried on in a manner which
does not impede the orderly conduct of school classes and programs, and such activi-
ties shall be subject to rules and regulations of the governing board. Such rules and
regulations shall include a provision specifying that no material which advocates the
commission of an unlawful act may be issued or distributed under this section.
CAL. EDUC. CODE § 9013 (1969) (repealed 1971), reprinted in STATE OF CALIFORNIA, CALI-
FORNIA LAWS, STATUTES, ETC. 532 (1969).
110. No. 51060 (N.D. Cal. filed Sept. 4, 1970). The court issued two opinions: (1) Memo-
randum and Order, filed September 4, 1970 [hereinafter Rowe I] and (2) Memorandum and
Order Supplementing Memorandum and Order of September 4, 1970, filed February 4, 1971
[hereinafter Rowe I1]. Although these orders significantly impacted the development of Cali-
fornia student press law, neither opinion was certified for publication.
111. RoweI, No. 51060, slip op. at 10.
112. Id. at 1-2. The opinion did not include facts specifying the content of the Rowe's
newspaper, The Free Press.
113. The Campbell Union High School District's provision provided in pertinent part:
The distribution or publication of printed matter in any of the schools of this
District is hereby prohibited except in such instances where the person or groups
preparing, distributing or publishing the same has secured the written authority of
this Board so to do and has complied with Education Code Sections 16551, et seq.,
requiring identification and full disclosure of the nature or capacity of such person or
group desiring to distribute or publish the same.
Campbell Union High School Dist. Bd. Res. 170-R, adopted Mar. 27, 1962, quoted in Rowe I,
No. 51060, slip op. at 15 n.2.
114. Rowe I, No. 51060, slip op. at 2.
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tribute the paper in contravention of those rules, would result in suspen-
sion or other discipline."' Rowe ified an action against the school
officials and won a temporary restraining order preventing the officials
from "interfering with the distribution of [Rowe's] newspaper and from
disciplining [him] or others for such distribution." 116
In the summary judgment proceeding that followed, Rowe alleged
that sections 9012 and 9013 were unconstitutionally overbroad because
they prohibited protected as well as unprotected speech. 17 He also ar-
gued that the use of the terms "propoganda" and "partisan" rendered
the sections unconstitutionally vague. 11
In reviewing the code sections, the Rowe court pointed out that
"regulations which limit or prohibit speech must be drawn as narrowly
as possible so that the legitimate governmental object may be achieved
with the minimum burden on speech."119 The court added that this "ele-
mentary principle of constitutional law" applied to students. 2 ° Relying
on Tinker,' the court concluded that sections 9012 and 9013 were im-
permissibly overbroad since they prohibited expression whether or not it
created a disruption of legitimate educational activities. 122  The court
noted that under sections 9012 and 9013, "so innocent and innocuous a
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id at 3.
118. Id.
119. Id. (footnote omitted); see also supra note 41 and accompanying text.
120. Rowe I, No. 51060, slip op. at 3.
121. The Rowe court delineated the basic principles set forth by the Supreme Court in
Tinker as follows:
1. Students are "persons" within the meaning of the Constitution and are possessed
of fundamental rights which are not lost in school.
2. Students are not the "closed circuit" receipients [sic] of only that which the state
wishes to communicate; they may not be confined to officially-approved sentiments.
3. Student freedom of speech includes personal intercommunication of controver-
sial ideas.
4. School officials have the burden of showing constitutionally-valid justifications
for limitations on student speech.
5. A generalized fear or apprehension of a disturbance is not a constitutionally ade-
quate justification. A desire to avoid the expression of controversial or unpopular
ideas or the discomfort and unpleasantness which accompany them is not a constitu-
tionally adequate justification.
6. School officials must demonstrate that the prohibited speech would have actually
caused substantial and material disruption of, or interferance [sic] with, classwork, or
with the requirements of discipline appropriate to the operation of the school. Rea-
sonable time, place and manner regulations regarding expression of ideas orally or in
writing are permissible, as they are in any other public institution or facility.
Id. at 3-4 (summarizing Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969)). The
court also referred to numerous other lower federal court decisions which elaborated on and
developed these principles in the student press setting. See id. at 4, 15 n.4.
122. Id. at 5-4
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document as a leaflet explaining one's First Amendment rights or urging
students to write their Congressmen on some current issue would be, and
indeed have been, prohibited."' 23
In response to the overbreadth argument, the school district argued
that the statutes were valid as they were merely reasonable time, place
and manner regulations on student speech. 124 The court rejected this
argument, finding first that section 9012 was a "complete prohibition
rather than a regulatory provision." 125 Although section 9013 was not
on its face a total prohibition, the court reasoned that it was a prohibition
in effect because it excluded the time period when the "vast majority of
the desired [student] audience" was present and available for receiving
the communication. 126 Consequently, the court characterized sections
9012 and 9013 as unreasonable time, place and manner restrictions.
127
The school district also argued that the students' immaturity justi-
fied the restrictions of the statutes. 28 The court concluded that "while
immaturity is a valid reason for certain specific, well defined limitations
on high school students' rights, it cannot justify the comprehensive re-
strictions of [sections] 9012-13. ' '129 Moreover, the court found unpersua-
sive the district's in loco parentis argument finding instead that "[i]n the
area of political and social opinions.., the authority of school boards is
limited."'
130
Finally, the court dismissed the school district's arguments that the
123. Id. (footnote omitted). The court further noted that "[c]ampaign literature of the es-
tablished political parties would also violate the statutes. Even an article decrying environ-
mental pollution might be considered 'propoganda' or 'partisan' and therefore not
permissible." Id.
124. Id. at 5; see also supra note 40 and accompanying text.
125. Rowe I, No. 51060, slip op. at 5 (emphasis in original).
126. Id. at 6. The court also pointed out that "[tihe First Amendment includes the right to
receive as well as to disseminate information." Id. (citing Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381
U.S. 310 (1965)). The court noted that "'[it is patently unfair in light of the free speech
doctrine to close to the students the forum which they deem effective to present their ideas.
The rationale of Tinker carries beyond the facts in that case.'" Id. (quoting Zucker v. Panitz,
299 F. Supp. 102, 105 n.5 (S.D.N.Y. 1969)). Furthermore, the court was unpersuaded by the
argument that "the existence of an alternative forum or mode of expression permits suppres-
sion of the chosen one." Id. (citing Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. School Dist., 393 U.S. 503
(1969); Wirta v. Alameda-Contra Costa Transit Dist., 68 Cal. 2d 51, 434 P.2d 982, 64 Cal.
Rptr. 430 (1967)).
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 7.
130. Id. (footnote omitted). The school district also argued that the prohibitions in the
statutes were necessary because the student audience was a "captive audience." Id. at 7. The
court did not find merit in this argument because students were not "forced to take any of the
disputed publications." Id. Furthermore, the court stated that if a student attempted to force
material on another student, he could be punished. Id.
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"disruptions" of Rowe's newspapers justified the sections' prohibi-
tions.1 31 The court indicated that disruption arguments could be divided
into two categories: "intellectual" and "physical" disruption.132  The
school district's interest in freedom from intellectual disruption was
based on the belief that students are entitled to an "unimpaired" educa-
tion.'33 Thus, "the administration should have control over virtually all
of a student's intellectual experiences during the school hours in order to
insure the type of education it deems best."' 34 The school district argued
that the "disagreeable and sometimes impolite contents of the student
publications not authorized by the school officials 'disrupt' this con-
trolled situation."'3 5 Applying the Tinker "substantial disruption" stan-
dard,1 36 the court found this concept of disruption unacceptable.'
3 7
The court also rejected the other branch of the intellectual disrup-
tion argument which theorized that the distribution of student newspa-
pers "critical of the faculty and administration ... [would] impair the
effectiveness of the criticized parties by reducing students' respect and
confidence in them and undermining their authority."'3 8 The court ruled
that "the problems presented by such criticism do not justify the total
131. id. at 7-9.
132. Id. at 7-8.
133. Id. at 8.
134. Id. In his affidavit in the Rowe matter, then State Superintendent of Schools Max
Rafferty stated:
Since the most important teaching aid is the printed word, it follows also that the
school must have full control of that same printed word whenever and wherever it
wanders into the confines of the school itself ... [.] A school cannot live in an
internal environment which it does not itself govern, any more than a court can so
live .... It would be a sorry irony indeed if the school were compelled to use its own
immemorial weapon against the powers of ignorance to cut its own throat .... If a
school is not to control all publications within its walls and on its grounds, then the
lid is indeed off. Make way for stag films, filthy postcards, and the Memoirs of the
Marquis de Sade.
Affidavit of State Superintendent Max Rafferty, quoted in Weiner, Little-Known California
Case Influences Freedom of All High School Publications, SCHOOL PRESS REv., Dec. 1972, at
3.
135. Rowe I, No. 51060, slip op. at 8. (footnote omitted).
136. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
137. Rowe I, No. 51060, slip op. at 8. The court indicated that "[t]he fact that students may
think about the newspapers during class is not a 'disruption' justifying restriction." Id. (em-
phasis in original). The court recognized that "teachers unquestionably have the right to con-
trol class discussion and to discipline those who persist in talking about other things or refuse
to respond to questions regarding the subject matter of the discussion." Id. at 8-9. Accord-
ingly, the court found that "[t]hese are the narrower, more specific type of restrictions on
student communication that are proper and do relate to actual disruption of classwork or
discipline." Id. at 9.
138. Id.
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prohibition of [such criticism]."' 39
With regard to the physical disruptions alleged, the court required
that such disruptions be subject to narrower and more particular regula-
tion than that found in sections 9012 and 9013. 14 As for areas which the
school could control, the court suggested that littering could be prohib-
ited and punished and the time, place and manner of newspaper distribu-
tion could be regulated. 4 The court also added that disruption caused
by the advocacy of the violation of school rules "may be prohibited, and
like obscenity, may be part of a prior restraint scheme."142
Although the court believed the primary infirmity of the statutes to
be overbreadth, it also found that the statutes were "vague in the sense
that their terms [were] impermissibly unclear." '143 The court stated that
"[e]ven assuming, as we do not, that the school authorities could ban
'propoganda' or other 'partisan' materials, a person would be acting at
his peril in trying to ascertain what is prohibited." 144 This lack of clarity
was especially impermissible because suspension or expulsion could re-
sult from violation of the statutes.1 45 The court invalidated the school
regulation 46 as well, finding it unconstitutionally overbroad 41 and un-
able to meet the substantial disruption standard. It declined to reach the
issue of whether the regulation was an unconstitutional prior restraint. 48
In concluding, the court reemphasized that, although it voided sec-
tions 9012 and 9013, it did not preclude the school district from "enact-
ing and enforcing reasonable time, place and manner regulations or from
controlling certain aspects of the contents of student publications."'1
49
Although the court noted that the United States Supreme Court views
prior restraints with disfavor and requires certain procedural safeguards
when such restraints have been permitted, 5 ° it indicated that "a system
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id. (footnote omitted).
142. Id. (footnote omitted).
143. Id. at 10 (footnote omitted).
144. Id.
145. Id. (footnote omitted). The court noted that "[d]isciplinary rules do not have to be
drawn with the clarity required of criminal statutes. However, since serious penalties can
result from their enforcement, they must be sufficiently specific to reasonably warn students of
what is prohibited." Id. at 18 n.20 (citations omitted).
146. See supra note 113.
147. Rowe I, No. 51060, slip op. at 11. The court stated that the language used in the
regulation referring to "[a]ll printed materials" was overbroad as such materials "certainly
could not be deemed likely to cause types of disruption which can be prohibited." Id.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 12.
150. Id. (footnote omitted); see also supra note 33 and accompanying text.
1084
STUDENT PRESS CENSORSHIP
of prior review may be constitutionally permissible in the secondary
school setting."' 1  The court qualified its statement, however, by
stressing that "student communications cannot be prohibited because the
school officials disagree with what is being said or because they think
students should only be exposed to ideas which they approve."' 5 2 The
court then gave the school district ninety days to submit a proposed reg-
ulation concerning the distribution and dissemination of printed materi-
als on school grounds.'53
Although the Campbell school board adopted new regulations, it
still imposed extensive prior restraints on students who sought to dis-
tribute literature on campus.' 54 The same three-judge panel found the
proposed prior restraint system unconstitutional as "too encompassing
and potentially devastating to withstand constitutional scrutiny."' 55
In reviewing the proposed system, the court focused on the system's
lack of procedural safeguards' 56 and noted that "[w]hen a student pub-
lisher's interests are not economic, but political or social, and the effec-
tiveness of the item may be severely diminished by even a brief delay in
its distribution, it may be that even one day's restraint is an impermissi-
ble burden."'5 7 Hence, the Rowe court, apparently after reassessing its
previous suggestions, prophesied that "[i]t may be that no system of prior
restraint in the area of student publications can be devised which imposes
a restraint sufficiently short-lived and procedurally protected to be
constitutional."'1
5 8
The court did suggest, however, that "[w]hat may well be best-
although perhaps not constitutionally compelled-is a simple prohibition
against the distribution of certain catagories of material."' 5 9 According
151. Rowe I, No. 51060, slip op. at 11-12 (footnote omitted).
152. Id. at 11. The court added that:
Rules which appear arbitrary to students detract from the credibility of attempts
to instill rationality and individualism in them. Adherence to a rule which has not
been or cannot be justified may provoke or contribute to disorder in the schools.
The societal interest in allowing a free flow of information, allowing a person to
develop both socially and intellectually through expression, allowing dissent both as
a political safety valve and as a means of exposing error are applicable to children as
well as adults.
Id. (quoting Note, Public Secondary Education: Judicial Protection of Student Individuality,
42 S. CAL. L. REv. 126, 130-32 (1969)).
153. Id. at 12-13 (footnote omitted).
154. Rowe II, No. 51060, slip op. at 1-2.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 2.
157. Id. at 3 n.1.
158. Id. at 2 (emphasis added).
159. Id.
April 1987] 1085
1086 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 20:1055
to the court, the prohibition "could be coupled with the prior submission
of the material to school authorities for informational purposes only, and
with reasonable time, place, and manner regulations."' 60 This "straight-
forward system," the court believed, "would allow the unfettered distri-
bution of student publications except in those instances where the
content of the material is outside the protections of the First Amend-
ment."16' In those instances, the court suggested that "school authori-
ties could prevent distribution by prior court order."'1
62
The court added that school officials could seize objectionable mate-
rial without a court order; however, if they did so, they would be acting
"at their peril."16 The court further suggested that in situations "where
the content is unobjectionable but there is an infraction of reasonable
regulations controlling the manner of distribution, the student could...
be disciplined in the same manner as for infractions of any duly adopted
school regulation."'" After setting forth what it considered to be the
constitutional parameters of student press regulation, the court invited
the State Board of Education to promulgate statewide guidelines in this
area.' 
65
160. Id.
161. Id. As examples of proper standards, the court suggested "obscenity, criminal libel,
advocacy of law-breaking or inciting to violence." Id. at 3.
162. Id. at 2 (footnote omitted).
163. Id. at 4 n.2.
164. Id. at 2.
165. In its order dated September 4, 1970, the Rowe court requested that the State Depart-
ment of Education and the State Board of Education "promulgate guidelines for the distribu-
tion of printed material on high school campuses which would be in the form of
recommendations to all of the school districts within the State and that these guidelines be
submitted to this Court for approval .... ." Rowe I, No. 51060, slip op. at 3. The Rowe I1
court repeated this request. Rowe 11, No. 51060, slip op. at 3.
On March 11, 1971, following the Rowe decisions, the State Superintendent of Public
Instruction submitted a draft of student publication guidelines to a committee of the State
Board of Education. The State Board recommended that those guidelines be presented to the
Rowe court for its approval. On June 23, following a hearing on the matter, the court ap-
proved the guidelines as amended by the court. See Bright v. Los Angeles Unified School
Dist., 18 Cal. 3d 450, 460, 556 P.2d 1090, 1096, 134 Cal. Rptr. 639, 645 (1976).
In the meantime, the California Legislature was preparing to enact § 10611 of the Califor-
nia Education Code (Senate Bill No. 890). See infra note 166 and accompanying text. The
State Superintendent of Public Instruction wrote a memorandum to the State Board of Educa-
tion urging adoption of the guidelines proposed by the State Superintendent. The Superinten-
dent believed that adoption of the guidelines "would indicate to [local school] districts the
limits of their authority [pursuant to Senate Bill No. 890], to the extent that overly restrictive
regulations, if tested in court would fail.... The guidelines presented to the Board will help
the schools to comply with the mandates of Senate Bill 890." Bright, 18 Cal. 3d at 460, 556
P.2d at 1096, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 645 (quoting Memorandum from State Superintendent of Pub-
lic Instruction to State Board of Education (Sept. 24, 1971)).
The State Board of Education adopted the guidelines on October 15, 1971. The Board's
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2. The reply: Education Code section 10611
In 1971, the California Legislature responded to the Rowe decision
and repealed sections 9012 and 9013 of the Education Code. The legisla-
ture then enacted Education Code section 10611.166 Section 10611, enti-
tled Student Exercise of Free Expression, provided that "students of the
resolution uncompromisingly indicated that the school district's authority stopped short of any
form of prior restraint. Id. The guidelines provided in pertinent part:
The 18 year old has recently been granted the right to vote in national, state and
local elections.
The preparation of the newly enfranchised youth to exercise their rights and
duties as citizens in a democratic society includes the inter-communication of ideas,
and the need for a forum to express such ideas.
This process of inquiry includes an expansion of student rights regarding circu-
lation of petitions, circulars, newspapers, and other printed matter, the use of bulletin
boards, and the wearing of insignia.
Schools should encourage students to express opinions, to take stands, to sup-
port causes, and to present ideas. Students should realize that such rights are subject
to reasonable time, place and manner restrictions and to certain prohibitions. There
should be no prior censorship or requirements of approval of the contents or wording of
the printed materials related to student expression on campus.
The following guidelines are intended to aid each school or school district in
drafting its own set of guidelines for student expression on the campus of the school
wherein the students attend as pupils in the California public school system. The
guidelines are not intended for the control of persons who are not students of the
school wherein such guidelines are implemented.
CALIFORNIA STATE BD. OF EDUC., GUIDELINES FOR STUDENT EXPRESSION ON CAMPUS
(1971) (emphasis added), reprinted in Bright, 18 Cal. 3d at 461 n.7, 556 P.2d at 1097 n.7, 134
Cal. Rptr. at 646 n.7.
The Guidelines provided as follows:
CIRCULATION OF PETITIONS, CIRCULARS, NEWSPAPERS AND
OTHER PRINTED MATTER.
Students should be allowed to distribute petitions, circulars, leaflets, newspa-
pers, and other printed matter....
PROHIBITED MATERIAL
1. Material which is obscene to minors according to current legal definitions.
2. Material which is libelous according to current legal definitions.
3. Material which incites students so as to create a clear and present danger of
the imminent commission of unlawful acts or of the substantial disruption of the
orderly operation of the school.
4. Material which expresses or advocates racial, ethnic, or religious prejudice
so as to to create a clear and present danger of imminent commission of unlawful acts
or of the substantial disruption of the orderly operation of the school.
5. Material which is distributed in violation of the time, place, and manner
requirements.
Id.
166. In construing Education Code § 10611, the California Supreme Court remarked that:
Insofar as [§ 10611] restricted [students'] right of free expression it followed the sug-
gestion by the Rowe court to a remarkable degree: it contained a simple prohibition
against the distribution of certain categories of material, made no specific provision
for any system of prior restraint, and authorized the enactment of reasonable time,
place and manner regulations. To an even more remarkable degree the language of
[§ 10611] paralleled the guidelines drawn up by the State Superintendent of Public
Instruction.... [T]he guidelines specifically excluded any form of prior restraint.
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public schools have the right to exercise free expression."1 67
Section 10611 authorized the distribution of literature, use of bulle-
Bright, 18 Cal. 3d at 461, 556 P.2d at 1096, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 645-46 (footnote omitted). See
supra note 165 for the guidelines referred to by the Bright court.
The actual grassroots beginnings of California's legislation began in the Los Angeles Uni-
fied School District with a handful of high school journalism teachers. Wiener, supra note 107,
at 83. In 1973, the Los Angeles City Schools published its "Course of Study for Advanced
Journalism" and advised that "It]he concept of freedom of the press does not apply to high
school newspapers." Id. (quoting Los ANGELES CITY SCHOOLS, COURSE OF STUDY FOR AD-
VANCED JOURNALISM (1973)). When the Los Angeles Journalism Teachers Association
(LAJTA) applied to the school board for clarification of that statement, they were advised that
the handbook was being revised. The Student Rights and Responsibilities Handbook was re-
vised; however, it still provided that "[a]lthough a high degree of freedom is extended to the
school newspaper staff, advisers and administrators retain the authority to censor when neces-
sary.... In occasionally exercising censorship, the adviser is protecting the student's privilege
to produce a newspaper." Wiener, supra note 134, at 4 (quoting Los ANGELES CITY
SCHOOLS, STUDENT RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES); see also J. NELSON, supra note 5, at 96.
Since the handbook provided nothing further to explain what constituted "when necessary,"
administrators "retained a free hand to edit as [they] saw fit." Wiener, supra note 107, at 83.
In November 1973, representatives from the LAJTA spoke before the Los Angeles school
board and requested that they revise the existing board rules to conform with Tinker, Rowe
and the newly enacted Education Code § 10611. Id. The board dismissed the request and
instructed the LAJTA representatives to gather more information about the subject. A Los
Angeles Times reporter at the board meeting publicized this presentation and soon other me-
dia focused on the issue, bringing it to the public forefront. See, e.g., School Board, supra note
107; A. Schreiber, Free Press With Censorship: Nonsense (KFWB Radio 98 editorial, Apr. 10,
1974) ("Student reporters may not always express their conclusions as soundly as we'd like,
they're learning, and we should try to understand. What we don't want is self-serving censor-
ship because that's contrary to everything we believe.") (copy on file at Loyola of Los Angeles
Law Review); see also Local Teacher Fights For Student Newspaper Rights, Canoga Park
Chronicle, Apr. 17, 1974, p. 1, col. 2.
Three "long, stormy" hearings were held before the school board committees. Wiener,
supra note 107, at 84. Finally, in April 1974, a motion to grant free press rights to student
journalists was made and debated before the board of education, an overflow audience and a
crowd of television cameras and radio microphones. Id. The motion was defeated, five to two.
The board subsequently adopted Board Rule 1275 on April 22, 1974. Board Rule 1275 is set
forth in full, infra note 191.
167. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 10611 (West 1972) (repealed 1976). Former California Educa-
tion Code § 10611 provided:
Students of the public schools have the right to exercise free expression including, but
not limited to, the use of bulletin boards, the distribution of printed materials or
petitions, and the wearing of buttons, badges, and other insignia, except that expres-
sion which is obscene, libelous, or slanderous according to current legal standards, or
which so incites students as to create a clear and present danger of the commission of
unlawful acts on school premises or the violation of lawful school regulations, or the
substantial disruption of the orderly operation of the school, shall be prohibited.
Each governing board of a school district and each county superintendent of
schools shall adopt rules and regulations relating to the exercise of free expression by
students upon the premises of each school within their respective jurisdictions, which
shall include reasonable provisions for the time, place, and manner of conducting
such activities.
Id. The legislature also enacted § 25425.5 which governs community colleges. Section
25425.5 (now codified as § 76120) was identical to § 10611 in all respects except that such
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tin boards and the wearing of buttons and badges with restrictions only
on material that was obscene, libelous or slanderous "according to cur-
rent legal standards" or which "so incite[d] students as to create a clear
and present danger of the commission of unlawful acts on school prem-
ises or the violation of lawful school regulations, or the substantial dis-
ruption of the orderly operation of the school." '16 8 Additionally, the
statute required each school district governing board and each county
superintendent of schools to adopt rules and regulations to govern the
exercise of free expression by students on school premises of each school.
These regulations were to contain "reasonable provisions for the time,
place, and manner of conducting [student expression]."' 16 9 Section 10611
did not, however, provide any penalty for the failure of the school dis-
tricts or boards of education to enact such regulations. Although the
enactment of section 10611 enhanced the protection of student expres-
sion in general, the statute quickly became the target of controversy since
it contained no specific reference to official student newspapers.
170
In reaction to this controversy, the California Legislative Counsel
issued an opinion in 1974, and announced its conclusion that the first
amendment and section 10611 protected student expression in official
student newspapers.171 The Legislative Counsel determined that school
administrators could not exclude material from school publications un-
less it was obscene, libelous or would substantially disrupt school
phrases as "pupils" and "school district" in § 10611 were replaced by "students" and "com-
munity college district" in § 25425.5.
Under the California Constitution, the legislature does not have authority to enact rules
governing the University of California. The University of California Board of Regents is au-
tonomous and propounds its own rules. Apparently, since there is no state college equivalent
to § 10611, the legislature felt that a law comparable to § 10611 was not needed for Califor-
nia's nineteen state colleges and universities, which are within the legislature's purview. W.
Overbeck, Protecting Student Press Freedom By State Law: The Experience in California 5
(1977) (unpublished manuscript presented to the Secondary School Division, Association for
Education in Journalism).
168. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 10611.
169. Id.
170. See infra notes 205-06 and accompanying text.
171. See W. Overbeck, supra note 167, at 6. See generally W. OVERBECK & R. PULLEN,
MASS MEDIA LAW IN CALIFORNIA 176 (1979). The Legislative Counsel opined:
[W]hen a school district acts as the publisher of a high school newspaper, its power
to control the content of such a publication is necessarily more limited than would be
the case if a private publisher was involved. Once the school district establishes a
student activity which involves elements of free expression, any control or censorship
which exists must be consistent with First Amendment constitutional guarantees.
Op. Off. Legis. Counsel (Mar. 20, 1974), reprinted in Overbeck, supra note 167, at 6. See infra
notes 272-74 and accompanying text & notes 298-306 and accompanying text for a discussion
of whether the school or school district is in fact the "publisher" of an official school
newspaper.
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activities.1 72
Despite the Legislative Counsel's opinion, many school systems ig-
nored section 10611's provisions regarding the regulation of student ex-
pression in student publications."7 3 For example, the Los Angeles
Unified School District, the largest school district in California,1 74 main-
tained its policy that "the principle of freedom of the press does not ap-
ply to high school newspapers." 175  When confronted with the
Legislative Counsel's opinion, the Los Angeles Unified School District's
lawyers simply stated that they disagreed. 176 Hence, the Los Angeles
school district maintained its policy of granting school principals broad
power to censor student publications. 177
The question of whether the provisions of section 10611 protected
student expression in student publications from administrative censor-
ship was soon addressed by the California Supreme Court. In Bright v.
Los Angeles Unified School District,178 the California Supreme Court in-
terpreted section 10611 and determined that the legislature did not in-
tend the statute to "confer upon local school districts carte blanche to
enact regulations embodying constitutionally suspect prior restraint sys-
tems."' 179 Rather, section 10611 only permitted the subsequent punish-
ment of students distributing literature containing the catagories of
172. The Legislative Counsel directed:
While the governing board of a school district is given certain broad powers to con-
trol the editorial and advertising content of a high school newspaper published as
part of a course of study in journalism.... it is our opinion that material cannot be
excluded from such publications unless it is obscene or libelous or would substan-
tially disrupt or materially interfere with school activities.
Op. Off. Legis. Counsel (Mar. 20, 1974), reprinted in Overbeck, supra note 167, at 6.
173. W. OVERBECK & R. POLLEN, supra note 171, at 176; see Letwin, supra note 15, at
160-65, for a discussion of school district survey results following the enactment of Education
Code § 10611.
174. The Los Angeles Unified School District is still the largest school district in California
and in 1984, had an enrollment of approximately 556,865 students. See CAL. STATE DEP'T OF
EDUC., CALIFORNIA PUBLIC SCHOOL DIRECTORY 207 (1985).
175. Wiener, supra note 107, at 83 (quoting Los Angeles City Schools' Course of Study for
Advanced Journalism (1973)); see also W. OVERBECK & R. POLLEN, supra note 171, at 176.
176. W. OVERBECK & R. PULLEN, supra note 171, at 176; see also School Board, supra note
107. The Los Angeles Times reported that the Los Angeles school board's legal counsel, Ron
Apperson, "simply disagrees with [the legislative counsel's] opinion." Id. Paraphrasing Ap-
person's position, the Times stated that he "insisted that if newspapers are considered a part of
the instructional program ... then the law gives principals authority to control them." Id.
Apperson emphasized that " 'if anything goes in (the newspapers) that is offensive to the com-
munity, it is the representative of the board (principal) who gets the phone call, not the teacher
or the (student) writer.'" Id. (quoting Ron Apperson) (parenthetical additions in original).
177. See supra note 166.
178. 18 Cal. 3d 450, 556 P.2d 1090, 134 Cal. Rptr. 639 (1976).
179. Id. at 464, 556 P.2d at 1099, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 648.
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expression delineated in the statute. 180
The Bright case arose in the Los Angeles Unified School District in
1974, when University High School officials refused sophomore Susan-
nah Bright permission to distribute on campus her newspaper, the Red
Tide. 8" The newspaper contained an article entitled "Students Fight
Rules at Locke," which concerned the Locke High School dress code.'
8 2
A portion of the article appeared on the newspaper's front page under
the subheading "[P]rincipal Lies." The article contained claims that the
principal at Locke High School had lied in explaining how that school's
new dress code had been adopted.
83
As required by the school district's regulations, 8 4 Ms. Bright sub-
mitted her newspaper to the school administrators for their approval
prior to the distribution of the newspaper on campus. The administra-
tors postponed distribution as they were concerned that the subtitle and
180. Id.
181. The Red Tide was intended for distribution to high school students but was produced
independently of the public school system, thus making the newspaper an "unofficial" or "un-
derground" student publication. See supra note 15.
182. Bright, 18 Cal. 3d at 453, 556 P.2d at 1091-92, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 640-41.
183. Id. at 453-54, 556 P.2d at 1092, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 641. The new Locke High School
dress code prohibited male students from wearing hats in class. Id. at 453, 556 P.2d at 1092,
134 Cal. Rptr. at 641. The author of the article in the Red Tide asserted:
[Locke principal] Hobbs stated a number of lies (1) that the no hats in class rule was
made both by students and teachers, and not by him, (2) that the hats question is
neither a frequent or heated subject of debate in faculty meetings and in fact the
faculty is generally in support of the no hats rule, (3) that the student council has
never made any attempt to change this rule, and (4) that the faculty and students are
generally in support of this rule.
Id. at 454 n.3, 556 P.2d at 1092 n.3, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 641 n.3. This issue of the Red Tide also
contained articles which discussed the right of pregnant minors to obtain abortions without
parental consent, described the heroic portrayal of Abraham Lincoln in textbooks as a myth,
and examined the relationship between Patricia Hearst's family and the Symbionese Liberation
Army. Id. at 457 n.4, 556 P.2d at 1094 n.4, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 643 n.4.
184. The challenged Los Angeles School Board Administrative Regulation 1276-1 provided
in pertinent part:
The procedures to be followed in the implementation of guidelines relating to
student expression on campus are as follows:
a. Circulation of Petitions, Circulars, Newspapers, and Other Printed Matter.
Students should be allowed to distribute petitions, circulars, leaflets, newspapers, and
other printed matter subject to the following limitations:
d. Prohibited Material
1. Material which is obscene to minors according to current legal defini-
tions.
2. Material which is libelous according to current legal definitions.
3. Material which incites students so as to create a clear and present dan-
ger of the imminent commission of unlawful acts or of the substantial disruption
of the orderly operation of the school.
4. Material which expresses or advocates racial, ethnic, or religious preju-
dice so as to create a clear and present danger of imminent commission of un-
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article might be libelous.185 The University High administrators inde-
pendently investigated the truth of the assertion that the Locke High
School principal had lied1 86 and, upon advice of county counsel, tried to
contact the Locke principal.187 The assistant principal at Locke stated
that the charges in the Red Tide were inaccurate and thus, distribution of
the Red Tide was further postponed.188 The University High principal
finally spoke with the Locke principal and he verified the statements at-
tributed to him in the Red Tide; he denied that they were false. 189 After
consulting with Los Angeles school district and county attorneys, the
University High principal banned distribution of that issue of the Red
Tide. 190
lawful acts or of the substantial disruption of the orderly operation of the school.
5. Material which is distributed in violation of the time, place, and man-
ner requirements.
e. Disciplinary Action.
Any student who wilfully and knowingly:
1. distributes any petitions, circulars, newspapers, and other printed mat-
ter;
2. wears any buttons, badges, or other insignia;
3. posts on a bulletin board any item in violation of the aforementioned
prohibitions should be suspended, expelled or otherwise penalized depending on
the severity of the violation, and in accordance with established disciplinary
procedures.
Los Angeles School Bd. Admin. Reg. 1276-I, reprinted in Bright, 18 Cal. 3d at 453 n.2, 556
P.2d at 1091 n.2, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 640 n.2.
University High School students were informed of this board regulation and the proce-
dures to which they had to adhere by circulars, such as the following:
UNIVERSITY HIGH SCHOOL
TO: STUDENTS
FROM: John Welch, Principal
SUBJECT: DISTRIBUTION OF "NON SCHOOL LITERATURE"
The rules at University High School regarding distribution of "Non-School
Literature" are based on the STUDENT RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES
HANDBOOK (1972) page 6.
A student wishing to distribute "Non-School Literature" must attach an infor-
mational copy of the literature to this form and give them to the principal or his
secretary 24 hours in advance of desired distribution time. Within 24 hours the prin-
cipal will respond to your request, and return this sheet to you. It is necessary to
have this signed sheet before distribution is made. Permission to distribute this mate-
rial does not imply approval of contents by either the Board of Education or the
administration of University High School.
Memorandum from Principal John Welch to University High School Students (undated), re-
printed in Bright, 18 Cal. 3d at 454 n.2, 556 P.2d at 1091 n.2, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 640 n.2.
The circular also provided that the printed materials were subject to limitations on the
time, place and manner of distribution. Id.
185. Bright, 18 Cal. 3d at 453-54, 556 P.2d at 1092, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 641.
186. Id. at 454, 556 P.2d at 1092, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 641.
187. Id. at 453-54, 556 P.2d at 1092, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 641.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 454, 556 P.2d at 1092, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 641.
190. Id. The University High School officials, however, did permit the distribution of a
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Ms. Bright then sued the school district claiming that the district's
rules and regulations 91 constituted an illegal prior restraint system viola-
tive of section 10611 and of the first amendment to the United States
Constitution and article I, section 2(a) of the California Constitution. 192
After discussing the Tinker and Rowe decisions and examining the
legislative history of section 10611,193 the California Supreme Court con-
cluded that the section did not authorize any form of prior restraint of
student expression. 94 The court specified that under section 10611
school officials were authorized only to halt distribution of the offensive
material once it had begun and to then discipline the students responsible
for such distribution. 95 The school officials were "not... authorized [by
section 10611] to prevent the distribution in the first place through prior
student flyer which protested the administrative decision to ban the issue of the Red Tide.
They also authorized a noon protest meeting. Id.
191. For the text of the challenged regulation, see supra note 184. In existence at the time
of this controversy was Los Angeles School Board Policy 1275 which provided:
A school newspaper is primarily designed to serve as a vehicle for instruction
and is, in addition, intended as a means of communication. Therefore, it is operated,
substantially financed, and controlled by the School District. The ultimate decision
regarding the material to be included in such a newspaper must, therefore, be left to
the judgment of the school principal.
A school newspaper can best function when a full opportunity is provided for
students to inquire, question, and exchange ideas. Articles should reflect all areas of
student interest, including topics about which there may be dissent and controversy.
It is the intent of the board that students be provided with avenues for the research of
ideas and causes of interest to them and should be allowed to express their opinions.
Controversial subjects should be presented in depth with a variety of viewpoints pub-
lished simultaneously.
In the event of disagreement with the principal over a news article or editorial,
the student editor and the journalism teacher may appeal the decision of the princi-
pal to the area superintendent.
Los Angeles School Bd. Policy 1275 (adopted Apr. 22, 1974), reprinted in Overbeck, supra
note 167, at app. II.
192. Bright, 18 Cal. 3d at 455, 556 P.2d at 1092-93, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 641-42. Ms. Bright
claimed that the rules and regulations were unconstitutional on their face and as applied. In
addition to her prior restraint arguments, Ms. Bright presented equal protection and due pro-
cess causes of action under both the federal and state constitutions. Id. at 455, 556 P.2d at
1093, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 641-42. She sought relief on two counts: first, for the banning of the
distribution of the newspaper because it contained libelous material; and second, for the ban on
the sale of underground newspapers. Id.
The trial court denied Ms. Bright's request for a preliminary injunction against the en-
forcement of the regulations and denied her relief and damages. Id. The court received no
oral testimony and made no findings of fact or conclusions of law. Id. The court based its
decision on the verified pleadings, declarations, affidavits and exhibits. Id. Ms. Bright then
appealed.
193. Id. at 455-61, 556 P.2d at 1093-97, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 642-46; see also supra notes 165-
66.
194. Id. at 462, 556 P.2d at 1098, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 647.
195. Id.
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administrative censorship or prior restraint of its content."' 196 The court
found that it was "difficult to conceive that the Legislature in enacting
section 10611 intended to resurrect a system of prior restraint without
specifically so stating." 197 This was especially so "since former sections
9012 and 9013 for which section 10611 was a replacement had just been
declared unconstitutional ...because they purported to permit prior
restraints on the free expression of secondary school students."'19 More-
over, the court believed that the legislature was well aware of the "sensi-
tive and complicated constitutional problems" involved in dealing with
attempts to control student newspapers.199 Accordingly, the Bright
court also invalidated the portions of the district's regulations which au-
thorized content-based prior restraint of student publications.2"
While Bright stands as California's landmark case in establishing
that students possess some free press rights, two observations indicate
that the decision was by no means an absolute triumph for student press
freedom. First, the Bright decision involved an unofficial student news-
paper, not a school-sponsored or "official" student newspaper.20 1 Thus,
although the court did not limit its holding to unofficial papers, school
officials could arguably deny the decision's binding authority on the regu-
lation of official newspapers.2 °2 Second, and more significantly, the
196. Id. at 464, 556 P.2d at 1099, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 648. Plaintiff Bright and the defendant
school district asserted diametrical positions with respect to the meaning of the language in
§ 10611, specifically with regard to the word "prohibited." Id. at 462, 556 P.2d at 1097, 134
Cal. Rptr. at 646. Bright argued that the statute's declared objective and the legislative history
indicated that the legislature intended to reject any system of prior restraint. Id. Further-
more, since the Rowe court and the State Board of Education used the word "prohibited" to
mean a system rejecting prior censorship, Bright argued that the word, as used by the legisla-
ture in § 10611, should be construed likewise. Id.
On the other hand, the defendant school district argued that by its use of the phrase "shall
be prohibited" the legislature intended that the types of expression falling within the exceptive
language should not be disseminated on high school campuses. Id. The word "prohibit,"
defendants argued, was synonymous with the word "prevent." Thus, according to the defend-
ants, § 10611 allowed school authorities to completely forbid distribution of the specified cate-
gories of student expression. Id.
The court recognized that "prohibit" was capable of both interpretations but chose to
accept plaintiff Bright's connotation of the language. Id.; see also supra note 166.
197. Id. at 463, 556 P.2d at 1098, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 647.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 464, 556 P.2d at 1099, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 648. The court held that "the regula-
tions of defendant Los Angeles Unified School District here under review ... insofar as they
purport to authorize prior censorship of the contents of student publications, are invalid." Id.
201. See supra note 15.
202. Less than a month after the Bright decision the Los Angeles School Board adopted
new guidelines which still contained extensive provisions for prior censorship under a wide
range of circumstances. The revised Board Policy 1275 provides the following:
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Bright court did not prohibit censorship outright. The court invalidated
INTRODUCTION: A school newspaper is designed to serve as a vehicle for in-
struction and is, in addition, a means of communication. It is operated, substantially
financed, and controlled by the Student Body and the school district. A school news-
paper can best function when a full opportunity is provided for students to inquire,
question, and exchange ideas. Articles should reflect all areas of student interest,
including topics about which there may be dissent and controversy. It is the intent of
the [Los Angeles School] Board that students be provided with avenues for the re-
search of ideas and causes of interest to them and should be allowed to express their
opinions. Controversial subjects should be presented in depth with a variety of view-
points published.
PURPOSES OF OFFICIAL STUDENT NEWSPAPERS: (1) To exist as an in-
structional device for the teaching of writing and other journalistic skills; (2) To
provide a forum for opinions of students, school staff, and members of the commu-
nity; (3) To serve the entire school by reporting school activities.
RIGHTS OF STUDENT JOURNALISTS: (1) To print factual articles dealing with
topics of interest to the student writers; (2) To print, on the editorial page, opinions
on any topic, whether school related or not, which they feel is of interest to them-
selves or to the readers.
RESPONSIBILITIES OF STUDENT JOURNALISTS: (1) To submit copy that
conforms to good journalistic writing style; (2) To re-write stories, as required by the
journalism advisor, to improve journalistic structure, sentence structure, grammar,
spelling and punctuation; (3) To check facts and verify quotes; (4) In the case of
editorials on controversial issues, to provide space for rebuttals, in the same issue if
possible, but otherwise no later than the following issue; (5) Subject to the specific
limitations in these Guidelines, student editors are responsible for determining the
contents of their official student newspapers.
MATERIAL NOT PERMITTED IN SCHOOL NEWSPAPERS: (1) Material
which is libelous or which violates the right to privacy; (2) Material which is obscene,
according to the current standards of the community; (3) Profanity, hereby defined
as that language which would not be used in the L.A. Times or the L.A. Herald-
Examiner; (4) Material which advocates the breaking of any law; (5) Material which
criticizes or demeans any race, religion, sex or ethnic group; (6) Ads for cigarettes,
liquor, or any other product not permitted to teenagers; (7) Any material, the publi-
cation of which would cause substantial disruption of the school. Substantial disrup-
tion is hereby defined as the threat of physical violence in the school or nearby
community and/or the disruption of the school's educational program; (8) Endorse-
ments of political candidates or ballot measures, whether such endorsements are
made by editorial, article, letter, photograph or cartoon. The newspaper may, how-
ever, publish "fact sheet" types of articles on candidates and ballot measures pro-
vided such articles do not endorse any person or position, and provided equal space is
provided for all candidates for a particular office and for both sides of a ballot
measure.
DETERMINATION OF APPROPRIATENESS: (1) The newspaper advisor shall
have the primary responsibility for reviewing each article, prior to its publication, to
determine if it satisfies all of the conditions of these Guidelines; (2) The school princi-
pal or his [or her] designated representative other than the newspaper advisor may
also review copy prior to its publication, if he so requests; however, such copy must
be returned to the student editors within 24 hours after it is submitted for review; (3)
No copy may be censored except for reasons specifically listed in these Guidelines;
(4) Nothing in these Guidelines is intended to allow censoring of any article merely
because it is controversial or because it criticizes a particular school, a school proce-
dure, or the school system itself.
RESOLUTION OF DIFFERENCES: (1) In the event of disagreement as to
whether an article shall be printed, each school shall have a Publications Board,
which shall meet within 24 hours to submit its opinion; (2) The Publications Board
shall consist of the principal or his [or her] designated representative; the journalism
advisor; the editor-in-chief; a representative from student government, from the [Par-
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the school's prior restraint system primarily because section 10611 did
not authorize prior restraints.203 As the court indicated, its decision did
not preclude the legislature from someday establishing a system of prior
restraint in the school environment. 2" Hence, because the court's ruling
was based primarily on the court's statutory interpretation of section
10611, the scope of Bright is limited. Nevertheless, although Bright is
somewhat limited, the position taken by the California Supreme Court
bolsters students' free press rights and gives some guidance as to how the
courts should construe Education Code section 48907.
B. California Education Code Section 48907
In recognition of the remaining potential for administrative censor-
ship of official student publications, journalism teachers in Northern and
Southern California lobbied for an amendment to section 10611 which
would specifically include official school publications.2 °0 Within a month
of the 1976 Bright decision, legislation was introduced in the California
Senate to accommodate those concerns.20 6
ent Teacher Association/Parent Teacher Student Association] and from the Advi-
sory Council; and other members as mutually agreed upon; (3) If the Publications
Board cannot solve the dispute, then an appeal may be made to the Area Superinten-
dent, who may seek advice from the Board's legal staff in making his decision; (4)
Further appeal may be made in accordance with Secondary School Curriculum
Guide for Instruction, pages 35-38, titled Controversial Material.
Los Angeles School Bd. Policy 1275 (adopted Jan. 20, 1977). These guidelines are presently in
effect.
203. Bright, 18 Cal. 3d at 464, 556 P.2d at 1099, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 648. The court did,
however, address first amendment concerns in ruling. See supra note 193.
204. Id.
205. In gathering facts to present to the Los Angeles School Board in their fight to revise
the district guidelines, the LAJTA discovered that student newspapers in 25% of the Los
Angeles senior high schools and 40% of the junior high schools had experienced overt censor-
ship. See Wiener, supra note 107, at 84. Even more newspapers had been curbed by covert
censorship. Id. For example, the LAJTA found that the following articles had been censored:
A junior high school newspaper article which contained the phrase "bosom buddies" was la-
beled obscene and was therefore suppressed. Twenty-five thousand copies of a student newspa-
per containing the word "masturbate" in a movie review of The Exorcist were destroyed. A
drawing showing a student smoking was also banned as was an editorial calling for the
decriminalization of marijuana. School officials also excised an article criticizing a bicenten-
nial pageant which would cost the school board several hundred thousand dollars, Id.
Spurred by this predominance of censorship, the LAJTA redirected its attention from the local
entities and aimed for the California Legislature. See Wiener, supra note 107, at 84.
206. On December 9, 1974, Assemblyman John Vasconcellos, introduced Assembly Bill
207 to amend Education Code section 10611 to specifically include official student newspapers
within the ambit of its protection. 1 LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, JOURNAL
OF THE ASSEMBLY, 1975-76 Reg. Sess., at 132. See Wiener, supra note 107, at 84. The bill
included language giving students "the right of publication in student newspapers" subject to
the existing restrictions in section 10611. Cal. A.B. 207, 1975-76 Reg. Sess. (1974). The bill
breezed through the assembly and was sent to the senate on May 12, 1975. 2 LEGISLATURE OF
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Despite prior unsuccessful attempts to amend section 10611,207 the
California Legislature passed a new law, Education Code section 48907,
which specifically protects student expression in official school publica-
tions.20 8  This protection, however, is not absolute: section 48907
reauthorizes administrative censorship of student publications.20 9
Section 48907 takes direct aim at the Bright decision and reinstates
some prior restraint in the public schools. 210 Section 48907 provides in
THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, JOURNAL OF THE SENATE, 1975-76 Reg. Sess., at 3458 [hereinaf-
ter SENATE JOURNAL]. It received a "do pass" recommendation from the Senate Education
Committee, 3 SENATE JOURNAL, supra, at 4090, but was defeated on the senate floor 20 to 11
on August 14, 1975, 3 SENATE JOURNAL, supra, at 6566, after a senator charged that the bill
would open the door for students to proliferate four-letter words in their newspapers. Wiener,
supra note 107, at 84.
207. After a motion to reconsider, Assembly Bill 207 was amended several times. At one
point the amended bill read "[p]rior review or restraint in advance of distribution of student
newspapers ... is prohibited." Cal. A.B. 207, Reg. Sess. 1975-76 (as amended Apr. 17, 1975).
A subsequent amendment excised the exception to obscene expression. Id. (as amended May
7, 1975). Both provisions were later deleted.
At this time, the Kennedy Commission was investigating student press censorship at the
national level. See supra note 5. The Commission's dispiriting report encouraged other groups
in California to lobby against the "unconscionable and unconstitutional" censorship of the
student press. In 1976, Senator Alan Robbins of Los Angeles reintroduced Assembly Bill 207
as Senate Bill 2120. Although well supported, the bill failed on a 17 to 17 vote. 7 SENATE
JOURNAL, supra note 206, at 13322. The bill was brought to another senate vote on August
11, 1976, where it failed 21 to 17. Id. at 15146.
Meanwhile, back in Los Angeles, the LAJTA addressed a new liberal school board panel.
Community support had become well organized and television and radio newspersons, journal-
ism professors, attorneys, the Parent Teacher Association, teachers and students testified
before the board. Victory was finally won after a six to one vote. The Los Angeles Unified
School District became the first large city school system to officially grant first amendment
rights to student journalists as part of its board of education rules. Wiener, supra note 107, at
84.
The LAJTA then made a final effort to get legislative protection for student journalists'
rights. Backed by the California Association of School Boards, the California Teachers Asso-
ciation and the Los Angeles Board of Education, Senator Ralph Dills introduced Senate Bill
357 on February 22, 1977. The bill passed and became the present Education Code section
48907.
208. Education Code § 10611 was renumbered as § 48916 in 1976, prior to its amendment
in 1977. Section 48916 as amended did not officially become § 48907 until 1983. All post-
amendment references in this Comment, however, will be made to § 48907 for the purpose of
simplification. See infra Appendix A for the full text of Education Code § 48907.
209. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 48907 (West Supp. 1987). In addition to the inclusion of official
student publications within the ambit of statutory protection, § 48907 differs from § 10611 in a
number of other ways. The third paragraph of § 48907 contains provisions which define the
previously undefined roles of student editors and journalism advisers. The student editors are
now responsible for assigning and editing the news, editorial and feature content of their publi-
cations. The adviser's role is to "supervise the production of the student staff, to maintain
professional standards of English and journalism, and to maintain the provisions of [§ 48907]."
CAL. EDUC. CODE § 48907.
210. Id. See supra notes 195-200 and accompanying text.
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pertinent part:
Students of the public schools shall have the right to exer-
cise freedom of speech and of the press including, but not lim-
ited to, the use of bulletin boards, the distribution of printed
materials or petitions, the wearing of buttons, badges, and other
insignia, and the right of expression in official publications,
whether or not such publications or the means of expression are
supported financially by the school or by use of school facilities,
except that expression shall be prohibited which is obscene,
libelous, or slanderous. Also prohibited shall be material which
so incites students as to create a clear and present danger of the
commission of unlawful acts on school premises or the violation
of lawful school regulations, or the substantial disruption of the
orderly operation of the school.
There shall be no prior restraint of material prepared for
official school publications except insofar as it violates this sec-
tion. School officials shall have the burden of showing justifica-
tion without undue delay prior to any limitation of student
expression under this section.211
Section 48907 also requires each governing board of a school district and
each county board of education to "adopt rules and regulations in the
form of a written publications code ... which shall include reasonable
provisions for the time, place, and manner of conducting ... activities
within its ... jurisdiction."
2 12
IV. ANALYSIS: CHALLENGING THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF
EDUCATION CODE SECTION 48907
By enacting Education Code section 48907, the California legisla-
ture firmly established that California students have statutory free press
rights. 213 Although the legislature has taken a commendable step by leg-
islating student press freedom, the potential constitutional infirmities in
section 48907 render the statute a dangerous license for impermissible
211. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 48907 (emphasis added).
212. Id. (emphasis added).
213. While California students have statutory free press rights, it does not necessarily follow
that they have constitutionally based free press rights. The legislative history indicates, how-
ever, that these statutory rights are indeed the codification of students' constitutional rights.
The failing of § 48907 is that it does not encompass all of these rights. Hence, students are not
allowed to fully enjoy their first amendment and article I, § 2(a) freedoms.
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administrative censorship of student expression in official school
publications.
The primary difficulty with section 48907 is that by permitting ad-
ministrators to exercise prior restraint in certain circumstances, the legis-
lature may have authorized activity which unconstitutionally infringes
on students' free speech and press rights.z14 Another difficulty concerns
the construction of the statute itself. Thus, section 48907 may also be
unconstitutional because of the vagueness and overbreadth of its terms
and requirements.215
Nearly a decade has passed since the adoption of section 48907, yet
to date there are no reported cases interpreting the statute's language or
validating its constitutionality under either the United States or Califor-
nia Constitutions.216 A California court deciding a case of first impres-
214. See infra notes 240-511 and accompanying text.
215. See infra notes 428-80 and accompanying text.
216. In 1981, the First District Court of Appeal generally referred to § 48907 (then
§ 48916) in deciding whether a high school student had a first amendment right to wear a
badge which contained the message "Fuck the Draft" to school. Hinze v. Superior Court, 119
Cal. App. 3d 1005 (1981) (ordered depublished) (LEXIS, States library, Cal file).
Presently on appeal before the California Court of Appeal for the Fourth District is a case
brought by the editor-in-chief of a public high school newspaper, David Leeb, against his
principal and the Garden Grove Unified High School District (GGUHSD) for the allegedly
unconstitutional censorship of the school newspaper. See Leeb v. DeLong, appeal docketed, 4
Civ. No. G 002587 (4th Dist. filed Aug. 1985); see also, Kossen, supra note 18.
The case arose in the spring of 1984, when the Rancho Los Alamitos High School princi-
pal and GGUHSD associate superintendent barred the distribution of the April Fools' edition
of the school newspaper. Appellant's Opening Brief at 6, Leeb v. DeLong, appeal docketed, 4
Civ. No. G 002587 (4th Dist. Aug. 1985). The school administrators feared that "the use of
the word 'nude' in the headline of an article reporting that Playboy magazine was going to do a
photographic feature on the 'Girls of Rancho' would draw too much attention, and that mem-
bers of the community would object on the ground that the use of such language in a high
school newspaper was inappropriate." Id. at 5. The article was accompanied by a photograph
of some female students. The ultimate grounds for the decision to bar distribution were that
the photograph "might be libelous." Id. at 6. The school administrators acted pursuant to
GGUHSD Administrative Regulation 7120.1 which provides that:
There shall be no prior restraint of materials prepared for official school publica-
tions except where material for publication or expression may:
a. be obscene, libelous, or slanderous;
b. incite students as to create a clear and present danger of the commission of un-
lawful acts on school premises;
c. violate lawful school regulations;
d. substantially disrupt the orderly operation of the school.
Id. at 10.
On June 4, 1984, David Leeb filed suit in Orange County Superior Court challenging the
constitutionality of the seizure of the school newspaper and sought a temporary restraining
order releasing the paper for distribution. Id. at 2. The superior court denied Leeb's request
and instead set an expedited hearing on his application for a preliminary injunction. Id. On
February 7, 1985, cross motions for summary judgment were heard in the superior court re-
garding the constitutionality of Education Code § 48907 and the GGUHSD administrative
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sion brought under section 48907 could, however, look to California
education law predating the enactment of the statute, such as Bright v.
Los Angeles Unified School District,217 as well as federal precedent for
guidance in resolving the constitutional issues.218
In deciding student expression and press cases brought before them,
federal courts have fairly explicated many of the free speech terms used
in section 48907, such as obscenity,219 libel220 and substantial disrup-
tion.221 Left unresolved by the courts, however, is the difficult question
of whether or not a system of prior restraint like section 48907 is a
proper method of regulating student expression.
A. Legislative Authority
The California Legislature has the constitutional duty and power to
maintain a system of free public education for the state.222 The legisla-
ture has plenary power to set educational policies as long as it does not
regulation. The court found in favor of the school district and held that § 48907 does not
violate article I, § 2 of the California Constitution. Id. at 3. Leeb appealed the decision to the
California Court of Appeal for the Fourth District. The case is now pending.
The issues presented by appellant Leeb are (1) whether "Article I, Section 2 of the Cali-
fornia Constitution... appl[ies] to public school students, thereby rendering the prior restraint
system erected by Education Code Section 48907 and GGU[H]SD Administrative Regulation
7120.1 unconstitutional per se"; and (2) whether, "[e]ven if Article I, Section 2, as applied to
public school students, allows for imposition of a system of prior restraint .... the prior re-
straint provisions of Education Code Section 48907 and GGU[H]SD Administrative Regula-
tion 7120.1 [are] unconstitutional because of their failure to provide specific procedural
protections and exact definitions of prohibited material?" Id. at 3-4. This case presents the
California Court of Appeal with its first opportunity to construe and define the scope of
§ 48907.
217. 18 Cal. 3d 450, 556 P.2d 1090, 134 Cal. Rptr. 639 (1977).
218. See Annotation, supra note 103, for an excellent collection and summarization of fed-
eral student press cases.
Following Tinker, numerous student press cases were brought. Between 1969 and 1984,
United States District Courts in 18 states and Puerto Rico heard 25 cases concerning high
school student journalists. L. INGELHART, supra note 103, at 62. During the 1980's, however,
the influx of such cases subsided; but.presently, according to Mark Goodman, the executive
director of the Student Press Law Center, nearly a dozen student censorship cases are pres-
ently active. Kossen, supra note 18, at 1, col. 2. Goodman noted that "[n]ot since the turbu-
lent 1970s have so many student press issues been in court." Id.
219. See infra notes 370-75 and accompanying text.
220. See infra notes 396-412 and accompanying text.
221. See infra notes 348-56 and accompanying text & notes 464-70 and accompanying text.
222. CAL. CONST. art. IX, §§ 1, 5; see Myers v. Arcata Union High School Dist., 269 Cal.
App. 2d 549, 551, 75 Cal. Rptr. 68, 72 (1969); Akin v. Board of Educ., 262 Cal. App. 2d 161,
167, 68 Cal. Rptr. 557, 561 (1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1041 (1969).
Article IX, § 1, entitled Encouragement of Education, provides that "[a] general diffusion
of knowledge and intelligence being essential to the preservation of the rights and liberties of
the people, the Legislature shall encourage by all suitable means the promotion of intellectual,
scientific, moral, and agricultural improvement." CAL. CoNsT. art. IX, § I.
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violate the federal or California Constitutions.223 By statute, the legisla-
ture has delegated to local school district governing boards the general
authority to operate the public schools within their respective jurisdic-
tions224 and to promulgate the rules and regulations necessary to control
student conduct.225 This delegation of legislative authority is permissible
as long as the legislature prescribes reasonable standards for those enti-
ties to follow in enacting local policies and regulations.
226
223. 29 Op. Att'y Gen. 82, 83 (1957); see also Mountain View Union High School Dist. v.
City Council of Sunnyvale, 168 Cal. App. 2d 89, 335 P.2d 957 (1959); see generally 1 J. RAPP,
EDUCATION LAW § 3.02(3)(a), 3-12 (1986); Project, supra note 70, at 1375-76.
The California Legislature, unlike the majority of other states, has taken a major interest
in formulating educational policy. Project, supra note 70, at 1377 n.8. Other states generally
leave the formulation of educational policy to state and local administrative agencies and vari-
ous elected bodies, such as school boards. Id. at 1377. As the California Attorney General
advised, "'the public schools of this state are a matter of state-wide rather than local or munic-
ipal concern ... and the state Legislature is given comprehensive powers in relation thereto.'"
29 Op. Att'y Gen. 82, 83 (quoting Hall v. City of Taft, 47 A.C. 179, 181-82 (1956)); see also
Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954) ("education is perhaps the most important
function of state and local governments").
224. Myers, 269 Cal. App. 2d at 551, 75 Cal. Rptr. at 72 (citing CAL. EDUC. CODE § 921
(West 1969)); Akin, 262 Cal. App. 2d at 163, 68 Cal. Rptr. at 561. Former California Educa-
tion Code § 921 provided that "[e]very school district shall be under the control of a board of
school trustees or a board of education." CAL. EDUC. CODE § 921 (West 1969) (recodified as
CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 35010, 72230). See generally CAL. CONST. art. IX, § 14. Article IX,
§ 14 provides:
The Legislature shall have power, by general law, to provide for the incorpora-
tion and organization of school districts . . .. of every kind and class, and may
classify such districts.
The Legislature may authorize the governing boards of all school districts to
initiate and carry on any programs, activities, or to otherwise act in any manner
which is not in conflict with the laws and purposes for which school districts are
established.
CAL. CONST. art. IX, § 14; see also CAL. EDUC. CODE § 35160 (West 1978). Education Code
§ 35160 provides:
On and after January 1, 1976, the governing board of any school district may
inititate and carry on any program, activity, or may otherwise act in any manner
which is not in conflict with or inconsistent with, or preempted by, any law and
which is not in conflict with the purposes for which school districts are established.
CAL. EDUC. CODE § 35160. The California Attorney General has stated that the enactment of
Education Code § 35160 was intended by the legislature to be a grant of general authority to
school districts on school-related subjects. 64 Op. Att'y Gen. 146, 147-48 (1981). The Attor-
ney General noted that the passage of Article IX, § 14, served to significantly expand the
authority of school districts. 61 Op. Att'y Gen. 75, 76 (1978).
225. Myers, 269 Cal. App. 2d at 566, 75 Cal. Rptr. at 72 (citing CAL. EDUC. CODE § 10604
(West 1969)). Former § 10604 provided in pertinent part:
The governing board of any school district may make and enforce all rules and regu-
lations needful for the government and discipline of the schools under its charge.
Any governing board shall enforce the provisions of this section by suspending or, if
necessary, expelling a pupil in any elementary or secondary school who refuses or
neglects to obey any such rules or regulations.
CAL. EDUC. CODE § 10604 (West 1969) (repealed 1977).
226. See generally 3. RAPP, supra note 223, at 3-17.
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Courts disagree as to the degree of specificity that the legislature
must use in delegating its education authority and in prescribing the
standards for the local entities to follow. 227 The standard varies accord-
ing to the nature of the ultimate objective and the problems involved.228
As a general rule, however, broad guidelines which are consistent with a
legislative plan will generally suffice to meet constitutional requirements
if they provide adequate standards to reasonably guide and restrain the
exercise of delegated authority.
229
No other state in the country has legislated student press free-
dom.2 0 Therefore, although a number of courts have addressed the issue
of student press rights, none have determined the requirements which a
student press rights statute must meet in order to pass constitutional
muster. Courts have, however, determined the constitutional require-
ments for student press regulations promulgated at the school district
and individual school levels.231
It may be argued that legislation need not be as specific as local
regulations since the role of the legislature is merely to delegate its au-
thority to govern education and to provide general guidance for local
education entities to follow. Nevertheless, "while legislatures 'ordinarily
may delegate power under broad standards..., [the] area of permissible
indefiniteness narrows ... when the regulation ... potentially affects
fundamental rights,' like those protected by the first amendment.
'232
Furthermore, "where a law authorizes a system of prior licensing, the
Supreme Court has consistently required the statutory delegation to pro-
vide 'narrowly drawn, reasonable and definite standards for the [adminis-
tering] officials to follow.' "233
In addition, when the legislature enacts general rules for the multifa-
rious school districts to follow, it presumes that each district will adopt a
particular procedure or policy best suited to local needs. This presump-
tion may hold true when the districts receive general directives to create
new schools or to set the length of the school day; but, with regard to
section 48907, the legislative presumption is misplaced. Through section
48907, the legislature directs each school district governing board and
227. Id. at 3-18.
228. Id. at 3-19.
229. Id. at 3-20.
230. LAW OF THE STUDENT PRESS, supra note 60, at 35.
231. See infra notes 502-11.
232. L. TRIBE, supra note 26, at 732-33 (quoting United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 274-
75 (1968) (Brennan, J., concurring)); see, eg., supra notes 119-27 and accompanying text.
233. L. TRIBE, supra note 26, at 732-33 (quoting Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268, 271
(1951)).
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each county board of education to adopt written publication guidelines
which comport with the standards set forth in the statute.234 Neverthe-
less, many school districts have failed to act accordingly.2 35  Further-
more, those districts which do have guidelines generally provide no more
specific guidance than does the statute.236 Although broad language may
at times be tolerated at the legislative level, it cannot be at the local
level.
237
In order for section 48907 to be a constitutional and an effective
guide to school districts drafting local student press guidelines, the stat-
ute must provide specific terminology and criteria for the districts to fol-
low. 238 To assure its effectiveness, section 48907 should not be analyzed
leniently as a general statute, but rather under the more rigorous stan-
dard used for determining the constitutional validity of local
regulations.239
234. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 48907.
235. See infra notes 524-26 and accompanying text.
236. Id.; see supra notes 19-21 and accompanying text.
237. See supra notes 232-33 and accompanying text & infra notes 458-80 and accompany-
ing text.
238. A number of California school districts have directly incorporated the language of
§ 48907 into their guidelines. Unfortunately, the guidelines provide nothing further to eluci-
date the conditions under which student publications may be censored. See infra text accom-
panying notes 524-26.
239. Statutes imposing criminal sanctions are scrutinized under a more rigorous standard
than are general statutes. See supra note 43. At least one California court has analogized
student regulations which, if violated, result in the student's expulsion from school to criminal
statutes. In Myers v. Arcata Union High School District, a California court of appeal noted that
a high school's dress policy was "not a 'law' in the sense that criminal sanctions attend its
violation," however, the court found it significant that "a violation mean[t] suspension from
school." 269 Cal. App. 2d at 560, 75 Cal. Rptr. at 74. The court added that since "[t]he
importance of an education to a child is substantial... the state cannot condition its availabil-
ity upon compliance with an unconstitutionally vague standard of conduct." Id. at 560, 75
Cal. Rptr. at 74-75 (citations omitted). See also supra note 145 and accompanying text for the
Rowe court's discussion of this matter.
The United States Supreme Court, however, appears to have rejected this reasoning. In
Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser, 106 S. Ct. 3159 (1986), the Court held that school
officials had not violated a student's fourteenth amendment due process rights when they sus-
pended him for giving an "offensive" speech. Id. at 3166. The Court held that "[g]iven the
school's need to be able to impose disciplinary sanctions for a wide range of unanticipated
conduct disruptive of the educational process, the school disciplinary rules need not be as
detailed as a criminal code which imposes criminal sanctions." Id. The Court thus found that
the two day suspension imposed on the student did "not rise to the level of a penal sanction
calling for the full panoply of procedural due process protections applicable to a criminal
prosecution." Id.
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B. The Recommended Approach for Determining the Constitutionality
of Section 48907 Prior Restraints as Per Se Unconstitutional
A statute which conflicts with the California Constitution or de-
prives a person of a federal constitutional right is unconstitutional and
thereby void.2" Whether a statute is unconstitutional depends upon
whether or not it is broad enough to authorize unconstitutional action.2 41
Therefore, the constitutionality of section 48907 depends upon whether
the action it authorizes-administrative prior restraint-is an unconsti-
tutional action. This determination, in turn, depends upon the extent to
which school administrators can constitutionally exercise control over
students and their publications.
Under California law, prior restraints of the press are per se uncon-
stitutional under article I, section 2(a) of the California Constitution.242
If the language of this section, which states that "every person may freely
speak, write and publish his or her sentiments on all subjects," is inter-
preted literally, then "every person" includes students and no prior re-
straints may be imposed on any student expression.2 43  Under this
interpretation, section 48907 would be unconstitutional and void because
it violates the article I, section 2(a) ban against prior restraints.
At the federal level, the position that prior restraints of the student
press are per se unconstitutional is not unprecedented. The United States
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that a system in which
public school administrators review publications prior to distribution is
an unconstitutional method of controlling student conduct and expres-
sion.2 The court of appeals in Fujishima v. Board of Education 24- con-
eluded that Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School District,24 6 when
read in conjunction with United States Supreme Court cases forbidding
prior restraint, 247 bars any form of prior restraint in secondary
240. See Provident Land Corp. v. Provident Irrigation Dist., 94 P.2d 83, 85 (Cal. Ct. App.
1939); see also Wright v. Compton United School Dist., 46 Cal. App. 3d 177, 183, 120 Cal.
Rptr. 115, 119 (1975) ("state Constitution is controlling and statutes which are inconsistent
with and contrary to constitutional provisions cannot stand").
241. See In re Blanc, 81 Cal. App. 105, 252 P. 1053 (1927).
242. See supra notes 47-59 and accompanying text.
243. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. a; see supra note 4. In Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping
Center, 23 Cal. 3d 899, 592 P.2d 341, 153 Cal. Rptr. 854 (1979), aff'd, 447 U.S. 74 (1980), the
California Supreme Court held that under the California Constitution, high school students had
the right to reasonably exercise their free speech rights on private property. Id. at 910, 592
P.2d at 342, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 855; see supra note 58.
244. See Fujishima v. Board of Educ., 460 F.2d 1355 (7th Cir. 1972).
245. 460 F.2d 1355.
246. 393 U.S. 503 (1969); see supra notes 87-103 and accompanying text.
247. 460 F.2d at 1357 (citing Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931)); Id. at n.2 (citing
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schools.
2 48 This argument is even stronger in California since the Cali-
fornia Constitution is more protective and, accordingly, the courts' atti-
tude toward prior restraint is more hostile than at the federal level.249
In Fujishima, three high school students brought a class action suit
challenging the constitutionality of a school regulation which prohibited
distribution on school premises of any publication unless it had been ap-
proved by the superintendent of schools.250 Under this regulation, two
students were suspended for distributing their underground newspaper
without permission. Another student was suspended for giving a fellow
student a petition and later distributing leaflets without permission.251
The school board argued that the regulation was permissible be-
cause it did not require approval of the content of the publication before
distribution.25 2 The court rejected this argument and found that the
school board previously had interpreted the rule to require content ap-
proval.253 In fact, the court indicated that the school principals believed
that the rule required prior approval of a publication's content.254 After
analyzing the decisions by other federal courts,255 the Fujishima court
determined that administrative review of student publications prior to
distribution and any subsequent censorship of those publications consti-
tuted an unconstitutional prior restraint.256 The court concluded that
the Tinker forecast rule is the proper "formula for determining when the
requirements of school discipline justify punishment of students for the
exercise of their First-Amendment rights."2 7 The court declared that
the rule is "not a basis for establishing a system of censorship and licens-
ing designed to prevent the exercise of [those] rights. 2 58
New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971); Organization for a Better Austin
v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415 (1971); Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965); Bantam Books, Inc.
v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58 (1963)); see supra notes 26-43 and accompanying text.
248. Fujishima, 460 F.2d at 1357-58.
249. See supra notes 50-57 and accompanying text.
250. Fujishima, 460 F.2d at 1356. Section 6-19 of the Chicago Board of Education Rules
provided: "No person shall be permitted... to distribute on the school premises any books,
tracts, or other publications .... unless the same shall have been approved by the General
Superintendent of Schools." Chicago Bd. of Educ. Rules § 6-19, reprinted in Fujishima, 460
F.2d at 1356.
251. Fujishima, 460 F.2d at 1356.
252. Id. at 1357.
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. Id. at 1357-58 (citing Quarterman v. Byrd, 453 F.2d 54 (4th Cir. 1971); Eisner v.
Stamford Bd. of Educ., 440 F.2d 803 (2d Cir. 1971); Riseman v. School Comm., 439 F.2d 148
(1st Cir. 1971)).
256. Id. at 1359.
257. Id. at 1358 (emphasis in original).
258. Id. (emphasis in original).
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 20:1055
The court stated that the school board could promulgate reasonable
and specific regulations setting forth the time, place and manner in which
the distribution of written materials may occur. 25 9 The court warned,
however, that boards should not interpret the language to mean that they
may require a student to obtain administrative approval of the time,
place and manner of the particular distribution the student proposes.260
In short, the Fufishima court found that the first amendment, vis-a-
vis Tinker, was broad enough to encompass a student's right to be free
from administrative prior restraint. Since the California courts have re-
peatedly found that the rights of free expression and free press under the
California Constitution are broader than similar rights found under the
United States Constitution, 261 students clearly should be protected from
prior restraints under the California Constitution. This position, to-
gether with the reasoning employed by the Fujishima court, is consistent
with the legislative history of Education Code section 48907262 and with
the reasoning of the courts in Rowe v. Campbell Unified School Dis-
trict 2 63 and Bright v. Los Angeles Unified School District.2 4 The Rowe
court held that "it may be that no system of prior restraint in the area of
student publications can be devised which imposes a restraint sufficiently
short-lived and procedurally protected to be constitutional. ' 265 Further-
more, the California Supreme Court in Bright was reluctant to find prior
restraint of student publications acceptable.26 Although the Bright
court could have interpreted section 10611 as allowing prior restraints, it
did not. Instead, the court extensively reviewed the legislative history of
section 10611 and determined that the courts and the legislature intended
to prohibit the exercise of prior restraints of student publications.267
Punishment of the student after the distribution of offensive material was
sufficient.268
Given the hostile attitude of the California courts toward prior re-
259. Id. at 1359.
260. Id.
261. See supra notes 50-57 and accompanying text.
262. See supra note 166 and accompanying text.
263. Rowe v. Campbell Union High School Dist., No. 51060 (N.D. Cal. order filed Sept. 4,
1970) [hereinafter Rowel]; Rowe v. Campbell Union High School Dist. (N.D. Cal. order filed
Feb. 4, 1971) [hereinafter Rowe 11]; see supra note 110 and accompanying text & notes 159-62
and accompanying text.
264. 18 Cal. 3d 450, 556 P.2d 1090, 134 Cal. Rptr. 639 (1977).
265. Rowe II, No. 51060, slip op. at 2.
266. Bright, 18 Cal. 3d 450, 556 P.2d 1090, 134 Cal. Rptr. 639; see supra notes 178-80 and
accompanying text.
267. Id.
268. Id.
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straint,2 69 the courts should find that any system of prior restraint in the
secondary school setting is per se unconstitutional and, accordingly,
should strike that portion of Education Code section 48907 which autho-
rizes prior restraint.
270
C. An Alternative Approach for Determining the Constitutionality of
Section 48907: Official Student Publications and
the Forum Theory
Despite the strong legislative history and precedent supporting the
ban of prior restraints, California courts may hold otherwise. Although
the legislature cited article I, section 2(a) of the California Constitution
as authority for the enactment of section 48907, the courts may neverthe-
less find that high school students are not entitled to the constitution's
full protection. In other words, students have a constitutional right to
speak, write and publish freely, but that right may be limited by prior
restraint due to the demands of the "special characteristics" of the school
environment. In recent decisions on student press issues, courts adopting
this position employed the "forum theory" analysis to determine the con-
stitutionality of content-based administrative regulation of student
speech.
1. The forum theory
Education Code section 48907 provides free press rights to student
journalists writing for the "official publications" of the school.271 Stu-
dent journalists enjoy these rights regardless of whether the school publi-
269. See supra notes 47-59 and accompanying text.
270. Presently before the United States Supreme Court, in Kuhlmeier v. Hazelwood School
District, 795 F.2d 1368 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. granted, 55 U.S.L.W. 3493 (U.S. Jan. 20, 1987)
(No. 86-836), is the question of whether school administrators may exercise content-based
prior restraint over material in a public high school student newspaper.
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the per se rule and held instead that "the
Tinker standards are to be applied whenever administrators can reasonably predict that the
content of a student publication will violate the Tinker standard." Kuhlmeier, 795 F.2d at
1374 n.5 (citing Shanley v. Northeast Indep. School Dist., 462 F.2d 960 (5th Cir. 1972); Quar-
terman v. Byrd, 453 F.2d 54 (4th Cir. 1971); Eisner v. Stamford Bd. of Educ., 440 F.2d 803
(2d Cir. 1971)). The court advised, however, that "if student writings are to be censored prior
to publication, the least restrictive means are to be followed." Id. (emphasis added).
Irrespective of the Supreme Court's ruling on this first amendment issue, the California
courts may still find prior restraint of the student press per se unconstitutional under article I,
§ 2 of the California Constitution. In Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74
(1980), the Supreme Court held that the State of California has authority "to exercise its police
power or its sovereign right to adopt in its own Constitution individual liberties more expan-
sive than those conferred by the Federal Constitution." Id. at 81; see supra note 58.
271. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 48907; see supra note 15.
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cation is supported financially by the school or is produced using school
facilities. 272 Nevertheless, school authorities may believe that since the
official school publication is an organ of the school, it should be under
their complete control. They may argue that this control should parallel
the complete control that private publishers exercise over their publica-
tions: they can censor content for any reason whatsoever, halt distribu-
tion of an edition they do not like, or fire editors and staff at will.
273
Every court faced with this argument by school officials has rejected
it and instead declared that school administrators do not have the power
to control the content of school publications just because the publication
is funded and sponsored by the school.274 The legal reasoning adopted in
these cases is based on the "forum theory."
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in San Diego Commit-
tee Against Registration and the Draft (CARD) v. Governing Board of the
Grossmont Union High School District,275 recently applied the forum the-
272. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 48907; see supra note 171.
273. See, e.g., supra note 134. See also Comm Board's Role, Power as Publisher Debated,
UCLA Daily Bruin, Feb. 25, 1987, at 1, col. 1. On February 11, 1987, the Daily Bruin, the
University of California, Los Angeles student newspaper, published a controversial comic strip
containing alleged racial slurs. The UCLA Communications Board, which is composed of
students and administrators, is considering whether it can ban the comic strip from the Daily
Bruin without violating the first amendment. The primary issue under debate is whether a
public college newspaper enjoys the same rights and power of control as the publisher of a
commercial paper or instead, is more restricted because it is an agent of the state. Id. at cols.
1,4.
274. See Kuhlmeier v. Hazelwood School Dist., 790 F.2d 1368 (8th Cir. 1986), cert.
granted, 55 U.S.L.W. 3493 (U.S. Jan. 20, 1987) (No. 86-836); San Diego Comm. Against Re-
gistration and the Draft (CARD) v. Governing Bd., 790 F.2d 1471 (9th Cir. 1986); Gambino
v. Fairfax County School Bd., 429 F. Supp. 731 (E.D. Va.), aff'd, 564 F.2d 1577 (4th Cir.
1977); see also LAW OF THE STUDENT PRESS, supra note 60, at 14.
The Gambino v. Fairfax County School Board court was one of the first courts to deem a
high school newspaper a public forum entitled to first amendment protection. In Gambino,
school officials enforced school regulations to prohibit publication of an article that they found
objectionable. The article was entitled, "Sexually Active Students Fail to Use Contraception."
429 F. Supp. at 737. In finding the school board's actions unconstitutional, the court reasoned
that:
While the state may have a particular proprietary interest in a publication that legiti-
mately precludes it from being a vehicle for First Amendment expression, it may not
foreclose constitutional scrutiny by mere labeling. Once a publication is determined
to be in substance a free speech forum, constitutional protections attach and the state
may restrict the content of that instrument only in accordance with First Amend-
ment dictates.
Id. at 734 (citations omitted). For a more thorough discussion of the forum theory in the
school setting, see generally Nahmod, Beyond Tinker: The High School as an Educational
Public Forum, 5 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 278 (1970); Note, Public Forum Theory in the
Educational Setting: The First Amendment and the Student Press, 1979 U. ILL. L.F. 879; see
also LAW OF THE STUDENT PRESS, supra note 60, at 14-22.
275. 790 F.2d 1471 (9th Cir. 1986).
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ory analysis to determine whether and to what extent school officials
could regulate the content of official school newspapers. The suit arose
after the school board rejected an anti-draft advertisement submitted by
CARD for placement in a number of the district's student newspapers. 6
The court began its analysis by acknowledging that "[c]ertain state
facilities which may be appropriately used for communication, enjoy spe-
cial constitutional status as 'public forums.' "277 The court added that
"[i]n these public forums, the First Amendment narrowly circumscribes
the government's power to exclude or regulate speech., 2 78 The court
then explained that the United States Supreme Court has identified three
types of public forums: (1) traditional public forums; (2) limited public
forums; and (3) nonpublic forums. 9
The court explained that a "traditional public forum" is a place,
such as a street or a park, "'which by long tradition or by government
fiat [has] been devoted to assembly and debate.' ",280 In a traditional pub-
lic forum, "'the rights of the State to limit expressive activity are sharply
circumscribed.' ",281 The court declared that:
"In these quintessential public forums, the government may not
prohibit all communicative activity. For the state to enforce a
content-based exclusion it must show that its regulation is nec-
essary to serve a compelling state interest and that it is narrowly
drawn to achieve that end. The State may also enforce regula-
tions of the time,, place, and manner of expression which are
content-neutral, are narrowly tailored to serve a significant gov-
ernment interest, and leave open ample alternative channels of
communication. 282
The second type of forum, a "limited public forum," consists of
"'public property which the State has opened for use by the public as a
276. Id. at 1472-73. The Board rejected the advertisement because it believed that publica-
tion of the advertisement would contribute to the solicitation of illegal acts by the district's
students. Id. at 1473 (footnote omitted).
277. Id. at 1474 (citing Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and Educ. Fund, 105 S. Ct.
3439 (1985); Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37 (1983)).
278. Id. at 1475.
279. Id.
280. Id. (quoting Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45
(1983); accord Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and Educ. Fund, 105 S. Ct. 3439, 3449
(1985)).
281. Id. (quoting Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45
(1983); accord Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and Educ. Fund, 105 S. Ct. 3439, 3449
(1985)).
282. Id. (quoting Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983)
(citations omitted); accord Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and Educ. Fund, 105 S. Ct.
3439, 3448-49 (1985)) (emphasis added).
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place for expressive activity.' ,,283 Once the state creates a limited public
forum, its rights to impose constraints on the type of expression permit-
ted in that forum are also quite restricted. The court stated that in a
limited public forum, "'[r]easonable time, place and manner regulations
are permissible, and a content-based prohibition must be narrowly drawn
to effectuate a compelling state interest.' ,1284 The court added that " 'the
identical broad free speech rights attach to the first and second types of
public forums,' although in the latter type of forums those broad rights
apply only within the particular boundaries of the specific forum that has
been established.
285
The third type of forum, a "non-public forum," is "'[p]ublic prop-
erty [such as a military base or a jail] which is not by tradition or
designation a forum for public communication.' ,286 The court ex-
plained that this type of forum is governed by standards different from
those governing the traditional and limited public forums.287 In a non-
public forum, the state, in addition to time, place and manner regula-
tions, "'may reserve the forum for its intended purposes, communicative
or otherwise, as long as the regulation on speech is reasonable and not an
effort to suppress expression merely because public officials oppose the
speaker's view.' "288 In addition, the court pointed out that" '[t]he exist-
ence of reasonable grounds for limiting access to a nonpublic forum...
will not save a regulation that is in reality a facade for viewpoint-based
discrimination.' "289
2. Official school publications as limited public forums.
The school board in San Diego Committee contended that school
newspapers should be classified as non-public forums and, therefore, the
283. Id. (quoting Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45
(1983); accord Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and Educ. Fund, 105 S. Ct. 3439, 3449
(1985)).
284. Id. (quoting Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37,46 (1983)
(citations omitted)) (emphasis added).
285. Id. at 1475-76 (quoting Cinevision Corp. v. City of Burbank, 745 F.2d 560, 569 (9th
Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 2115 (1985); accord Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense
and Educ. Fund, 105 S. Ct. 3439, 3448 (1985)).
286. Id. at 1476 (quoting Cinevision Corp. v. City of Burbank, 745 F.2d 560, 568 n.8 (9th
Cir. 1984), cert denied, 105 S. Ct. 2115 (1985) (quoting Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local
Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 46 (1983)).
287. Id.
288. Id. (quoting Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 46
(1983); accord Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and Educ. Fund, 105 S. Ct. 3439, 3448
(1985)) (emphasis in original).
289. Id. (quoting Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and Educ. Fund, 105 S. Ct. 3439,
3454 (1985)).
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regulations need only be reasonable to be constitutional.2 90 The court
disagreed and held that the school newspapers were limited public
forums.29 1
The court stated that the determination of whether the school news-
paper was a limited public forum or a non-public forum depended upon
the "type of forum the government intended to create.1292 The court
added that the government's intent may be "evidenced by '[its] policy
and practice... [as well as] the nature of the property and its compatibil-
ity with expressive activity.' "293 Observing that "[e]verything that ap-
pears in a newspaper is speech, whether commercial, political, artistic, or
some other type," the court concluded that "[n]ewspapers, including the
Board's, are devoted entirely to expressive activity.1294 Accordingly, the
court admitted that it would be - 'difficult to think of any other kind of
property that [was] more compatible with expressive activity.1 29 5 Thus,
the evidence in the case clearly indicated to the court that the school
board intended to create a limited public forum.296
The court then held that "[h]aving established a limited public fo-
rum, the [School] Board [could not], absent a compelling governmental
interest, exclude speech otherwise within the boundaries of the
forum.5
297
290. Id.
291. Id.
292. Id. (citing Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and Educ. Fund, 105 S. Ct. 3439, 3449
(1985)).
293. Id. (citing Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and Educ. Fund, 105 S. Ct. 3439, 3449
(1985)).
294. Id.
295. Id.
296. Id.
297. Id. at 1478. The task before the San Diego Committee court was to define the precise
limitations on the topics which could be discussed by non-students in the limited public forum
that the board created, i.e., the school newspaper. Id. at 1476. Thus, the court focused pri-
marily on the "access" component of the forum theory analysis.
The school board contended that it permitted use of the paper by non-students only for
"non-political commercial speech." Id. at 1477. The board claimed that while recruitment
advertisements by the military services were non-political, CARD's ads were political. Id.
The court held that the military service ads (1) offered vocational or career opportunities
to students; and (2) were political. Id. The court reasoned that "the government's interest in
promoting military service is not an economic one; it is essentially political or governmental."
Id. The court concluded that "[b]ecause the Board permitted the publication of advertise-
ments advocating military service, there can be no question but that the Board intended to
open the newspapers for advertisements on this topic-at least by one side to the debate." Id.
at 1478.
Accordingly, the court held that the board could not "allow presentation of one side of an
issue, but prohibit the presentation of the other side." Id. (citing City of Madison Joint School
Dist. v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n, 429 U.S. 167, 175-76 (1976)). Hence, the
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As discussed above, under traditional forum theory analysis, once a
school newspaper is deemed to be a public forum school officials must
first demonstrate that the particular content-based regulation of student
expression advances a compelling state interest.298 The compelling state
interest advanced is usually the interest in maintaining an environment
where the educational process may occur without disruption.2 99 There
board violated the first amendment when it banned CARD's advertisements from the school
newspapers. Id.
The court held in the alternative that even if the student paper was a nonpublic forum, the
board's conduct was still unconstitutional as it was unreasonable and constituted viewpoint-
based discrimination. Id. Under the reasonableness prong, the court determined that the
board's different characterization of the military service ads and the CARD ads was incorrect
and therefore unreasonable. Id. at 1478-79. Furthermore, the court found the board's argu-
ments that the ads urged illegal conduct and reduced the available space for student expression
unpersuasive. Id. at 1479-80. Finally, the court held that since the board provided advertising
space to advocates of military service, yet refused to allow space for opposing advertisements,
the board had engaged in viewpoint-based discrimination. Id. at 1481.
298. See supra note 282 and accompanying text.
299. See, e.g., Myers v. Arcata Union High School Dist., 269 Cal. App. 2d 549, 561, 75 Cal.
Rptr. 68, 73 (1969); Akin v. Board of Educ., 262 Cal. App. 2d 161, 167-68, 68 Cal. Rptr. 557,
561 (1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1041 (1969). See generally Tinker v. Des Moines Indep.
School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
In addition to the substantial disruption standard, the Tinker Court held that student
expression could be curtailed if it involved the "invasion of the rights of others." 393 U.S. at
513. Put another way, the state has a substantial or compelling interest in preventing students
from invading the rights of others.
The question of how to construe the phrase "invasion of the rights of others" is presently
before the United States Supreme Court. Kuhlmeier v. Hazelwood School Dist., 795 F.2d
1368 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. granted, 55 U.S.L.W. 3493 (U.S. Jan. 20, 1987) (No. 86-836). The
general question presented in this case is whether school administrators violated the school
newspaper staff's first amendment rights by deleting two pages from the paper because the
administrators objected to the content of two articles on those pages. Id. at 1370.
The administrators objected to one story concerning three unnamed Hazelwood High
female students and their experiences with teen pregnancy. The other story dealt with the
impact of divorce on young persons. Id. at 1374-75. The principal objected because he be-
lieved that the girls in the pregnancy article could be identified. He found the divorce article
objectionable because the parents of the students interviewed had not consented to the stories.
Id. at 1371. Accordingly, the principal excised the pages on which the articles appeared with-
out consulting the student staff. Id.
In addressing the constitutionality of the administration's actions, the court first discussed
whether the school newspaper was a public forum. Id. at 1371-74. The Eighth Circuit found
that the paper was a public forum "because it was intended to be and operated as a conduit for
student viewpoint." Id. at 1372.
Having established the newspaper as a public forum, the court held that the administra-
tors could censor only if the school officials could "demonstrate that the prohibition was 'nec-
essary to avoid material and substantial interference with school work or discipline.., or the
rights of others."' Id. at 1374 (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. School Dist., 393 U.S.
503, 511 (1969)). The Eighth Circuit held that "invasion of rights of others" referred only to
tortious acts. Id. at 1375-76 (citing Note, Administrative Regulation of the High School Press,
83 MIcH. L. Rlv. 625, 640 (1984)). Accordingly, the court held that "school officials are
justified in limiting student speech under this standard only when publication of that speech
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may be other similar interests advanced, such as an interest in "teaching
students the boundaries of socially appropriate behaviour.""
In addition, school officials must show that content-based regula-
tions are narrowly drawn to achieve the compelling interest.30 1 Despite
the presence of an arguably colorable state interest, it is difficult to justify
Education Code section 48907's authorization of administrative content-
based prior restraint as a narrowly tailored restriction.3 °2
Some courts have suggested that the traditional or limited forum
theory analyses do not apply in the high school context; instead, the stan-
dard is somewhat lower.30 3 Those courts interpreted the standard set
forth in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School District,3 4 and pro-
posed that "in order for a prohibition on protected speech to be adjudged
valid, school officials must demonstrate that the prohibition was 'neces-
could result in tort liability of the school." Id. at 1376. The court announced that "[a]ny
yardstick less exacting than potential tort liability could result in school officials curtailing
speech at the slightest fear of disturbance." Id.
The Eighth Circuit determined that on the facts of the case, the only conceivable tort
action which could have been maintained against the school had the pregnancy case study
been published was an "invasion of privacy" action. Id. at 1376. After examining the facts,
the court concluded that no tort action would lie against the school. Id. Therefore, the school
officials were not justified in censoring and their doing so violated the students' first amend-
ment rights. Id.
While the students emerged victorious from the court of appeals, the administrators were
left in a rather awkward position by the court. Apparently, before any prior restraint is justi-
fied under the "invasion of rights" standard, administrators will have to consult an attorney
for an advisory opinion regarding the likelihood of actual tort liability. Presumably, unless the
decision to censor was based on at least a reasonable belief that tort liability could ensue, the
administrators would not meet their burden and any censorship would therefore be unconstitu-
tional. While this approach is somewhat burdensome, it nevertheless assures that some pre-
liminary legal investigation will occur before censorship decisions are made. Since Kuhlmeier
deals only with the invasion of privacy tort, the question of whether administrators may censor
potentially libelous material will remain unanswered by the Supreme Court (unless it adopts a
more expansive interpretation of "invasion of the rights of others" and/or provides dicta re-
garding libel). See infra notes 396-412 and accompanying text for a discussion of administra-
tive authority to censor potentially libelous expression. See infra note 404 for a discussion of
one court's grant of broad discretion to school officials with regard to potential libel. See supra
note 33 and infra notes 481-501 and accompanying text for a discussion of what procedural
safeguards are constitutionally required in censorship systems.
300. Bethel School Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 106 S. Ct. 3159 (1986). The court in Nicholson
v. Board of Education Torrance Unified School District, 682 F.2d 858 (9th Cir. 1982), in
upholding prior review by the school principal to assure accuracy, stated that "the school
possessed a substantial educational interest in teaching young student writers journalistic skills
which stressed accuracy and fairness." Id. at 863.
301. See supra note 282 and accompanying text.
302. See infra notes 413-501 and accompanying text for arguments against finding § 48907
a narrowly tailored restriction.
303. See, e.g., Kuhlmeier, 795 F.2d 1368.
304. 393 U.S. 503.
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sary to avoid material and substantial interference with school work or
discipline. . ., or the rights of others.' "305 The Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals requires a "strong showing on the part of the school administra-
tors that publication of the forbidden materials [will] 'materially and sub-
stantially interfere with the requirements of appropriate discipline or the
operation of the school'" before it will allow "outright prohibition or
censorship. "306
Although the California state courts have not had the opportunity
to apply a forum theory analysis to student publications, the limited pub-
lic forum theory has been applied in an analogous context. In Bailey v.
Loggins, 3°7 the California Supreme Court applied the forum theory anal-
ysis to a prison newspaper. The court determined that although the
prison environment was restrictive, by statute "California prisoners re-
tain[ed] all rights encompassed under the heading of the freedom of the
press in the First Amendment to the United States Constitution and arti-
cle I, section 2 of the California Constitution, except to the extent that
such rights must be curtailed for institutional security and public
safety."' 30 8 Consequently, the court found that established constitutional
principles applied in defining the prison journalists' rights.30 9 Similarly,
it may be argued that pursuant to Education Code section 48907, stu-
dents retain the same constitutional rights, subject to restrictions based
on order and safety. Accordingly, constitutional principles should gov-
ern in defining student journalists' rights.
In deciding how to categorize the prison newspaper, the Bailey court
looked to the intended purpose of the newspaper. The court determined
that the Department of Correction's regulations made it "clear that the
department contemplated that the institutional publication it authorized
would include expressions of prisoners' ideas and views. '310 Thus, the
court ruled that the prison newspaper operated as a "limited public fo-
rum for prisoner expression." '' Section 48907 similarly provides that
305. Kuhlmeier, 795 F.2d at 1374 (citing Tinker v. Des. Moines Indep. School Dist., 393
U.S. 503, 511 (1969)); Nicholson, 682 F.2d at 863 n.3; Trujillo v. Love, 322 F. Supp. 1266,
1270 (D. Colo. 1971)).
306. Nicholson, 682 F.2d at 863 n.3 (citing Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. School Dist., 393
U.S. 503, 509 (1969)). The Nicholson court also cited Education Code § 48916 (now § 48907)
for this proposition. See supra note 300.
307. 32 Cal. 3d 912, 654 P.2d 758, 187 Cal. Rptr. 575 (1982).
308. Id. at 915, 654 P.2d at 763, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 580.
309. Id.
310. Id. at 916, 654 P.2d at 764, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 581. This court's reasoning is similar to
that employed by the San Diego Committee court. See supra notes 292-96 and accompanying
text.
311. Id. at 915, 654 P.2d at 763, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 580.
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official publications shall be vehicles for student expression; it expressly
provides that "[s]tudents of the public schools shall have ... the right of
expression in official publications .... 3 12 Thus, section 48907 makes it
"clear that the [legislature] contemplated that the institutional publica-
tion[s] it authorized would include expressions of [students'] ideas and
views." Consequently, California students' publications are also limited
public forums.
Having determined that the prison newspaper was a limited public
forum, the Bailey court proceeded to analyze whether the prison newspa-
per "enjoy[ed] any protection under the First Amendment or correlative
California provisions. 313 The court determined that the paper was enti-
tled to such protection and rejected the two most commonly propounded
arguments against such a finding. First, the court rejected the argument
that "state financial support of the paper permitted the state, as pub-
lisher, to exercise complete control over its contents. ' 314  Second, the
court rejected the argument that "the state as publisher enjoys the same
total control over the content of the newspaper as a private publisher." '315
The court pointed out that "that contention overlooks the critical dis-
tinction between a government as publisher and a private publisher.
316
The court then observed that
[w]hen identical claims based on the state's right as publisher
have been asserted to justify censorship of high school and col-
lege newspapers, the courts have emphatically rejected those
claims. A state university-and the same is true of the Depart-
ment of Corrections-"is clearly an arm of the state and this
fact will always distinguish it from the purely private publisher
as far as censorship rights are concerned.,
3 17
312. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 48907.
313. Bailey, 32 Cal. 3d at 918, 654 P.2d at 765, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 582.
314. Id.
315. Id. at 918-19, 654 P.2d at 766, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 583 (citing Miami Herald Publishing
Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 255 (1974)).
316. Id. at 919, 654 P.2d at 766, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 583.
317. Id. (citing Bazaar v. Fortune, 476 F.2d 570, 574 (5th Cir.), aff'd, 489 F.2d 255 (1973)).
The Bailey court also cited Gambino, 429 F. Supp. 731, for its position on the forum theory.
In Gambino, the school board argued that because high school students are less mature, the
board as publisher had total control over the newspaper's content. Id. at 734-35. The court
rejected this argument. The Bailey court adopted the reasoning of the Gambino court and
held:
"While the scope of constitutional freedom may vary with the nature of the environ-
ment and the maturity of the individuals affected, the considerations governing the
applicability of First Amendment analysis in the first instance does not change.
Either the First Amendment is operative, or it is not. And if it is applicable, only
then does the distinction between the extent to which speech is protected... become
significant."
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The court ultimately held that under the applicable constitutional
provisions, the Department of Corrections could not censor newspapers
"merely because it disagree[d] with the views presented, object[ed] to in-
mate criticism of administration policy, or [sought] to avoid discussion of
controversial issues."31 In conclusion, the court declared:
[A]lthough the department retains greater powers to regulate
and censor than would be appropriate outside the prison walls,
it does not have total or arbitrary power, but must exercise its
authority even-handedly and with sensitivity to the values pro-
tected by the First Amendment and corresponding California
constitutional and statutory provisions.319
In sum, since section 48907 governs official-school-sponsored-
school publications, the forum theory analysis is applicable. In Bailey,
the Supreme Court recognized that even given the sensitive atmosphere
of a prison, absolute censorship by state officials was incompatible with
the constitutional guarantees of free speech and press found in the first
amendment and in article I, section 2(a). By analogy, the California
courts should find that while school officials may "retain greater powers
to regulate and censor than would be appropriate outside the [school]
walls," they must exercise their authority "even-handedly and with sensi-
tivity" to the applicable constitutional and statutory provisions.
Accordingly, if a student publication is more than a "mere activity,
time and place sheet," that is, it serves as a "forum" for student expres-
sion,320 then school officials may not censor the content of the publica-
tion simply because it is a school-sponsored publication. School
authorities cannot censor content which they disfavor, withdraw finan-
cial support because they object to the content, or dismiss or suspend
editors and staff because of disagreement over the viewpoints expressed
in the articles published.321
3. An illustrative model of analysis: the California three-prong test
While Bailey is quite instructive regarding the California Supreme
Court's application of the forum theory to institutional publications, the
California courts have not had a direct opportunity to decide the consti-
Bailey, 32 Cal. 3d at 919 n.7, 654 P.2d at 583 n.7, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 583 n.7 (quoting Gambino
v. Fairfax County School Bd., 429 F. Supp. 731, 734-35, aff'd, 564 F.2d 157 (1977)).
318. Bailey, 32 Cal. 3d at 920, 654 P.2d at 767, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 584.
319. Id. at 922, 654 P.2d at 768, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 585.
320. Note, supra note 274, at 883 (citing Zucker v. Panitz, 299 F. Supp. 102, 103 (S.D.N.Y.
1969)).
321. Id. at 882-88.
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tutionality of student press regulations since Bright v. Los Angeles Uni-
fied School District322 was decided and section 48907 was enacted.
Accordingly, they have yet to develop a method of analyzing content-
based prohibitions on student speech. The courts have, however, ad-
dressed the constitutional validity of other school regulations involving
students' free expression rights.
In evaluating district and school regulations regarding student
grooming regulations,323 the California courts have employed a three-
prong test to determine whether the school policy constitutes an uncon-
stitutional infringement on the students' rights.324 First, the court de-
cides whether the restraint imposed on the student's right rationally and
reasonably relates to the enhancement of a free public education. The
second inquiry is whether the benefits which the public gains by the re-
straint on that freedom outweigh the resulting impairment of the stu-
dent's right. Finally, the court will determine whether any alternative
less subversive or less restrictive of the student's constitutional right is
available.
The components of this test encompass the elements in a modified
"limited public forum" analysis; however, this test most closely resem-
bles the analysis employed if the forum is non-public. 25 Although this
commentator strongly urges adoption of the limited forum theory analy-
sis326 (as the alternative to the per se rule), application of the less strin-
gent California three-prong test illustrates that section 48907 suffers from
constitutional infirmities which cannot satisfy the minimum require-
ments under even the most lenient analytic model. Thus, irrespective of
322. 18 Cal. 3d 450, 556 P.2d 1090, 134 Cal. Rptr. 639 (1976).
323. The Myers court held that a student's long hairstyle and the wearing of a beard were
rights entitled to protection under the first amendment. Myers, 269 Cal. App. 2d at 557, 75
Cal. Rptr. at 72 (citing Akin v. Board of Educ., 262 Cal. App. 2d 161, 68 Cal. Rptr. 557
(1968), cerL denied, 393 U.S. 1041 (1961)).
324. See Akin, 262 Cal. App. 2d 161, 68 Cal. Rptr. 557. In determining whether the de-
fendant school district's "Good Grooming Policy" constituted an unreasonable infringement
on the student plaintiff's constitutional rights, the Akin court adopted the California Supreme
Court's three-prong test set forth in Bagley v. Washington Township Hosp. Dist., 65 Cal. 2d
499, 501-02, 421 P.2d 409, 414-15, 55 Cal. Rptr. 401, 406-07 (1965). The Akin court, as well
as other courts employing this test, refer to the three-pronged analysis as the Bagley test. For
purposes of discussion here, however, the test will be referred to as the Akin test.
325. See supra text accompanying notes 286-89. For most courts it is a given that the state
has a compelling or substantial interest in maintaining order and discipline in the schools.
Hence, the focus shifts to the means employed to achieve those ends. Whether a regulation is
reasonable may depend on the outcome of the California balancing test. Moreover, all of the
tests (public forum, nonpublic forum and California) require that the state use the least restric-
tive means available (i.e., the restriction must be narrowly tailored to the state interest).
326. See supra text accompanying notes 283-85.
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whether the traditional, limited or non-public forum analysis is applied,
Education Code section 48907 does not pass constitutional scrutiny.
a. prong P rational and reasonable relationship
In deciding the constitutionality of student dress code regulations327
and the search and seizure of students and their belongings, 3 28 California
courts have repeatedly claimed that school authorities "may impose
more stringent regulations upon the constitutional rights of minors than
upon those of adults."32 9 The courts find that it is "manifestly clear that
not every public restriction or limitation placed upon the exercise of sec-
ondary students' constitutional rights is... prohibited. Where there is
an invasion of protected freedoms... 'the power of the state to control
the conduct of children reaches beyond the scope of its authority over
adults.' "330 Thus, the courts hold that the "imposition of reasonable
restraints on the exercise of constitutional rights may be proper. ' 331 The
question presented under the first prong therefore becomes whether the
imposition of prior restraints and the authorization of administration
censorship is reasonably related to the maintenance of a proper learning
environment.332 School officials may try to satisfy this requirement by
showing that unrestrained student conduct will disrupt school
activities.333
327. See Akin, 262 Cal. App. 2d at 168, 68 Cal. Rptr. at 562; see also Myers, 269 Cal. App.
2d 549, 551, 75 Cal. Rptr. 68, 74.
328. See, eg., In re Donaldson, 292 Cal. App. 2d 509, 75 Cal. Rptr. 220 (1969); see supra
note 63.
329. See Myers, 269 Cal. App. 2d at 558, 75 Cal. Rptr. at 73.
330. Akin, 262 Cal. App. 2d at 162, 68 Cal. Rptr. at 560 (quoting Ginsberg v. New York,
390 U.S. 629, 638 (1968)); see also Myers, 269 Cal. App. 2d at 552, 75 Cal. Rptr. at 73 (quoting
Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 638 (1968)).
331. Akin, 262 Cal. App. 2d at 166, 68 Cal. Rptr. at 561 (citations omitted).
332. The issue has been similarly framed by the federal courts. See infra note 333.
333. See Akin, 262 Cal. App. 2d at 168, 68 Cal. Rptr. at 562; see also Shanley v. Northeast
Indep. School Dist., 462 F.2d 960 (5th Cir. 1972). The Shanley court held that "[i]n formulat-
ing regulations... school officials have a wide latitude of discretion. But the school is always
bound by the requirement that the rules and regulations must be reasonable." Id. at 969 (quot-
ing Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 748-49 (5th Cir. 1966)). The court cautioned that it was
not the court's function to consider whether such rules are "wise or expedient but merely
whether they are a reasonable exercise of the power and discretion of the school authorities."
Id. The Burnside court explained that:
Regulations which are essential in maintaining order and discipline on school
property are reasonable. Thus, school rules which assign students to a particular
class, forbid unnecessary discussion in the classroom and prohibit the exchange of
conversation between students are reasonable even though these regulations infringe
on such basic rights as freedom of speech and association, because they are necessary
for the orderly presentation of classroom activities. Therefore, a reasonable regula-
tion is one which measurably contributes to the maintenance and order and decorum
within the educational system.
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In Akin v. Board of Education,"' a California court of appeal found
that the Riverside Unified School District's "Good Grooming Policy"
which forbade students from wearing beards was rationally and reason-
ably related to the enhancement of a free public education.335 There, the
court found that the administrative policy was "the result of the consid-
ered judgment of a number of persons who were experienced in the field
of education. 3 36 The administrators and teachers testified that the wear-
ing of a beard would "definitely [be] disruptive of the educational process
... [and] such a disturbance would have a prejudicial effect on the educa-
tional environment and adverse effects on other students .... The
school officials also claimed that "the academic system and maintenance
of discipline were best served when there were no such influences [be-
cause the] proper classroom atmosphere and decorum flourished where
such ... students were not subjected to distraction by other pupils. '338
In addition to these general statements, the school district was able to
cite specific instances when disruption resulted from a student wearing a
beard.339 The court of appeal in Myers v. Arcata Union High School Dis-
trict,3 ° reasoned similarly in finding that the school district's hair length
policy was a reasonable way to prevent disruption. 3 1' Thus, that policy
satisfied the first prong of the test.
342
In addressing whether section 48907 meets this first prong, support-
ers of the section's prior restraint system will attempt to justify its impo-
sition on students' rights by arguing that restraints on student expression
are a reasonable means by which the officials may maintain "proper
classroom atmosphere and decorum. ' 343 Because school authorities tra-
ditionally have been granted broad powers to control student conduct,
344
the courts could find that restraints on obscene, libelous and disruptive
Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 748 (5th Cir. 1966) (emphasis added); see also supra note 100
for a discussion of Burnside.
334. 262 Cal. App. 2d 161, 68 Cal. Rptr. 557 (1968), cer. denied, 393 U.S. 1041 (1969).
335. Id. at 168, 68 Cal. Rptr. at 562.
336. Id.
337. Id.
338. Id.
339. Id. For example, school officials testified that disruption resulted when male students
wished to follow the example set by a foreign exchange student and a basketball player who
wore beards. Id. The school officials claimed that the foreign visitor was the subject of teasing
and harrassment. Id.
340. 269 Cal. App. 2d 549, 75 Cal. Rptr. 68 (1969).
341. Id. at 559, 75 Cal. Rptr. at 74.
342. The court briefly discussed the first prong. It stated matter of factly that "long hair, on
male students, had a disruptive effect at Arcata High School." Id.
343. Akin, 262 Cal. App. 2d at 163, 68 Cal. Rptr. at 562.
344. Id. at 167, 68 Cal. Rptr. at 561.
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student expression are reasonably related to the state's goal of fostering
an environment conducive to learning. 45 Allowing supposedly obscene
and libelous expression could seriously impair the "proper classroom at-
mosphere and decorum." 346 Expression inciting students to break school
rules or destroy school property could also stain the pristine learning
environment. Because these types of expression are potentially distract-
ing and disruptive, there is a reasonable relationship between restraining
speech and the legislative goal of maintaining order. Following this rea-
soning, section 48907 would pass the first prong.
Although the first prong of the Akin three-prong test appears to be
easily met, it is important to note that both Akin and Myers predate
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School District.347 The Tinker Court
proclaimed that students may express themselves even though their ex-
pression may be somewhat distracting or disruptive. Only when student
expression "'materially and substantially interfere[s] with the require-
ments of appropriate discipline in the operation of the school'" may
school officials infringe on that expression. 348 The Court advised that
before any student expression may be restrained, administrators must
"be able to show that [their] action was caused by something more than a
mere desire to avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness that always ac-
company an unpopular viewpoint., 349 Furthermore, administrative ac-
tion may not be the result of an "undifferentiated fear" of disruption.3"'
Therefore, California courts today must look beyond the mere fact that
student expression could disrupt or distract students. Instead, they must
employ the Tinker test to determine whether substantial disruption or
disorder will result if the expression is not inhibited. This requirement as
modified by Tinker parallels the first component of the modified limited
forum analysis.351
345. See, eg., Fraser v. Bethel School Dist., 755 F.2d 1356 (9th Cir. 1985), rev'd, 106 S. Ct.
3159 (1986).
346. Akin, 262 Cal. App. 2d at 168, 68 Cal. Rptr. at 562.
347. 393 U.S. 503 (1969). Thus, while both the Akin and Myers courts recognized that
students had the constitutional right to express themselves via their choice to wear a beard or
have long hair, those courts were not guided by the substantial disruption standard. Neverthe-
less, apparent from the criteria used by these courts is that they required a factual showing by
the school district that the student conduct disrupted school activity in some way.
348. Id. at 509 (quoting Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (5th Cir. 1969)).
349. Id.
350. Id.
351. See Montalvo v. Madera Unified School Dist., 21 Cal. App. 3d 323, 98 Cal. Rptr. 593
(1971). The Montalvo court stated that when first amendment rights are involved, the courts
"must ask whether the gravity of the 'evil,' discounted by its improbability, justifies such inva-
sion of free speech as is necessary to avoid the danger." Id. at 332, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 599
(quoting Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 510 (1950)).
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Since Tinker, other courts construing the "substantial disruption"
standard have held that neither a "mild curiosity" by students, nor an
administrator's belief that a particular expression "could" or "might"
cause a disruption is sufficient to justify suppression of student speech.
In addition, a school official's mere "intuition" that disruption will result
is insufficient.352 In short, the lower courts have concluded that in order
to justify suppression of student expression, an administrator needs de-
monstrable facts that disruption will occur.353
A California court in Montalvo v. Madera Unified School District,
354
adopted the substantial disruption standard and held that only upon a
showing of substantial disruption will there be a reasonable relationship
352. The Montalvo court noted that "if First Amendment rights are involved, the court will
give little weight to expert opinion testimony expressing fears of disruption, divisiveness, and
interference with the educational process where the opinions are not based on actual inci-
dents." Id. at 332, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 599 (citations omitted).
353. See Bethel School Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 106 S. Ct. 3159 (1986) (school district's
imposition of sanctions on student for lewd and indecent speech permissible); Papish v. Board
of Curators, 410 U.S. 667 (1973) (use of profanity in newspaper distributed on college campus
not disruptive of school environment); Trachtman v. Anker, 563 F.2d 512 (2d Cir. 1977) (pro-
hibition against distribution of sex questionnaire permitted on ground it would substantially
disrupt high school-holding based on affidavits of psychologists and psychiatrists advising
that survey could cause "significant emotional harm" to some students); Joyner v. Whiting,
477 F.2d 456 (4th Cir. 1973) (university could not withdraw financial support from school
paper which editorialized in favor of racial segregation without evidence that expression dis-
rupted school); Sullivan v. Houston Indep. School Dist., 475 F.2d 1071 (5th Cir. 1973) (high
school administrators could not suppress distribution of newspaper on disruption ground sim-
ply because some students read newspaper during class); Shanley v. Northeast Indep. School
Dist., 462 F.2d 960 (5th Cir. 1972) (court prohibited discipline of high school students for
distributing newspaper advocating reform of marijuana laws and containing birth control in-
formation because no evidence of disruption); Scoville v. Board of Educ., 425 F.2d 10 (7th Cir.
1970) (court reversed discipline of students for selling newspaper urging students to refuse to
accept or to destroy any "propaganda" issued by the school, claiming that the dean had a "sick
mind" and containing the statement "[o]ral sex may prevent tooth decay" because no evidence
that paper disruptive); Norton v. Discipline Committee, 419 F.2d 195 (6th Cir. 1969) (court
upheld suspension of students for distributing literature which urged college students to en-
gage in disorderly and destructive activities, including seizure of buildings), cert. denied, 399
U.S. 906 (1970); Frasca v. Andrews, 463 F. Supp. 1043 (E.D.N.Y. 1979) (court upheld princi-
pal's seizure of school paper based on two letters to editor: one from several lacrosse team
members who physically threatened sports editor, the other accused student government of-
ficer of using school computer to change grade which justified forecast of substantial disrup-
tion); Leibner v. Sharbaugh, 429 F. Supp. 744 (E.D. Va. 1977) (court upheld right of student
to distribute "racist" student newspaper because school unable to show distribution would
disrupt school).
354. 21 Cal. App. 3d 323, 332, 98 Cal. Rptr. 593, 601 (1971) (citing Tinker v. Des Moines
Indep. School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 514 (1969)). The Montalvo court held that the burden is on
the school board to justify a constitutional invasion by "facts which might reasonably have led
[them] to forecast substantial disruption of or material interference with school activities." Id.;
see also Los Angeles Teachers Union v. Los Angeles City Bd. of Educ., 71 Cal. 2d 550, 559,
199 Cal. Rptr. 35, 42 (1969).
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between the goal of order and the restraint of student expression. 3"5
Since the outcome of the test is so dependent upon the facts in each case,
it is difficult to make any generalizations about the disruptive or distract-
ing quality of student expression in their publications. Hence, the courts
may simply construe the statute as authorizing regulations which require
such a factual showing.356 Nevertheless, the test no longer appears to be
that the regulation be merely a reasonable means of achieving order and
discipline. Instead, regulations must be necessary to achieve those ends.
In short, the regulation will be reasonable only when school officials can
show that disruption will result if they do not intervene.
b. prong II. balancing the state's and students' interests
Prong two of the Akin test requires a balancing of the benefits to the
public education system against the burdens placed on the students' exer-
cise of their rights.35 7 The Akin court found that the school's anti-beard
policy easily passed the second prong. After having determined that
bearded students would have disrupted the school environment, the
court held that the "public derives benefit where public school students
are academically trained in a classroom climate devoid of disruptive in-
fluences." '358 The court added that since "the public assumes the cost of
maintaining the public school system ... [they] are entitled to have
[their] schools operated with a minimum of interruption. ' 35 9 The court
therefore concluded that the public benefit derived from ensuring "[g]ood
study habits and proper conduct on the part of youngsters . ..out-
weigh[ed] the restraint on the peripheral right to grow a beard.
'360
Section 48907's system of prior restraint would similarly benefit the
public. But, unlike the right to grow a beard, the rights of free expression
and press are not peripheral rights; they are fundamental rights.
361
Moreover, the right to be free from prior restraint is a super fundamental
right.362 Therefore, on balance, the scales might not tip so easily in favor
of the restraint. As the long line of cases disfavoring prior restraint of
expression illustrates, the state's interest must far outweigh the individu-
355. Montalvo, 21 Cal. App. 3d at 332, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 601.
356. See infra notes 516-20 for recommendations regarding how the legislature can define
these terms.
357. Akin, 262 Cal. App. 2d at 168, 68 Cal. Rptr. at 562; see also Myers, 269 Cal. App. 2d at
551, 75 Cal. Rptr. at 74.
358. Akin, 262 Cal. App. 2d at 162, 68 Cal. Rptr. at 562.
359. Id.
360. Id.
361. See supra notes 22-59 and accompanying text.
362. Id.
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als' or press' right to express themselves. 363 This is true even for
students.3 4
One argument that may be put forth is that the state's or public's
interest in maintaining order never outweighs the students' free speech
and press rights. Therefore, students' rights prevail over any statute or
regulation imposing a prior restraint on student expression.365 Neverthe-
less, implicit in section 48907 is the notion that the state's interest in
maintaining order and discipline in the school may outweigh the stu-
dents' rights to express themselves if the expression is obscene, libelous
or creates a clear and present danger366 of: (1) the commission of unlaw-
ful acts on school premises; (2) the violation of lawful school regulations;
or (3) the substantial disruption of orderly school operation.367
1) substantial disruption
When school officials can show that student expression will create a
"substantial disruption of the orderly operation of the school," then
prior restraint of that expression is statutorily permissible.368 In other
words, the state's interest in maintaining order will outweigh the stu-
dents' free expression rights. As discussed in connection with the first
prong of the test, however, the potential for disruption must be factually
substantiated.369
2) obscenity
Section 48907 also provides that students' rights of free expression
and press fall when that expression is obscene.370 Again the state and
public interest in maintaining a public school where "students are aca-
demically trained in a classroom climate devoid of disruptive influences"
arguably outweighs the student's right.
363. See supra notes 30-36 and accompanying text.
364. See supra note 297 and accompanying text.
365. See supra notes 242-70 and accompanying text.
366. In the adult context, there are several requirements before speech may be suppressed
because it creates a "clear and present danger" of an unwanted act or occurrence. The censor
must show that: (1) the speaker is directly inciting imminent lawless action; (2) the speaker is
advocating that the action is to be taken immediately; and (3) the speech is likely to incite or
produce the action advocated. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per
curiam). The censor must also show that the harm or evil to be prevented is a serious one.
Moreover, the burden rests on the censor to show that the least restrictive alternative available
to accomplish the state's purpose is used.
367. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 48907. See infra Appendix A for the full text of § 48907.
368. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 48907.
369. See supra notes 352-56 and accompanying text.
370. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 48907.
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The primary justification used by the courts which have addressed
the issue of restraining obscene student speech is that obscenity is not
protected by the first amendment.37' Caution should be exercised by the
courts in this area because, while obscenity is not protected by the first
amendment, other closely related categories of speech are protected.
Although the United States Supreme Court has expressly held that "four
letter" words are not obscene,3 72 nearly every charge of obscenity as-
serted against student publications was provoked by the presence of non-
sexual offensive language or simple profanity.373 In ruling in student
press cases, the federal courts have held that students' expression rights
prevail over the state's interest in restraining "inappropriate and inde-
cent" speech, "earthy" words, profanity or "offensive material. '374 The
371. The United States Supreme Court has ruled that obscenity is not protected by the first
amendment. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973). Thus, several courts have suggested
that school officials may constitutionally impose a prior restraint on obscene material sought to
be distributed on high school campuses. See Nichols, Vulgarity and Obscenity in the Student
Press, 10 J.L. & EDuc. 207 (1981), and LAW OF THE STUDENT PRESS, supra note 60, for a
discussion of such cases. See generally F. DUTILE, supra note 77, at 189-97. The difficult
question is, however, how to define obscenity. The current test, as set forth in Miller v. Califor-
nia, requires that the material meet the following three criteria in order to qualify as legally
obscene:
a) Whether the average person, applying contemporary community standards,
would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to prurient interest;
b) Whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual con-
duct as defined by state law;
c) Whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political or
scientific value.
Miller, 413 U.S. at 24.
Obscenity, in general, is hard core pornography: the explicit and graphic description of
sexual activity that arouses sexual feelings. The Supreme Court has ruled, however, that what
may not be obscene for adults may be obscene for minors. See Ginsberg v. New York, 390
U.S. 629 (1968); see also New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982). Nevertheless, the material
must still depict explicit sex and must meet the three prongs of the Miller test. It must appeal
to the prurient interest of a minor, depict sexual conduct, and lack serious literary, artistic,
political or scientific value for a minor. Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 646. See also CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 313 (West Supp. 1987), infra note 516.
372. Papish v. Board of Curators, 410 U.S. 667 (1973) (per curiam). In Papish, the Court
held that a college student could not be expelled for distributing his underground paper which
contained four-letter words and a cartoon of the Goddess of Justice and Statue of Liberty
being raped by a policeman. The Court ruled that the material was not constitutionally ob-
scene and declared that "the mere dissemination of ideas-no matter how offensive to good
taste--on a state university campus may not be shut off in the name alone of 'conventions of
decency.'" Id. at 670.
373. LAW OF THE STUDENT PRESS, supra note 60, at 39. See generally Nichols, supra note
371.
374. LAW OF THE STUDENT PRESS, supra note 60, at 39; see, e.g., Jacobs v. Board of School
Comm'rs, 490 F.2d 601 (7th Cir. 1973) (court reversed ban on underground newspaper on
ground that it contained "four-letter" words); Scoville v. Board of Educ., 425 F.2d 10 (7th Cir.
1970); Koppell v. Levine, 347 F. Supp. (E.D.N.Y. 1972) (despite presence of "four-letter"
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courts have uniformly rejected school officials' arguments that the pres-
ence of such words justifies prior restraint of student expression.
375
Therefore, the state's interest only outweighs the student's right to
"speak and write freely" when obscenity, as legally defined, is involved.
The United States Supreme Court recently addressed a related issue
in Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser.376 In Fraser, a high school
student filed a civil rights action against the school district after he was
disciplined for giving a speech which was allegedly "indecent, lewd, and
offensive to the modesty and decency of many of the students and faculty
in attendance at [a student elections] assembly. ' 377 The school district's
hearing examiner determined that the speech fell within the "ordinary
meaning of 'obscene'" as used in the school's disciplinary rule prohibit-
ing the use of obscene language in the school. The student was then
suspended for three days and was removed from the list of candidates for
graduation speaker. 378 The student then fied suit alleging that his first
words and depiction of couple in bed, court reversed suppression of school literary magazine,
finding that magazine contained no extended narrative tending to excite sexual desires or
predominantly appealing to a prurient interest and was therefore not obscene); cf. Bethel
School Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 106 S. Ct. 3159 (1986) (Court held school district acted within
its permissible authority in sanctioning student who gave "lewd" and "indecent" speech at
high school assembly-such speech not protected by first amendment); Baker v. Downey City
Bd. of Educ., 307 F. Supp. 517 (C.D. Cal. 1969) (court upheld discipline of students for use of
"profanity and vulgarity" in student newspaper). The Baker decision may have been implic-
itly overturned by Papish, 410 U.S. 667. On the other hand, in light of Fraser, the Baker
decision may still be valid.
375. See supra note 374.
376. 106 S. Ct. 3159 (1986).
377. Id. at 3162. High school student Matthew Fraser gave his speech to an audience of
approximately 600 high school students at a student government pre-election assembly. Seek-
ing support for his candidate for office, Fraser declared:
"I know a man who is firm-he's firm in his pants, he's firm in his shirt, his
character is firm-but most ... of all, his belief in you, the students of Bethel, is firm.
"Jeff Kulman is a man who takes his point and pounds it in. If necessary, he'll
take an issue and nail it to the wall. He doesn't attack things in spurts-he drives
hard, pushing and pushing until finally-he succeeds.
"Jeff is a man who will go to the very end-even the climax, for each and every
one of you.
"So vote for Jeff for A.S.B vice-president-he'll never come between you and the
best our high school can be."
Id. at 3167 (Brennan, J., concurring) (quoting Matthew Fraser, speech delivered at Bethel
High School, Bethel, Washington, Apr. 26, 1983)).
378. Id. at 3162. The high school disciplinary rule prohibiting the use of obscene language
in school provided: "Conduct which materially and substantially interferes with the educa-
tional process is prohibited, including the use of obscene, profane language or gestures." Id.
(quoting Bethel High School's disciplinary rule). The majority did not discuss whether the
student's speech was "conduct" or whether the speech was indeed "speech" and therefore
entitled to greater protection. The Court appeared to have presumed that the speech was
"conduct" and fell within the ambit of the disciplinary rule. In dissent, Justice Stevens argued
that the Court's "reliance on the school's authority to prohibit ... conduct ... [was] mis-
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amendment freedom of speech right had been violated.379
In addressing the constitutionality of the suspension, the Court first
noted that "[n]othing in the Constitution prohibits the states from insist-
ing that certain modes of expression are inappropriate and subject to
sanction. ' 38 0 The inculcation of these speech values is, according to the
Court, "truly the 'work of the schools.' "" The Court therefore con-
cluded that "a highly appropriate function of public school education [is]
to prohibit the use of vulgar and offensive terms in public discourse."3 2
placed." Id. at 3170 n.4 (Stevens, J., dissenting). He believed that the student's speech "was
not 'conduct' prohibited by the disciplinary rule." Id. at 3170 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
379. Id. at 3163. The district court held that the school's sanctions violated the student's
first amendment rights. Id. at 3163. The district court also held that the school's disruptive
conduct rule, see supra note 378, was unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. Fraser, 106 S.
Ct. at 3163. The Supreme Court did not decide these issues. The district court also held that
the removal of the student's name from the graduation speaker list violated the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment. Id. The court awarded the student monetary relief and
issued an injunction ordering the school district to allow Fraser to speak at the graduation. Id.
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment and
held that the student's speech was no different than the black protest armband worn by the
students in Tinker, 393 U.S. 503. The school district argued that it had an interest in protect-
ing the "captive" student audience from lewd and indecent language. The court rejected this
argument finding instead that "the school board's 'unbridled discretion' to determine what
discourse is 'decent' would 'increase the risk of cementing white, middle-class standards for
determining what is acceptable and proper speech and behavior in our public schools.'" Id.
(quoting Fraser v. Bethel School Dist. No. 403, 755 F.2d 1356, 1363 (9th Cir. 1986)). The
court also rejected the school's argument that the power to determine the school curriculum
included power to control the language used to express ideas during a school-sponsored activ-
ity. Id.
380. Id. at 3165.
381. Id. (citing Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508 (1969)).
382. Id. The Supreme Court began its analysis by defining the objective of American public
education as "the inculcat[ion of] fundamental values necessary to the maintenance of a demo-
cratic political system." Id. at 3164; see supra note 77. The Court noted that the "fundamen-
tal values of 'habits and manner of civility' essential to a democratic society" include a
tolerance of divergent and perhaps unpopular political and religious views. Nevertheless the
Court held that: "The undoubted freedom to advocate unpopular and controversial views in
schools and classrooms must be balanced against the society's countervailing interest in teach-
ing students the boundaries of socially appropriate behavior." Id. at 3164.
The Court proceeded to reaffirm the proposition that "the constitutional rights of students
in public school are not coextensive with the rights of adults. . . ." Id. at 3164 (citing New
Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985)). The Court then discussed the line of cases which
limited first amendment protection for speakers using sexually explicit language to address an
audience possibly including children. Id. at 3165 (citing Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629
(1968) (Court upheld New York statute banning sale of sexually oriented materials to minors,
even though identical material entitled to first amendment protection with respect to adults);
Board of Educ., Island Trees Union Free School Dist. No. 26 v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 871-72
(1982) (plurality opinion) (school board has authority to remove vulgar books from public
school library without violating first amendment); id. at 879-81 (Blackmun, J., concurring); id.
at 918-20 (Rehnquist, J., concurring)). The Court explained that these cases "illustrate the
obvious concern on the part of parents, and school authorities acting in locoparentis to protect
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Accordingly, the Court held that "[t]he determination of what manner of
speech in the classroom or in the school assembly is inappropriate prop-
erly rests with the school board.
38 3
The student argued that under Tinker v. Des Moines Independent
School District,384 the school could not sanction a student for expressing
a political viewpoint.385 The Court, however, distinguished Tinker and
found instead that "[u]nlike the sanctions imposed on the students wear-
ing armbands in Tinker, the penalties imposed [on the student here] were
unrelated to any political viewpoint. ' 386 The Supreme Court thus held
that the first amendment did not bar the school district from disciplining
the student for giving the "offensively lewd and indecent" speech at the
assembly.387
While the Supreme Court appears to have granted broad discretion
to school officials in dictating the tenor of student speech, the Fraser de-
cision should not be read for more than it is worth. At issue in Fraser
was whether the student could be punished after giving his speech. Only
after examining the effect of the speech on the audience could the court
determine whether or not the student's punishment was constitutional.388
The Fraser Court did not sanction prior restraint of "lewd and indecent"
speech. As Justice Brennan noted in his concurrence: "the Court's hold-
ing concern[ed] only the authority that school officials have to restrict a
high school student's use of disruptive language in a speech given to a
children--especially in a captive audience-from exposure to sexually explicit, indecent, or
lewd speech." Id.; see supra notes 70-73 for a discussion of the in loco parentis doctrine.
The Court also relied on Federal Communications Commission v. Pacifica Foundation,
438 U.S. 726 (1978). The Pacifica Court recognized an interest in protecting minors from
being exposed to vulgar and offensive spoken language, id. at 749, and held that it was within
the power of the Federal Communications Commission to regulate a radio broadcast deemed
to be indecent but not obscene. Id. at 750-51. The Fraser Court adopted the reasoning of the
Pacifica Court and held that lewd and offensive words" 'are no essential part of any exposition
of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be
derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.'" Fraser,
106 S. Ct. at 3166 (quoting Federal Communications Comm'n v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S.
726, 746 (1978) (quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942))). Unlike
the Ninth Circuit, the Supreme Court did not distinguish Pacifica as a unique case involving
the broadcast media.
383. Id. at 3165.
384. 393 U.S. 503; see supra notes 87-100 for a discussion of the Tinker decision.
385. Fraser, 106 S. Ct. at 3163. The Court apparently did not find it significant that the
speech was given at a student government assembly preceding student body officer elections;
i.e., in a "political speech" context.
386. Id. at 3166.
387. Id.
388. Id. at 3165. In fact, school officials warned Fraser that his speech may be inappropri-
ate. They nevertheless did not censor his speech or prevent him from speaking. See id. at 3171
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
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high school assembly." '389 Justice Brennan noted that the same speech
may well be protected if given under different circumstances.390
Justice Brennan added that there was no suggestion in the case that
school officials attempted to regulate the student's speech because they
disagreed with his views.39 ' Moreover, the school officials did not at-
tempt to ban written materials they considered "inappropriate" for high
school students, or to limit what the students could hear, read or learn
about.392 In short, the school officials did not discipline the student be-
cause they opposed the ideas expressed in his speech.
Justice Brennan further counseled that "[t]he authority school offi-
cials have to regulate speech by high school students is not limitless.
'393
Specifically, "school officials.., do [not] have limitless discretion to ap-
ply their own notions of indecency. ' 394 Brennan advised that "'[c]ourts
have a first amendment responsibility to insure that robust rhetoric.., is
not suppressed by prudish failures to distinguish the vigorous from the
vulgar.' ,395
In sum, while the Fraser Court suggested that "lewd and indecent"
speech may be inappropriate in certain circumstances and therefore sub-
ject the speaker to discipline, it did not sanction prior restraint. There-
389. Id. at 3168 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment) (emphasis added).
390. Id. (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment). In his dissent, Justice Stevens noted
that "vulgar language, like vulgar animals, may be acceptable in some contexts and intolerable
in others." Id. at 3171 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Thus, vulgar language is often times simply
"'a pig in the parlor instead of the barnyard.'" Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Euclid v.
Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 388 (1926)).
Justice Brennan also disagreed with the Court's suggestion that school officials could le-
gitimately punish indecent or lewd speech because it was "insulting" to female students and
"seriously damaging" to the 14-year olds in the audience. Id. at 3168 n.2. Justice Brennan
stated:
There is no evidence in the record that any students, male or female, found the
speech "insulting." And while it was not unreasonable for school officials to con-
clude that [the student's] remarks were inappropriate for a school-sponsored assem-
bly, the language [he] used does not even approach the sexually explicit speech
regulated in Ginsberg v. New York, or the indecent speech banned in FCC v. Pacifca
Foundation. Indeed, to my mind, [his] speech was no more "obscene," "lewd," or
"sexually explicit" than the bulk of programs currently appearing on prime time
television or in the local cinema.
Id. at 3168 n.2.
391. Id. (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment).
392. Id. (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment) (citing Board of Educ. Island Trees
Union Free School Dist. No. 26 v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982)).
393. Id. (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment) (citing Thomas v. Board of Educ., 607
F.2d 1043, 1057 (2d Cir. 1979) (Newman, J., concurring in the result)).
394. Id. (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment) (quoting Thomas v. Board of Educ., 607
F.2d 1043, 1057 (2d Cir. 1979) (Newman, J., concurring in the result)).
395. Id. (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment) (quoting Thomas v. Board of Educ., 607
F.2d 1043, 1057 (2d Cir. 1979) (Newman, J., concurring in the result)).
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fore, the courts should not read Fraser to stand for that proposition.
Accordingly, the state's interest will not necessarily outweigh the stu-
dent's interests even though the language used may be lewd, indecent or
profane.
3) libel
Libelous expression, like obscenity, is not always protected
speech.3 96 There are instances, however, when libelous expression may
be privileged; for example, when the libel concerns a public official, pub-
lic figure or topic of public interest.397 Despite the sensitive nature of this
expression, the United States Supreme Court ruled that the first amend-
ment does not permit the government to impose a prior restraint on the
publication of a libelous commercial newspaper.398  The California
courts have similarly ruled.399 The remedy for libel is a sanction after
the expression has occurred. 4' °  Notwithstanding this, section 48907
clearly provides that school administrators may exercise prior restraint
over material that they deem to be libelous." 1 The Bright court dealt
with the prior restraint of a potentially libelous student publication and
ruled that prior restraints could not be imposed.4 2
396. See New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); see also supra note 27 for dis-
cussion of Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
397. See, eg., Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 105 S. Ct. 2939 (1985)
(matters of public concern); Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967) (public
figures); New York Times, 376 U.S. 254 (public officials).
398. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
399. See supra notes 54-57 and accompanying text.
400. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
401. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 48907.
402. See supra notes 193-200 and accompanying text. Since 1975, only six libel suits against
high school publications have been reported to the Student Press Law Center. Who Really
Pays for Libel? Liability and the Student Press, STUDENT PRESS L. CENTER REP., Fall 1985,
at 32 [hereinafter Libel, SPLC REP.]; see also "What Are You Afraid of, Mr. Jarvis and Mr.
Gann?", STUDENT PRESS L. CENTER REP., Winter 1978-79, at 7 [hereinafter Jarvis, SPLC
REP.]; Coach 0-Newspaper Won, STUDENT PRESS L. CENTER REP., Winter 1978-79, at 8. See
generally L. INGELHART, supra note 103, at 84, 86.
In 1978, Howard Jarvis and Paul Gann filed an $800,000 libel suit against the Granite
Hills High School student newspaper (El Cajon, California). Jarvis, SPLC REP., supra, at 7.
The student newspaper erroneously reported that Jarvis and Gann owned substantial Califor-
nia real estate and would save millions of dollars when the Proposition 13 tax initiative passed.
Id. Jarvis and Gann eventually dropped the suit.
In 1985, the school cook at Orinsky Falls High School in New York sued the school
district after an article in a newspaper-format class project described the cafeteria food as "not
fit for dogs to eat." Classroom 'Newspaper' Loses Libel Suit, STUDENT PREss L. CENTER
REP., Spring 1985, at 12. In 1985, a jury awarded the cook and her husband $10,001 in
damages. The district has requested that the court review the verdict. Id.
A student at Madison High School in New Jersey and her father sued the school newspa-
per reporter, adviser and the school board for compensatory and punitive damages claiming
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School officials have argued that censorship authority over poten-
tially libelous material is necessary in order to protect themselves, the
school district and ultimately the taxpayers from debilitating damage
judgments."° They maintain that if school districts are held liable, then
the state's interest in protecting taxpayers as well as preserving order in
their schools outweighs the students' right of free expression. These ar-
guments, however, are legally unsupportable. The courts that have ad-
dressed this issue have held that where administrators have not exercised
control over the content of student publications, neither they nor the
school districts were held responsible for the libel appearing in the publi-
cations.' When, however, administrators exercise their power of re-
view, the courts may hold them and their schools liable for the contents
that a photograph in the student newspaper damaged their reputations. 'Student Romance'
Sparks Libel Suit, STUDENT PRESS L. CENTER REP., Fall 1985, at 26. The student appeared
with a male student in a photograph accompanying an article entitled, "Student Romance
Gives Hallway 'R' Rating." Id. The suit is pending.
The other libel suits involved student yearbooks. For example, a student at Christian City
High School in Kentucky brought a $50,000 libel suit against the school after her name ap-
peared below the picture of a dog. The mistake was attributed to computer error and the suit
was dismissed. L. INGELHART, supra note 103, at 82.
403. LAW OF THE STUDENT PRESS, supra note 60, at 36; see also Libel, SPLC REP., supra
note 402, at 32. For example, in Leeb v. DeLong, appeal docketed, 4 Civ. No. G 002587 (4th
Dist. Aug. 1985), see supra note 216, the respondent principal and school district argued:
[I]t is clear that the Legislature enacted Education Code Section 48907 so that school
districts as publishers of official school publications could exercise some control over
the publications for which they are civilly liable. Such a regulation is in the public
interest in that it protects the taxpayers' funds from civil suits resulting from the
publication of defamatory articles written by immature high school students.
If it were determined that school districts had no right to prohibit the publica-
tion of certain materials, school districts would be at the mercy of inexperienced
students who might, intentionally or unintentionally, publish libelous, slanderous or
otherwise damaging material. Since most students are judgment proof, it would be
the school districts that would pay any judgment. Such a result would be bad public
policy and unfair to the state's taxpayers who would have to pay for the misdeeds of
unrestrained minor students.
Respondents' Opening Brief at 22-24, Leeb v. DeLong, appeal docketed, 4 Civ. No. G 002587
(4th Dist. Aug. 1985).
404. LAW OF THE STUDENT PRESS, supra note 60, at 37; Libel, SPLC REP., supra note 402,
at 37; see also Mazart v. New York, 441 N.Y.S.2d 600 (1981) (plaintiffs sued State of New
York for libelous letter printed in state university's student newspaper; court dismissed suit
finding that since state did not direct or participate in publication of newspaper and could not
exercise prior restraint, state could not be held responsible for content of paper); see also Milli-
ner v. Turner, 436 So. 2d 1300 (La. App.), cert. denied, 442 So. 2d 453 (La. 1983).
In Milliner, two state college faculty members brought a defamation action against stu-
dent reporters who had printed articles in the school newspaper describing one plaintiff as a
"proven fool" and the other as a "racist." 436 So. 2d at 1301. The court found that the
relationship between a university and its student newspaper was not analogous to a private
publisher and his or her newspaper, since publishers may censor as much as they like. Id. at
1302. The court concluded that since the first amendment barred state schools from exercising
April 1987] STUDENT PRESS CENSORSHIP 1131
of such publications."'
Furthermore, even if school districts could be held liable for libelous
anything but advisory control over student newspapers, these colleges could not be held liable
for any defamatory articles in the student newspapers. Id. at 1303.
By a parity of reasoning, the public high schools in the Seventh Circuit, where prior
restraint is prohibited, are likewise not liable for the libelous statements of their student jour-
nalists. Libel, SPLC REP., supra note 402, at 34 (citing Fujishima v. Board of Educ., 460 F.2d
1355 (7th Cir. 1972); Antonelli v. Hammond, 308 F. Supp. 1329, 1335 n.6 (D. Mass. 1970)).
A more difficult case is presented where the school officials exercise some control over the
content of the school publication. It has been suggested that even though public high school
administrators do not exercise control because they have developed a "hands off" policy, they
and/or the school may nevertheless be held liable because they had the legal authority to
control. Id. at 35. Thus, in California, the prior restraint provision in § 48907 may subject
school officials and school districts to liability. In other words, schools could be held liable
simply by virtue of the presence of the statutory authorization to censor. See Farmers Educ. &
Coop. Union of Am. v. WDAY, 360 U.S. 525, 531-35 (1959) (radio station sued for allegedly
libelous statements made in political candidate's speech--court held that station immune from
liability for defamation because station required by statute to broadcast unedited political
speeches).
For a contrary viewpoint, see Frasca v. Andrews, 463 F. Supp. 1043 (E.D.N.Y. 1979). In
Frasca, a high school principal ordered that an issue of the official school newspaper be seized
and destroyed. Id. at 1048. The newspaper carried an allegedly libelous and obscene letter to
the editor accusing a student body officer of being a "total disgrace to the school" and of using
the school computer illegally to change his grade. Id. at 1046. The district court judge dis-
missed the students' attempts to prove that their assertions were true, thus denying them the
opportunity to establish a complete defense to the libel charge. Id. at 1052. The court stated
that even if a determination was made that the statements were true and not libelous, the only
thing that would be established would be that the principal made a mistake. Id. The court
found this irrelevant and reasoned that the "disputes which arise in the day-to-day operations
of... public schools cannot as a general rule be resolved by federal district judges.. . ." Id. at
1052. Since federal judges could only view the disputes from a distance, the court ruled that
great deference should be given to school officials' decisions, even if they later turn out to be
wrong. Id. As long as there is a "substantial and reasonable basis" for the administrators'
decision, then this court would uphold their decision. Id.
Following the rationale of the Frasca court in the area of libel would be dangerous. Since
§ 48907 officially authorizes the exercise of prior restraint over libel, administrators would
have to do little more than to "speculate" and "intuit" that something was libelous in order to
justify suppressing the questionable material. Under Frasca the correctness of their decision
would be irrelevant. Moreover, the student journalists whose expression was suppressed
would have been erroneously and unconstitutionally deprived of their rights to free expression
and seemingly without remedy.
If prior restraint of libel is allowed, the courts should not apply a rational basis test, but
instead should review the prior restraint according to the well-established rule: with a "heavy
presumption" against its constitutional validity. See supra note 35. The special characteristics
of the school, including the superior and authoritative position that administrators hold over
students, should not warrant deference from the court. On the contrary, the courts should
carefully scrutinize administrative censorship over student expression. This may be especially
true in the area of libel since the school's interest involves more than just maintaining order.
In the interest of self-protection, the school officials may be censoring in fear of personal liabil-
ity for the libelous expression.
405. LAw oF THE STUDENT PREss, supra note 60, at 37-38; Libel, SPLC RP., supra note
402, at 35. The law in this area is still unsettled.
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student publications, the potential economic imposition on taxpayers is
an insufficient and unacceptable justification for the abrogation of stu-
dents' constitutional rights. It is a well-established principle that the
"vindication of conceded constitutional rights cannot be made dependent
upon any theory that it is less expensive to deny than to afford them."40 6
Finally, the argument that potential liability justifies control is even
less persuasive in California because of California's broad retraction
law.4 °7 The retraction law requires that a person anticipating a libel suit
must demand a retraction from the publication within twenty days of the
time he learns that the defamation has been published." 3 Failure to file
the retraction demand will severely limit the damages which may be re-
covered." 9 If faced with a libel suit, a student publication would likely
not refuse to print a retraction.410
Thus, with respect to the prior restraint of libelous expression, the
state's economic interest is not so great as to necessarily tip the scales in
favor of restraint. On the other hand, as with obscenity and substantial
disruption, the state still has an interest in facilitating the learning pro-
cess by maintaining a noncontroversial atmosphere.41  Whether this in-
terest is strong enough to overcome the general rule that libel is not to be
restrained prior to publication is doubtful.41 a
c. prong III least restrictive alternative
Even if the courts are deferential with respect to the first two prongs
of the Akin test and conclude first, that a reasonable relationship between
the statute or regulation and the state's interest is sufficient and, second,
that the state's interest outweighs students' rights, the statute still fails.
In order for a regulation to pass prong three, the court must conclude
that no alternative exists which is less subversive or less restrictive of
406. Watson v. Memphis, 373 U.S. 526, 537 (1963); see also Rush v. Obledo, 517 F. Supp,
905 (N.D. Cal. 1981). In Rush, the court evaluated California statutes and regulations which
permitted warrantless inspections of family day care homes. Id. at 906-07. The state defended
its measures by arguing that it did not have the resources available to conduct surveillance of
the homes by exterior observation, and that this lack of resources justified its use of warrantless
searches. The court rejected this argument, stating that neither administrative convenience
nor budgetary constraints justify governmental deprivation of fundamental constitutional
rights. Id. at 915 n.16.
407. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 48(a) (West 1982).
408. Id.
409. Id.
410. See infra note 541.
411. See supra notes 343-46.
412. See supra note 299.
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students' free expression and press rights.4 13 Section 48907 fails to meet
this test for four reasons: first, prior restraint is not the least restrictive
alternative available to maintain an orderly school environment; second,
section 48907 is vague; third, section 48907 is overbroad; and finally, sec-
tion 48907 lacks proper procedural safeguards to protect students' ex-
pression rights.
1) alternatives to prior restraint
The major fear cooling attempts to remove censorship authority
from school officials is that irresponsible student expression will strip ad-
ministrators of authority and thereby result in a disruption of the educa-
tional process.414 Justice Black, dissenting fervently in Tinker v. Des
Moines Independent School District, warned of chaos if students' expres-
sion rights were recognized.41' He predicted "the beginning of a new
revolutionary era of permissiveness in this country fostered by the judici-
ary."q416  Furthermore, he prophesied that administrative authority
would be undermined and control would be transferred from the educa-
tors to the "whims and caprices of [the] loudest-mouthed, but maybe not
[the] brightest students.1 41 7  Contrary to Justice Black's predictions,
however, Tinker did not begin a "new revolutionary era" of judicially
fostered permissiveness in the public schools; nor has the recognition of
413. Akin, 262 Cal. App. 2d at 168, 68 Cal. Rptr. at 562; see also Myers, 269 Cal. App. 2d at
551, 75 Cal. Rptr. at 74. In Kuhimeier, the Eighth Circuit noted that "if student writings are
to be censored prior to publication, the least restrictive means are to be followed." 795 F.2d at
1374 n.5; see supra note 299. If the court determines that the least restrictive means were not
used, then the statute is not "narrowly tailored" to the state's interest.
414. See generally Schimmel, supra note 1.
415. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 515-26 (Black,
J., dissenting).
416. Id. at 518 (Black, J., dissenting). Justice Black declared: "[I]f the time has come when
pupils of state-supported schools, kindergartens, grammar schools, or high schools, can defy
and flout orders of school officials to keep their minds on their own schoolwork, it is the
beginning of a new revolutionary era of permissiveness fostered by the judiciary." Id. (Black,
J., dissenting).
417. Id. at 525 (Black, J., dissenting); see also Schimmel, supra note 1, at 58. According to
Justice Black:
One does not need to be a prophet or a son of a prophet to know that after the
Court's holding today some students in... all schools will be ready, able, and willing
to defy their teachers on practically all orders .... Turned loose with lawsuits for
damages and injunctions against their teachers as they are here, it is nothing but
wishful thinking to imagine that young, immature students will not soon believe it is
their right to control the schools rather than the right of the States .... This case...
subjects all of the public schools in the country to the whims and caprices of their
loudest-mouthed, but maybe not their brightest, students. I, for one, am not fully
persuaded that school pupils are wise enough, even with this Court's expert help
from Washington, to run the 23,390 public school systems in our 50 states.
Id. at 525-26 (Black, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
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student press rights.418 In a survey conducted in the Seventh Circuit,
where prior restraint is per se unconstitutional, only 8 out of 1200
schools experienced any increase in disruptions following the court's rul-
ing." 9 Since little evidence supports Justice Black's warnings of chaos
where administrative censorship is prohibited, the need for prior restraint
is questionable.
In the Seventh Circuit, students may publish what they please,42°
but if they violate school regulations regarding what may properly be
published they will be sanctioned accordingly.421 This was also the Cali-
fornia rule until section 48907 was enacted.422 The reasons for including
prior restraint in section 48907 were political, not constitutional.
423 If
administrative fear of disruption or liability is unwarranted, then mainte-
418. Id.
419. Survey Reveals Little Change in Censorship Following Ruling Banning Prior Restraint,
STUDENT PRESS L. CENTER REP., Spring 1977, at 1. During May and April 1976, Robert
Trager, assistant professor of journalism at Southern Illinois University at Carbondale, to-
gether with the Student Press Law Center, conducted a survey of 1200 public schools in the
Seventh Circuit to determine the impact of the Fujishima decision on student newspapers. Id.
Questionnaires were sent to principals, journalism advisers and student editors which asked
about "'school size, location, newspaper distribution and sponsorship, underground publica-
tions, disruptions, censorship, libel, written policies, and the journalism background of advisor
and principal."' Id. (quoting Robert Trager).
The survey results indicated that the decision had little noticeable effect on the prior re-
view practices of the surveyed individuals. Id. Only 15% of the principals and 10% of the
advisers knew of the Fujishima case. Approximately 62% of the respondents believed that
administrators still had the authority to review student works before publication. Id. Despite
these figures, Trager found that in 82% of the schools, administrators do not exercise prior
review "as a matter of course."
Most significantly, the Trager survey revealed that the prohibition of prior restraints after
Fujishima did not result in "more disruption of school functions." Id. Only eight schools
reported any increase in disruption following the 1972 decision. Trager stated that it "'was
difficult to conclude that the (Fujishima) ruling has had any effect' on journalistic practices in
the Seventh Circuit." Id. Nevertheless, Trager noted that the "ruling has not caused any
significant problems for administrators." Furthermore, Trager recognized that "'[s ]ome
courts, in sustaining prior review in the high school context have done so out of a fear that...
high school students would abuse their rights.'" Id. (quoting Robert Trager). To that Trager
responded, "'[t]he survey reveals no such abuse.'" Id. (quoting Robert Trager).
A similar survey was conducted in 1978. High school journalism teacher James Nyka
surveyed 121 Illinois high schools with student populations greater than 1000. 'Press' Four-
Letter Word in Illinois, STUDENT PRESS L. CENTER REP., Spring 1978, at 9. Nyka concluded
that "[m]any newspaper advisers and administrators appear either unaware of students' consti-
tutionally protected rights, or have simply chosen to ignore them, hoping that the legal pendu-
lum will swing the other way." Id. (quoting James Nyka). Nyka reported that 40% of the
respondents stated that "material considered 'controversial' does not escape the attention of
administrators." Id.
420. See Fujishima, 460 F.2d 1355; see also supra notes 245-60 and accompanying text.
421. Fujishima, 460 F.2d at 1359.
422. See supra notes 196-97 and accompanying text.
423. See supra note 166.
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nance of the section 48907 prior restraint system would condone restric-
tion of speech based only on undifferentiated fear or apprehension of
disturbance.4 24 This exercise of censorship was clearly prohibited by the
Tinker Court.425
Furthermore, the United States Supreme Court has noted that while
the threat of subsequent punishment may "chill" speech, prior restraint
"freezes" it.426 Clearly the chill of subsequent punishment is less restric-
tive than the freeze of prior restraint.427 The censored speech may in fact
be protected; yet, the speech frozen by prior restraint never reaches its
audience.
2) vagueness
As the court in Myers v. Arcata Union High School District42 de-
clared, "the standards of permissible statutory vagueness [in areas of
freedom of expression] are strict and government may regulate 'only with
narrow specificity.' "429
The Myers court advised that "a 'law' violates due process 'if it is so
vague and standardless that it leaves the public uncertain as to the con-
ducts it prohibits or leaves judges and jurors free to decide, without any
legally fixed standards, what is prohibited and what is not in each partic-
ular case.' "I" The court noted that while the school policy was not
"law" in the sense that criminal sanctions would attach if violations oc-
curred, the potential for suspension existed if the student violated the
policy.431 Since the "importance of an education to a child is substan-
424. See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508-09.
425. Id.
426. Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 559 (1976) (footnote omitted); see also
supra note 35.
427. See generally Fujishima, 460 F.2d 1355; see also Shanley, 462 F.2d at 973 (reasonable
regulation of expression is constitutionally preferable to restraint); supra note 39.
The court in Baughman advised that it thought that "letting students write first and be
judged later [was] far less inhibiting than vice versa." 478 F.2d at 1350. The court reasoned
that
[o]ne danger of a censorship system is that the public may never be aware of what an
administrative agent refuses to permit to be published or distributed. A penal sanc-
tion assures both that some overt thing has been done by the accused and that the
penalty is imposed for an activity that is not concealed from the public.
Id. (quoting A Quantity of Books v. Kansas, 378 U.S. 205, 223 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting)).
Accordingly, the Baughman court held that "a regulation requiring prior submission of mate-
rial for approval before distribution must contain narrow, objective, and reasonable standards
by which the material will be judged." Id.; see infra note 441 and accompanying text.
428. 269 Cal. App. 2d 549, 75 Cal. Rptr. 68 (1969).
429. Id. at 560, 75 Cal. Rptr. at 74.
430. Id. (quoting Giaccio v. Pennsylvania, 382 U.S. 399, 402-03 (1966) (citations omitted).
431. Id.
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tial," '4 32 the court ruled that the state could not condition the availability
of education on an "unconstitutionally vague standard of conduct.
'433
In Myers, the court ruled that the term "extremes of hair styles" was
too vague to pass the third prong of the Akin test.434 The court reasoned
that "[e]xtremes of hair styles" were not facts, they were matters of opin-
ion and the "definitive opinion... rested in the sole-and neither con-
trolled nor guided-judgment of a single school official. '435 The school
official's good faith was irrelevant to the court; it was concerned with the
policy itself. The court concluded that the school policy was "'far from
the kind of narrow exception to freedom of expression which a state may
carve out to satisfy the adverse demands of other interests of society'...
and.., totally lack[ed] the 'specificity' required of governmental regula-
tions which limit the exercise of constitutional rights." '436
The federal courts have held that in order for regulations or guide-
lines to pass constitutional muster they must contain clear and precise
standards which define prohibited materials.4 37 By requiring the rules to
be as specific as possible, the courts have sought to avoid the danger of
432. Id. at 560, 74 Cal. Rptr. at 74-75; see also supra note 145 and accompanying text. But
see supra note 239.
433. Myers, 269 Cal. App. 2d at 560, 74 Cal. Rptr. at 75.
434. Id.
435. Id.
436. Id.
437. In Shanley, 462 F.2d at 976-77, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit invalidated
a school regulation prohibiting the distribution of printed matter. The court found the regula-
tion unconstitutionally vague and overbroad because it did not:
(1) state clearly the means by which students are to submit proposed materials to the
principal or school administration; (2) state a brief and reasonable period of time
during which the principal or administration must make their decisions; (3) state
clearly a reasonable appellate mechanism and its methodology; and (4) state a brief
and reasonable time during which the appeal must be decided.
Id. at 978; see also Williams v. Spencer, 622 F.2d 1200 (4th Cir. 1980); Nitzberg v. Parks, 525
F.2d 378 (4th Cir. 1975); Baughman v. Freienmuth, 478 F.2d 1345 (4th Cir. 1973); Eisner v.
Stamford Bd. of Educ., 440 F.2d 803 (2d Cir. 1971); Leibner v. Sharbaugh, 429 F. Supp. 744
(E.D. Va. 1977); Quarterman v. Byrd, 453 F.2d 54 (4th Cir. 1971).
The leading Second Circuit case is Eisner v. Stamford Board of Education. There, the
court of appeals held that the school rule banning material which "will interfere with the
proper and orderly operation and discipline of the school, will cause violence or disorder or
will constitute an invasion of the rights of others" was not vague or overbroad. Eisner, 440
F.2d at 808-09. The court did strike down the prior review procedure here because of "its lack
of procedure for prior submission by students for school administration approval, of student
written material before 'distribution.'" Id. at 810. In short, it failed to set a time limit for
review and to specify to whom and how material was to be submitted for clearance. Id. The
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit and district courts within that circuit have also de-
cided numerous other student press cases. See Thomas v. Board of Educ., 607 F.2d 1043 (2d
Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1081 (1980); Trachtman v. Anker, 563 F.2d 512 (2d Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 925 (1978); Frasca v. Andrews, 463 F. Supp. 1043 (E.D.N.Y.
1979); Bayer v. Kinzler, 383 F. Supp. 1164 (1974), aff'd, 515 F.2d 504 (2d Cir. 1975); Koppell
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"unconstitutionally chok[ing] off criticism either of themselves, or of
school policies, which they find disrespectful, tasteless, or offensive.
'4 38
In striking down the defendant school's system of prior submission,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in Baughman
v. Freienmuth 4 39 noted that any system of prior submission comes before
the court bearing a "heavy presumption" against its constitutionality.' 4
The Baughman court proceeded to set out the minimum requirements
for a constitutional prior submission regulation: Any regulation requir-
ing the prior submission of material for approval before its distribution
"must contain narrow, objective, and reasonable standards by which the
material will be judged.""' 1 The court required such a standard so that
the school officials enforcing the regulation would not have "impermissi-
ble power to judge the material on an ad hoc and subjective basis."" 2
The court further reasoned that the forbidden activity should be "clearly
delineated" so that basic first amendment freedoms would not be
inhibited.4 3
The degree of precision required to establish a constitutional system
of prior restraint is well illustrated by the Fourth Circuit's subsequent
v. Levine, 347 F. Supp. 456 (E.D.N.Y. 1972); Zucker v. Panitz, 299 F. Supp. 102 (S.D.N.Y.
1969).
438. Baughman, 478 F.2d at 1351 (citing Scoville v. Board of Educ., 425 F.2d 10, 14 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 826 (1970)).
439. 478 F.2d 1345 (4th Cir. 1973). See infra note 487 for the regulation at issue. Note the
similarity between the language in the challenged regulation and that found in § 48907.
440. Baughman, 478 F.2d at 1350.
441. Id.
442. Id.
443. Id. In reviewing the publication regulations before it, the Baughman court held that
the proscription against "distribution" is unconstitutionally vague. With respect to
some communicative material there may be no prior restraint unless there is "a sub-
stantial distribution of written material, so that it can reasonably be anticipated that
in a significant number of instances there would be a likelihood that the distribution
would disrupt school operations."
Id. at 1349 (quoting Eisner v. Stamford Bd. of Educ., 440 F.2d 803, 811 (2d Cir. 1971)). The
Baughman court added:
With respect to other types of material, e.g., pornography, one copy, indeed the only
copy may be the subject of what is legitimate prior restraint if what is forbidden is
precisely defined. The prohibition of material which "advocates illegal actions, or is
grossly insulting to any group or individual" seems to belong in the first catagory and
thus goes beyond the permissible standard (for that type of material) of forecasting
substantial disruption.
Id. (footnote omitted). The court concluded that "material which is, in the constitutional
sense, unprivileged libel or obscenity if read by children can be banned from school property by
school authorities." Id. (citing Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968)). The court further
advised that "a regulation imposing prior restraint must be much more precise than a regula-
tion imposing post-publication sanctions." Id.
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decision in Nitzberg v. Parks.4' Following the issuance of a preliminary
injunction, the defendant school district redrafted its regulations estab-
lishing a system of prior restraint in an attempt to comply with the stan-
dards set forth in Baughman." Despite the detailed definition of libel
contained in that regulation" 6 and the establishment of specific time pe-
riods for appeals," 7 the court nevertheless invalidated the regulation.
The court ruled that the definition of "libelous" material in the school
board's regulation failed to incorporate current constitutional stan-
444. 525 F.2d 378 (4th Cir. 1975).
445. Id. at 380-81; see supra notes 439-43 and accompanying text. Baltimore County Board
of Education Rule 5130.1(b) provided in part:
Literature may be distributed and posted by the student of the subject school in
designated areas on school property as long as it is not obscene or libelous ... and as
long as the distribution of said literature does not reasonably lead the principal to
forecast substantial disruption of or material interference with school activities.
If a student desires to post or make a distribution of free literature which is not
officially recognized as a school publication, the student shall submit such non-school
material to the principal for review and prior approval. In exercising this right of
prior restraint, principals shall follow the procedures specified in this policy. The
principal shall render a decision and notify the student within two (2) pupil days of
such submission. If the decision is in the negative, the principal shall state his rea-
sons to the student in writing. During this period of review, any supply of the mate-
rial may be retained by the student or may be left with the principal for safekeeping.
Distribution of such material during the review and appeal period, or following a
negative decision, shall be sufficient grounds for confiscation of such material and
suspension of the student by the principal. If the student is dissatisfied with the
decision of the principal with respect to the distribution of a non-school publication,
the student may appeal this decision to the appropriate area assistant superintendent
who shall render a decision, stating his reasons in writing, within three (3) pupil days
of such appeal. If an administrator fails to act within the time periods specified in
this paragraph, the student(s) who submitted the literature for review may distribute
same. (Appeal from a decision of an assistant superintendent is to the superintendent
of schools and thence to the Board of Education at the time of its next regularly
scheduled meeting.)
Nitzberg, 525 F.2d at 381 (parenthetical in original).
446. The board policy defined "libel or libelous material" as follows:
The First Amendment of the Constitution of the United States protects the right of
free expression by an individual, either in writing or in speech, on all matters of
public or general concern about a person, without regard to whether such person is
famous or anonymous, in whom the community and press have a legitimate and
substantial interest because of who he is or what he has done. However, a written or
oral statement about such a person which is made with "actual malice," that is, with
knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or
which was made with a high degree of awareness of its probable falsity, is subject to
sanction and is not protected by the First Amendment of the Constitution.
A statement is libelous and not protected by the First Amendment if it is made with
"actual malice" and if it tends to expose one to public hatred, shame, obloquy, contu-
mely, odium, contempt, ridicule, aversion, ostracism, degradation, or disgrace, or if it
induces an evil opinion of one in the minds of right-thinking persons, or if it causes
one to be shunned and avoided in society.
Id. at 381 n.3.
447. See supra notes 196-99 and accompanying text.
STUDENT PRESS CENSORSHIP
dards." The board's regulations were thus void for vagueness and
overbreadth. 449
Section 48907 allows school officials to censor student expression
which is libelous, obscene, creates a clear and present danger of the
breaking of school rules or will cause a substantial disruption of school
activities. The section provides no other guidance to school officials or
students regarding which student expression is unprotected by the stat-
ute. According to a number of federal courts, the use of those legal terms
of art without more renders the statute unconstitutionally vague. ° One
court declared that "[t]he use of terms of art such as 'libelous' and 'ob-
scene' are not sufficiently precise and understandable by high school stu-
dents and administrators untutored in the law to be acceptable
criteria. 451 ' The court also noted that "such terms are troublesome to
lawyers and judges" and pointed out that "[n]one other than a Justice of
the Supreme Court has confessed that obscenity 'may be undefina-
ble.' "452 The court further observed that" '[1]ibelous' is [a] legal term of
art which is difficult to apply to a given set of words."4 "3 Moreover, the
court explained that a determination "that words are libelous is not the
end of the inquiry [because] libel is often privileged." '454
It may be argued that in interpreting and applying section 48907,
administrators, teachers and students can rely on the definitions provided
in the California Civil and Penal Codes.455 However, it is unlikely that
these individuals will have the legal sophistication necessary to cross-ref-
erence the Education Code or their local guidelines with these codes.
Moreover, section 48907 does not make any reference to the other codes
or to any other sources for definitions of the legal terms used in the stat-
ute. Therefore, since section 48907 simply provides that obscene,
libelous or substantially disruptive expression may be subject to prior re-
straint with neither an explanation of what is obscene, libelous or sub-
stantially disruptive in the school setting, nor any cross-references to the
448. Nitzberg, 525 F.2d at 383.
449. Id.; see also infra notes 467-71 and accompanying text.
450. See Nitzberg, 525 F.2d 378; Baughman, 478 F.2d at 1350-51.
451. Baughman, 478 F.2d at 1350.
452. Id. (quoting Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring))
(footnote omitted).
453. Id. at 1351.
454. Id. (citing New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964)).
455. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 45 (West 1982) (libel); CAL. CIV. CODE § 45a (West 1982)
(libel on its face; other actionable defamatory language); CAL. CiV. CODE § 48a (West 1982)
(libel in newspaper); CAL. PENAL CODE § 248 (West 1982) (libel defined); CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 252 (West 1982) (publication defined); CAL. PENAL CODE § 311 (West Supp. 1987) (obscen-
ity defined); CAL. PENAL CODE § 313 (West Supp. 1987) (harmful matter to minors defined).
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Civil or Penal Codes, the statute is unconstitutionally vague.4 5 6 This is
especially so since the purpose of the statute was to define students' free
expression rights and responsibilities and to guide administrators, advis-
ers and students with regard to those rights.457
3) overbreadth
As a general rule, "[a] law is void on its face if it 'does not aim
specifically at evils within the allowable area of [government] control, but
... sweeps within its ambit other activities that constitute an exercise' of
protected expressive ... rights." '458 Because of the related problem of
vagueness with regard to the terms obscene, libelous and substantially
disruptive, as used in section 48907, the problem of overbreadth arises.
459
As the federal court decisions show, school administrators tend to use a
colloquial and not a legal definition of obscenity.460 Likewise, school offi-
cials generally are not in a position to determine whether expression is
legally libelous or obscene.461 Most officials simply adhere to the "I
know it when I see it" standard.462 Thus, protected speech is often cen-
sored erroneously.
Unlike determinations of which speech is to be categorized as ob-
scenity and libel, which are made after a judicial finding, the determina-
tion of what constitutes substantial disruption may best be made by
school officials. 463 The simple use of the term of art in the statute, how-
ever, does not adequately provide guidance to school officials or to stu-
dents regarding the criteria used in making the determination that some
conduct or expression is disruptive. 46' As the courts have indicated,
mere "intuition" or "speculation" that student expression will cause dis-
456. See infra note 516.
457. See supra notes 205-06.
458. L. TRIBE, supra note 26, at 710 (quoting Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 97 (1940)
(statute prohibiting all picketing void on its face since it banned peaceful picketing protected
by first amendment)).
459. See generally id. at 712-16.
460. See infra notes 503-04.
461. See supra notes 450-54.
462. This is the standard which former Supreme Court Justice Potter Stewart used to deter-
mine whether or not material was "obscene." See Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964)
(Stewart, J., concurring).
463. See Fraser, 105 S. Ct. at 3164-65. With regard to "offensive speech," Justice Stevens
observed that the student "was probably in a better position to determine whether an audience
composed of 600 of his contemporaries would be offended by the use of a four-letter word-or
a sexual metaphor-than is a group of judges who are at least two generations and 3,000 miles
away from the scene of the crime." Id. at 3169 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
464. Nitzberg, 525 F.2d at 383.
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ruption is not enough to justify suppression.465 Still, protected student
expression is often suppressed on those very grounds.4 66 Thus, use of the
term substantial disruption in section 48907 provides school officials with
the authority to censor protected as well as unprotected expression. In
short, the term substantial disruption without more is both unconstitu-
tionally vague and overbroad.4 67 As the Nitzberg court observed in re-
viewing the challenged regulation before it:
4 6 8
A crucial flaw exists in this directive since it gives no guidance
whatsoever as to what amounts to a "substantial disruption of
or material interference with" school activities; and, equally
fatal, it fails to detail the criteria by which an administrator
might reasonably predict the occurrence of such a
disruption.469
The court added that although the terms used came "directly from the
language in Tinker, . . . [i]t does not at all follow that the phrasing of a
constitutional standard by which to decide whether a regulation infringes
upon rights protected by the first amendment is sufficiently speciic... to
convey to students or people in general of what is prohibited.' "470
Similar difficulties arise in determining what kind of student expres-
sion will "create a clear and present danger of the commission of unlaw-
ful acts on school premises or the violation of lawful school
regulations."471
Section 48907 also suffers from the problem of "overbroad delega-
tion."4 72 As one commentator stated:
Statutes which open-endedly delegate to administering of-
ficials the power to decide how and when sanctions are applied
or licenses issued are overbroad because they grant such offi-
cials the power to discriminate-to achieve indirectly through
465. See supra notes 352-54 and accompanying text.
466. Id.
467. Nitzberg, 525 F.2d at 383.
468. See supra note 445 for the regulation.
469. Nitzberg, 525 F.2d at 383.
470. Id. (quoting Jacobs v. Board of School Comm'rs, 490 F.2d 601, 605 (7th Cir. 1973)
(footnote omitted), vacated as moot, 420 U.S. 128 (1975)).
471. What is a "clear and present danger" and to what must the clear and present danger
relate-to the mere act of violating the regulation; or to the results if the regulation is violated?
Furthermore, what kind of a showing must administrators make before they may censor on
that basis? See supra note 366 for a discussion of the "clear and present danger" test in the
adult context. If a student editorial advocated that students violate the "no chewing gum in
class" rule, could administrators exercise prior restraint on the ground that the editorial would
"create a clear and present danger of... the violation of lawful school regulations"?
472. See generally L. TRIBE, supra note 26, at 732-34.
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selective enforcement a censorship of communicative content
that is clearly unconstitutional when achieved directly.
73
The commentator further noted that "first amendment protection
often depends on balancing free speech rights and governmental interests
in particular situations, which depends in turn on a close, after-the-fact
scrutiny of the factual circumstances by the reviewing court."4 74 Fur-
thermore, "[e]xcept in those rare instances when bad faith is manifest,
the abuse of administrative discretion is likely to find shelter behind a
record of contradictory testimony and retrospective rationalization.
475
This commentator thus concluded that "covert censorship cannot be
checked adequately by judicial review of the scheme as applied in partic-
ular cases.,
47 6
In addition, even though "a court may seek to make its own charac-
terization of the expressive activity, [its] perception of the facts is inher-
ently subjective. 477 For example, the court will have to determine if the
violation of lawful school rules was indeed imminent or if an expression
would have substantially disrupted the school. The commentator found
that the courts tended to "be satisfied that the evidence is sufficient if the
record is not 'totally devoid of evidentiary support,' the minimal due pro-
cess standard."478 Therefore, "[flactual review is... an unreliable cure
for an overbroad delegation."47 9 Accordingly, "the Supreme Court has
consistently chosen facial invalidation of statutes containing essentially
standardless delegations in areas affecting first amendment rights."48
Section 48907 "open-endedly delegates to administering officials the
power to decide how and when [prior restraints] are applied." Therefore,
all of the coordinate dangers attach to this system of discretionary dele-
gation of free speech and press rights. The pitfalls accompanying after-
the-fact review of the school officials' justifications for the restraint are
especially troublesome in light of the great deference usually given by the
courts to such officials.
4) lack of procedural safeguards
Finally, students' constitutional rights may be unnecessarily in-
fringed upon because section 48907 lacks any procedural mechanisms to
473. Id. at 733 (citing Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 557-58 (1965)).
474. Id.
475. Id.
476. Id.
477. Id.
478. Id. (citing Thomas v. Louisville, 362 U.S. 199 (1960)).
479. Id.
480. Id. at 733-34.
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safeguard against erroneous classification of protected expression as un-
protected.481 Section 48907 sets forth neither a prompt and adequate
time period for review nor an appellate procedure for review of adminis-
trative decisions.
As the federal courts indicate, "quick disposition" is necessary in
free speech cases.4 82 Section 48907 provides only that officials must act
without "undue delay." What is undue delay? This standard is too dis-
cretionary as it "rest[s] in the sole-and neither controlled nor guided-
judgment of a single school official." ' 3 Furthermore, section 48907 does
not provide students with an opportunity to appeal a censorship decision.
As the courts have held, in order for a student press regulation to pass
constitutional muster, it must provide for an expedient appeals
procedure.4
In striking down the defendant school's system of prior submission,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in Baugh-
man,485 noted that any system of prior submission comes before the
court bearing a "heavy presumption" against its constitutionality, and
that such systems are tolerated only where they operate under judicial
superintendence and assure almost immediate judicial review of the va-
lidity of the restraint.4 86 The court ruled that the regulation at issue
48 7
was constitutionally deficient because: (1) it lacked a specific and reason-
ably short time period within which the principal must act; and (2) it did
not provide for the principal's failure to act.488 The court also held that
the rule was constitutionally deficient because it failed to provide for an
481. See generally Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965); see supra note 33.
482. Nitzberg, 525 F.2d at 384; see also Baughman, 478 F.2d at 1349; Shanley, 462 F.2d at
977; see also supra notes 156-58 for the Rowe court's discussion of the impact of delay on the
student press.
483. See Myers, 269 Cal. App. at 559, 75 Cal. Rptr. at 74.
484. Eisner, 440 F.2d 803; see supra note 437; see also infra note 510.
485. 478 F.2d 1345; see supra note 439.
486. Id. at 1350 (citing Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436 (1957)).
487. The challenged board regulations provided in pertinent part:
Under the following procedures, student publications produced without school spon-
sorship may be distributed in schools:
4) A copy must be given to the principal for his review. (He may require that
the copy be given him up to three school days prior to its general distribution.) If, in
the opinion of the principal, the publication contains libelous or obscene language,
advocates illegal actions, or is grossly insulting to any group or individual, the princi-
pal shall notify the sponsors of the publication that its distribution must stop forth-
with or may not be initiated, and state his reasons therefor. The principal may wish
to establish a publications review board composed of staff, students, and parents to
advise him in such matters.
Id. at 1347 (emphasis added).
488. Id. at 1348.
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"expeditious review procedure" of an adverse decision by school
authorities.489
The Nitzberg court also attacked a timetable for administrative re-
view.49 0 The court noted that its decision in Baughman "made it quite
plain that a prior restraint procedure, to be valid, must provide prompt
and adequate review."' 91 Here, the court found that the procedures to be
followed by the school administration were unclear for several reasons.
First, the regulation required the principal to render a decision on a pro-
posed publication within two "pupil days" and the assistant superinten-
dent reviewing the principal's decision had to render his decision within
three "pupil days."4 92 The court struck down this provision since the
term "pupil days" was undefined and because no specific time limit was
provided for an appeal from the assistant superintendent's decision to the
superintendent.493 In addition, the ultimate review by the school board
was permitted only "at the time of its next regularly scheduled meet-
ing. ,494 The court declared that "[s]uch protracted steps in the appeals
procedure are obviously incompatible with the quick disposition so nec-
essary in free speech cases.
4 95
In Bailey v. Loggins,496 the California Supreme Court observed that
"[n]ewspaper articles often must be published within a few days of the
event they describe, or the articles will lose all value as reportage of cur-
rent events; delay is often as effective form of censorship as suppression
of the article."4 97 The court accordingly held that " 'the prison adminis-
tration must.., ensure an expeditious review procedure. To be valid,
the regulations must prescribe a definite brief time within which the re-
view of submitted material will be completed.' "498
The regulations at issue in Bailey provided for three levels of appeal
and permitted a period of forty-five days between the initial grievance
and the final decision, with extra time for extraordinary cases. 499 Despite
this elaborate appeals procedure, the court concluded that this grievance
procedure was "not one suitable for occasions when timeliness and First
489. Id. at 1349 (quoting Quarterman v. Byrd, 453 F.2d 54, 59 (4th Cir. 1971)).
490. Nitzberg, 525 F.2d at 383-84.
491. Id. at 383.
492. Id. at 383-84.
493. Id. at 384.
494. Id.
495. Id.
496. 32 Cal. 3d 907, 654 P.2d 758, 187 Cal. Rptr. 575; see also supra notes 307-19.
497. Id. at 921, 654 P.2d at 768, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 585.
498. Id. (quoting The Luparer v. Stoneman, 382 F. Supp. 495, 502 (D. Vt. 1974)).
499. Id.
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Amendment considerations are implicated." 5"
When measured against the foregoing requirements, the casual ref-
erence to "undue delay" found in section 48907 is constitutionally unac-
ceptable. Moreover, section 48907 fails to provide an appeals procedure
during which time the "undue delay" clock is to run. Often times stu-
dents must simply wait until the next school board meeting which may
be weeks away.
Unchecked and unchallengeable censorship, which section 48907
fails to prohibit, infringes upon students' expression and press rights in
an unnecessarily restrictive way. A censored student's only recourse is to
turn to the courts. Given the imposing nature of litigation and its inher-
ent costs, most students will simply fail to fight for their chance to be
heard.50
5) summary
To summarize, the courts require that student press guidelines meet
the following requirements in order to overcome claims of vagueness,
overbreadth and a lack of procedural safeguards.
First, regulations must contain criteria and specific examples of
what is considered to be disruptive, obscene or defamatory so that stu-
dents will understand what expression is prohibited.0 2 For example, use
of the Tinker phrases "substantial disruption" and "material interfer-
ence" is unacceptable without specific "criteria by which an administra-
tor might reasonably predict the occurrence of such a disruption.
'50 3
The courts have held that a regulation which simply mimics the "phras-
ing of a constitutional standard" does not necessarily render the regula-
500. Id.
501. In a recent interview, Mark Goodman, Executive Director of the Student Press Law
Center, remarked: "'It's a rare situation when a student chooses to go to court. Everything is
against [him or her]' [including a] lack of support from parents, school administrators, and
often other students." Kossen, supra note 18, at 1, col. 4 (quoting Mark Goodman). A further
and more significant barrier which students must overcome is the cost of litigation. The attor-
ney for student David Leeb, see supra note 216, estimates that Leeb's suit against the school
district has cost Leeb approximately $12,000. Id.
If students file suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violation of their civil rights by state offi-
cials, they may be entitled to statutory attorneys' fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. However, un-
less the student does "prevail" he or she will be responsible for all of his or her own attorneys'
fees and the costs of litigation. Following Fraser, 106 S. Ct. 3159, the Ninth Circuit panel
concluded that he had not prevailed on any issue and was therefore not entitled to any attor-
neys' fees. Fraser v. Bethel School Dist. No. 403, Nos. 83-3987, 83-4142 (9th Cir. Jan. 15,
1987) (LEXIS, Genfed library, courts file).
502. LAW OF THE STUDENT PRESS, supra note 60, at 55 (citing Nitzberg v. Parks, 525 F.2d
378, 383 (4th Cir. 1975); Baughman v. Freienmuth, 478 F.2d 1345, 1351 (4th Cir. 1973)).
503. Nitzberg, 525 F.2d at 383.
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tion "sufficiently specific... to convey notice to students or people in
general of what is prohibited." 5"
Second, the regulations must provide definitions of all key terms
used in the regulation such as "disruption," "obscenity," "defamation"
and "distribution. " 05 Simply using terms of art such as "libelous" and
"obscene" is "not sufficiently precise and understandable by high school
students and administrators untutored in the law to be acceptable
criteria.
'50 6
Third, "publication guidelines must be included in the official school
publications or circulated to students in the same manner as other official
material.
o50 7
Fourth, "when publication guidelines provide for prior review by
school officials, they must specify to whom the material is to be submit-
ted for approval."' 08
Fifth, "any system of prior review must give students the right to a
prompt hearing before the decision-maker and to argue why distribution
should be allowed.
50 9
Sixth, publication guidelines must precisely limit the time in which
the official has to reach a decision on whether to prevent distribution.
The time period "must be reasonable, and the guidelines must provide
for the contingency of a school official failing to issue a decision within
the time specified." 510
Finally, "any system of prior review must include an expeditious
procedure for appealing an administrator's decision to suppress student
expression.",
511
When the prior restraint system set forth in Education Code section
48907 is measured against the foregoing requirements, it is evident that
the system does not survive constitutional scrutiny. Section 48907 not
504. Id. (quoting Jacobs v. Board of School Comm'rs, 490 F.2d 601, 606 (7th Cir. 1973),
vacated as moot, 420 U.S. 128 (1975)).
505. LAW OF THE STUDENT PRESS, supra note 60, at 55 (citing Hall v. Board of School
Comm'rs, 681 F.2d 965 (5th Cir. 1982); Nitzberg v. Parks, 525 F.2d 378, 382 (4th Cir. 1975)).
506. Baughman, 478 F.2d at 1350.
507. LAW OF THE STUDENT PRESS, supra note 60, at 55 (citing Nitzberg v. Parks, 525 F.2d
378, 384 (4th Cir. 1975)).
508. Id. (citing Eisner v. Stamford Bd. of Educ., 440 F.2d 803, 804 (2d Cir. 1971)).
509. Id. (citing Leibner v. Sharbaugh, 429 F. Supp. 744 (E.D. Va. 1977)).
510. Id. (citing Baughman v. Freienmuth, 478 F.2d 1345, 1351 (4th Cir. 1973); Quarterman
v. Byrd, 453 F.2d 54, 56 (4th Cir. 1971); Eisner v. Stamford Bd. of Educ., 440 F.2d 803, 804
(2d Cir. 1971)); see also Bailey, 32 Cal. 3d at 921, 654 P.2d at 768, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 585.
511. Id. (citing Hall v. Board of School Comm'rs, 681 F.2d 965, 966 (5th Cir. 1982); Shan-
ley v. Northeast Indep. School Dist., 462 F.2d 960, 970 (5th Cir. 1972); Leibner v. Sharbaugh,
429 F.Supp. 744, 747 (E.D. Va. 1977)).
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only fails to define legal terms of art, such as obscenity and libel, but it
also fails to provide a time limit within which administrators must review
student publications. Section 48907 merely provides that school officials
shall show justification for an imposition of prior restraint "without un-
due delay." Moreover, the statute fails to establish any appeal procedure
for adverse decisions and does not provide for judicial review.
Section 48907 does not appear to pass the Akin three-prong test for
constitutionally restraining students' rights. Not only is prior restraint
not the "least subversive" means of achieving order in the school, but the
language of the statute was not drawn with "narrow specificity" and,
therefore, does not provide adequate guidance to school officials or stu-
dents. Hence, although the legislature's goal in fostering student press
freedom is admirable, their means of achieving that goal, section 48907,
falls short of the constitutional minimum required to safeguard the rights
of free expression and press.
V. RECOMMENDATIONS
A. Banning Prior Review and Prior Restraints
The position taken by the Student Press Law Center, as reflected in
their guidelines, is that there shall be no prior restraint of the student
press.512 In their words, "[n]o student publication... will be reviewed
by school administrators prior to distribution. 51 3 This position is con-
sistent with both the first amendment of the United States Constitution
and article I, section 2(a) of the California Constitution. As the Seventh
Circuit illustrates, schools can function in the absence of administrative
control and censorship of the student press.514 The California Legisla-
ture should remove administrative prior restraint authority and return
the freedom from prior restraint to the California student press. In doing
so, the legislature would be taking the final step in meaningfully legislat-
ing student press freedom. Only then would section 48907 truly reflect
the legislative and judicial history of the statute.
51 5
B. Defining the Terms in Section 48907
One of the primary problems plaguing Education Code section
48907 is its lack of specific definitions for the categories of prohibited
512. See Student Press Law Center Model Guidelines for Student Publications, reprinted in
LAW OF THE STUDENT PRESS, supra note 60, app. A at 79-82 [hereinafter Model Guidelines].
See infra Appendix B for the full text of the Model Guidelines.
513. Model Guidelines, supra note 512, at 82.
514. See supra notes 418-19.
515. See supra notes 107-213 and accompanying text.
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speech. The definitions of libel and obscenity may be found in the Cali-
fornia Civil and Penal Codes. 16 Thus, at the very least, section 48907
should be amended to provide cross-references to these sections for defi-
nitions of the legal terms. Since the special characteristics of the school
environment and the presence of minors will have to be taken into con-
sideration in applying those general code sections to student expression,
the better solution is to amend section 48907 by adding a definitions sec-
tion which takes these factors into account.
The Student Press Law Center Model Guidelines for Student Publi-
cations set forth definitions of the terms used in section 48907.17 As the
definitions reflect the positions of the various federal courts which have
construed these terms, the California Legislature should adopt these defi-
nitions and incorporate them into section 48907. With regard to official
school publications, the Model Guidelines provide:
1. Students cannot publish or distribute material which
is "obscene as to minors". Obscene as to minors is defined as:
516. See supra note 455. California Penal Code § 311 defines "obscene matter" as
matter, taken as a whole, the predominant appeal of which to the average person,
applying contemporary statewide standards, is to prurient interest, meaning a shame-
ful or morbid interest in nudity, sex, or excretion; and is matter which taken as a
whole goes substantially beyond customary limits of candor in description or repre-
sentation of such matters; and is matter which taken as a whole lacks significant
literary, artistic, political, educational, or scientific value.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 311 (West Supp. 1987).
California Penal Code § 313 defines "harmful matter" as it relates to minors. Section 313
provides in pertinent part:
(a) "Harmful matter" means matter taken as a whole, the predominant appeal
of which to the average person, applying contemporary statewide standards, is to
prurient interest, meaning a shameful or morbid interest in nudity, sex, or excretion,
and is patently offensive to the prevailing standards in the adult community as a
whole with respect to what is suitable material for minors, and matter which taken as
a whole lacks significant literary, artistic, political, educational, or scientific value for
minors.
(1) When it appears from the nature of the matter or the circumstances of its
dissemination, distribution or exhibition that it is designed for clearly defined deviant
sexual groups, the predominant appeal of the matter shall be judged with reference to
its intended recipient group.
(2) In prosecutions under this chapter, where circumstances of production,
presentation, sale, dissemination, distribution, or publicity indicate that matter is be-
ing commercially exploited by the defendant for the sake of its prurient appeal, that
evidence is probative with respect to the nature of the matter and can justify the
conclusion that the matter lacks significant literary, artistic, political, educational, or
scientific value for minors.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 313 (West Supp. 1987).
California Civil Code § 45 defines "libel" as "a false and unprivileged publication by writ-
ing, printing, picture, effigy, or other fixed representation to the eye, which exposes any person
to hatred, contempt, ridicule, or obloquy, or which causes him to be shunned or avoided, or
which has a tendency to injure him in his occupation." CAL. CIV. CODE § 45 (West 1982).
517. Model Guidelines, supra note 512.
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(a) the average person, applying contemporary com-
munity standards, would find that the publication, taken
as a whole, appeals to a minor's prurient interest in sex;
and
(b) the publication depicts or describes, in a patently
offensive way, sexual conduct such as ultimate sexual acts
(normal or perverted), masturbation, excretory functions,
and lewd exhibition of the genitals; and
(c) the work taken as a whole, lacks serious literary,
artistic, political, or scientific value.
(d) "Minor" means any person under the age of
eighteen.
2. Students cannot publish or distribute material which
is "libelous", defined as a false and unprivileged statement
about a specific individual which injures the individual's repu-
tation in the community. If the allegedly libeled individual is a
"public figure" or "public official" as defined below, then
school officials must show that the false statement was pub-
lished "with actual malice", i.e., that the student journalists
knew that the statement was false, or that they published the
statement with reckless disregard for the truth-without trying
to verify the truthfulness of the statement.
(a) A public official is a person who holds an elected
or appointed office.
(b) A public figure is a person who either seeks the
public's attention or is well known because of his
achievements.
(c) School employees are to be considered public of-
ficials or public figures in articles concerning their school-
related activities.
(d) When an allegedly libelous statement concerns a
private individual, school officials must show that the false
statement was published willfully or negligently, i.e., the
student journalist has failed to exercise the care that a rea-
sonably prudent person would exercise.
(e) Under the "fair comment rule" a student is free
to express an opinion on matters of public interest. Specifi-
cally, a student enjoys a privilege to criticize the perform-
ance of teachers, administrators, school officials and other
school employees.
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3. Students cannot publish or distribute material which
will cause "a material and substantial disruption of school ac-
tivities."
(a) Disruption is defined as student rioting; unlaw-
ful seizures of property; destruction of property; wide-
spread shouting or boisterous conduct; or substantial
student participation in a school boycott, sit-in, stand-in,
walk-out or other related form of activity. Material that
stimulates heated discussion or debate does not constitute
the type of disruption prohibited.
(b) In order for a student publication to be consid-
ered disruptive, there must exist specific facts upon which
it would be reasonable to forecast that a clear and present
likelihood of an immediate, substantial material disruption
to normal school activity would occur if the material were
distributed. Mere undifferentiated fear or apprehension of
disturbance is not enough; school administrators must be
able to affirmatively show substantial facts which reason-
ably support a forecast of likely disruption.
(c) In determining whether a student publication is
disruptive, consideration must be given to the context of
the distribution as well as the content of the material. In
this regard, consideration should be given to past experi-
ence in the school with similar material, past experience in
the school in dealing with and supervising the students in
the subject school, current events influencing student atti-
tudes and behavior, and whether or not there have been
any instances of actual or threatened disruption prior to or
contemporaneously with the dissemination of the student
publication in question.
(d) School officials must act to protect the safety of
advocates of unpopular viewpoints.
(e) "School activity"-means educational activity of
students sponsored by the school and includes, by way of
example and not by way of limitation, classroom work, li-
brary activities, physical education classes, individual deci-
sion time, official assemblies and other similar gatherings,
school athletic contests, band concerts, school plays, and
scheduled in-school lunch periods.518
518. Id.
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The Model Guidelines, like section 48907, provide that school offi-
cials may regulate the time, place and manner of student publication dis-
tribution. "Distribution" is defined as the "means of dissemination of a
publication to students at a time and place of normal school activity, or
immediately prior or subsequent thereto... in areas of the school gener-
ally frequented by students."
'5 19
By including specific definitions in section 48907, the legislature can
more effectively guide county boards and school districts in their drafting
of guidelines. 20 While having a clear and precise statute on the books is
favorable from a legal standpoint, what may best serve the needs of stu-
dents and school officials may be specific guidelines promulgated by the
State Department of Instruction or State Board of Education 521 or by
local school districts and schools.
5 22
C. Establishing and Implementing Student Publication Guidelines at
the Local Level
Even if Education Code section 48907 is reconstructed to conform
to constitutional standards, its presence is no guarantee that student
press rights will be realized.52 3 Statutory protection only protects if ad-
ministrators know of the law and act to implement it. This does not
appear to have happened on a wide-scale degree with section 48907.
In the fall of 1985, the 58 county boards of education in California
and 182 selected school districts in each of those counties were surveyed
regarding section 48907 and student press guidelines.
52 4
519. Id. at 81.
520. See generally supra notes 527-48 and accompanying text.
521. But see infra note 529.
522. See infra notes 523-48.
523. See supra text accompanying notes 512-16.
524. A similar survey was conducted in 1978-79, soon after Education Code § 48907 (then
§ 48916) was enacted. See R. Pullen & P. Rasmussen, The Stark Reality of the 1977 Califor-
nia Education Code and Student Press Freedom 5-13 (Aug. 1980) (unpublished manuscript
presented to the Secondary Education Division at the Association for Education in Journalism
Annual Convention in Boston, Massachusetts).
In the Pullen-Rasmussen survey, fifty randomly selected California school districts were
surveyed. Twenty-five districts responded. Fifteen districts reported that they had a copy of
the statute, while nine said that they did not. Twelve respondents were very familiar with the
code, nine were somewhat familiar and two were not familar. Id. at 5. Thirteen of the districts
responding had established a publications code as required by the statute. Also, most schools
had no appeals procedure for students who wished to challenge a censorship decision. Id. at 6.
Telephone interviews with journalism advisers were also conducted. Many of the advisers
tolerated administrative censorship or censored themselves "fearing reprisals in the form of
poor teaching assignments, transfers, or contract termination." Id. at 13. These responses,
together with the survey results, led the surveyors to conclude that many districts were igno-
rant of or were ignoring the Education Code and thus were continuing to censor. Id. at 14.
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Eighteen of the 58 county boards of education responded. None of
them had adopted written publications guidelines for the school districts
and individual schools in their jurisdiction to follow. Of the 182 school
districts surveyed, 57 responded. Twenty-four of the school district su-
perintendents surveyed were unaware of any legislation governing stu-
dent publications. An additional 5 school district superintendents were
not aware of the legislation, but their district guidelines did refer to sec-
tion 48907. Accordingly, it was not surprising to find that only 24 of the
57 school districts had actual formal student press guidelines. Six of the
school districts reported that the decision to have guidelines was left to
the individual discretion of the schools in their districts.
Many of the school district guidelines were quite comprehensive,
5 25
while other districts simply stated that there was an "understanding" be-
tween the principal and the newspaper editor about what was acceptable.
None of the district guidelines, however, appeared to satisfy the require-
ments set forth in the Fourth Circuit cases. 26 All districts provided for
some type of prior restraint of obscene or libelous expression. Few of the
districts provided any sort of definition or description of what would con-
stitutute obscenity or libel. Likewise, few districts provided speedy and
specified time periods for review and appeal of censorship decisions.
The first step in implementing student press rights at the local level
is educating administrators, advisers and students about developments in
the law.527 One commentator suggests that state and regional journalism
associations take responsibility for educating their members.528 The as-
sociations, through its members, can then take the next step in imple-
menting student press rights: establishing written publication guidelines
at the district and individual school levels. Local guidelines may be
drafted or revised in the following manner.
5 29
They recommended that the State Board of Public Instruction lead the way in formulating
guidelines which comply with the Education Code. Id. at 14-15.
525. See the Los Angeles Unified School District's student press guidelines, Board Policy
1275, supra note 202.
526. Several school district representatives who responded to the survey requested that their
guidelines not be critiqued. Accordingly, no direct references will be made to a specific dis-
trict's guidelines (with the exception of the Los Angeles Unified School District's guidelines).
527. Administrators responding to the survey who knew of § 48907 stated that they re-
ceived legal information from various journalism associations, the district's legal counsel or
from journalism publications. See supra text accompanying note 513.
528. Eveslage, supra note 16, at 16, 17.
529. These recommendations are set forth in Eveslage, Guidelines: Protection or Trap, STU-
DENT PRESS L. CENTER REP., Winter 1983-84, at 19-21 [hereinafter Guidelines]. Statewide
guidelines may be promulgated; however, the effectiveness of such guidelines is debatable. In
1982, the Journalism Education Association (JEA) conducted a survey of 12 states to deter-
mine whether the states had any code, law, guidance or policy regulating student journalists.
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First, administrators and educators should strive for local accept-
ance of the guidelines.5 3° The Student Press Law Center's Model Guide-
lines for Student Publications 31 may serve as a prototype and may be
modified and adapted to meet the needs of each district, school, publica-
tion and staff.532 Personalized guidelines are more likely to garner local
support by students and administrators and "compliance might be
greater than if the regulations came to them from a state agency.
'533
Second, the guidelines should "be specific and focus on legal 'do's'
and 'don'ts'-what [advisers] can and cannot do and what can and can-
not be done to the [adviser] and... staff."'5 34 Prohibited content should
be specified535 and, if prior review is allowed, the review and appeals
procedures should be clearly delineated. 36
Third, the guidelines must clearly distinguish between the "enuncia-
tion of constitutional rights and limitations" and statements concerning
how a responsible and ethical journalist should perform.5 37 Although
constitutional rights are not predicated upon one's conformity to stan-
dards or responsible behavior, 38 guidelines which do not distinguish be-
tween "rights" and "responsibilities" may be viewed as a single contract
or agreement between the student journalists and the administration.539
Hence, administrators may use the guidelines as authority for rendering
student's free speech and free press rights contingent upon the student's
Eveslage, supra note 16, at 16. The uninformed responses by state officials (e.g., officials in
Attorney Generals' offices and Departments of Education) led the JEA to conclude that "those
higher in the education structure may have limited awareness of existing state and federal law
and regulations in [the area of student press law]." Id. at 16-17. Based on those findings, the
following question arose: Is a "state law or code... the best way to increase awareness of
student rights, induce among local educators acceptance of such imposition by state legislators,
or prompt greater student press freedom"? Id. at 17. Pointing to the failure of California
administrators and advisers to comply with the state law requiring the school districts to im-
plement publication guidelines, the JEA observed that "the existence of state law, even when it
dictates specific action, is no guarantee [of student press rights]." Id.
The JEA indicated that "judges, attorneys and educators seem to believe that school deci-
sions are best made in a specific way at the local or district level. Anything from outside or
above is perceived as advisory and subject to local interpretation and adaptation." Id.
530. Guidelines, supra note 529, at 20.
531. See infra Appendix B.
532. Guidelines, supra note 529, at 20.
533. Eveslage, supra note 16, at 17.
534. Guidelines, supra note 529, at 20.
535. Numerous cases illustrate the required degree of specificity in using terms of art such
as libel and obscenity in student publications guidelines. See supra notes 437-54 and accompa-
nying text.
536. See supra notes 482-95 and accompanying text.
537. Guidelines, supra note 529, at 21.
538. Id.
539. Id.
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conformity with the prescribed behavior.: °
Fourth, the staff's duties and responsibilities should be set forth.54
A code of journalism ethics is also useful as it informs students and ad-
ministrators that with press freedom comes ethical responsibility.54
In addition to guidelines, schools or school districts may establish
an informal administration-student relations committee to discuss mu-
tual concerns. The court in Nitzberg v. Parks5 43 suggested that the use of
such a committee might alleviate "the disruption and bitterness gener-
ated by an unpopular refusal of the administrator to allow circulation of
a student publication." 5" The court observed that
[t]hrough such a joint effort, final answers may be found for the
many difficult questions precipitated by prior restraint of stu-
dent publications. For example, such a committee might de-
cide (1) where on school property it would be appropriate to
distribute approved material; (2) the type of material that
might cause distractions and disruptions among the students;
and (3) the question of how serious a "disruption" must be
before prior restraint would be justified. Such a course would
lessen the possibility of arbitrary action and unfair treatment
which, in turn, we think, would improve teacher-student
relations.
545
In sum, arbitrary censorship is less likely if constitutional guidelines
and a forum for administration-student communication are in place.
5 46
When objectionable content is clearly defined and legal procedures are
described, the ground rules are set for both administrators and students
540. Id. at 20, 21. For example, students' protected rights may be made contingent upon
the performance of ethical and journalistic behavior if the guidelines contain statements such
as "news articles will be objective" or "students will verify the accuracy of all quotations." Id.
at 21.
541. Id. Education Code § 48907 provides some guidance in this area as it specifies the
adviser's and editors' roles. See LAW OF THE STUDENT PRESS, supra note 60, at 38 (list of
safeguards that student journalists should take to reduce the likelihood of libel suits); id. at 40
(issues to consider before publishing profanity); id. at 49 (students' use of copyrighted mate-
rial); id. at 74-77 (role of the adviser and safeguards to be taken as adviser).
542. Guidelines, supra note 529, at 21; see infra Appendix C for the Society of Professional
Journalists Sigma Delta Chi Code of Ethics. Eveslage suggests that the list of duties and the
code of ethics be kept distinct from the guidelines based on legal precedent. Guidelines, supra
note 529, at 21.
543. 525 F.2d 378 (4th Cir. 1975).
544. Id. at 385; see also LAW OF THE STUDENT PRESS, supra note 60, at 67 (chapter dis-
cussing conflict resolution).
545. Id.
546. Guidelines, supra note 529, at 19.
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prior to the occurrence of any controversy.5 47 Furthermore, guidelines
and committees foster better administration-student relations. A "mu-
tual understanding of one another's position should make each side more
sensitive and short-circuit confrontation."
548
VI. CONCLUSION
We would like to think that we have come a long way since the early
days of public education when school officials had absolute authority
over students' conduct and expression. But have we? Nearly half a cen-
tury ago the United States Supreme Court observed that since boards of
education "are educating the young for citizenship [there] is reason for
scrupulous protection of Constitutional freedoms of the individual, if we
are not to strangle the free mind at its source and teach youth to discount
important principles of our government as mere platitudes."549 Educa-
tion Code section 48907 does not provide scrupulous protection for the
freedom of the student press. Instead, its broad measures validate almost
unlimited administrative censorship.
Allowing section 48907's prior restraint system to remain on the
books as drafted licenses arbitrary administrative censorship of student
expression in their publications. In the process of censoring, school offi-
cials disparage students' conceptions of free speech and free press rights.
As one journalism adviser remarked, it is quite ironic that students learn
about freedoms fundamental to American government, such as free
speech and press, in civics class only to walk across the hallway to jour-
nalism class to find that those freedoms do not exist for students.550
The "'vigilant protection of constitutional freedoms is nowhere
more vital than in the community of American schools.' ",551 The Cali-
fornia courts and legislature must not forget that
547. Id.
548. Id.
549. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943).
550. Interview with Mark Wiener, Journalism Adviser at Canoga Park High School and
former president of the Los Angeles Journalism Teachers Association, in Canoga Park, Cali-
fornia (Nov. 6, 1985). Similarly, one federal court advised that "[perhaps it would be well if
those entrusted to administer the teaching of American history and government to our stu-
dents began their efforts by practicing the document on which that history and government are
based." Shanley v. Northeast Indep. School Dist., 462 F.2d 960, 978 (5th Cir. 1972). The
court added that "Eilt is most important that our young become convinced that our Constitu-
tion is a living reality, not parchment preserved under glass." Id. at 972 (footnote omitted).
See also supra note 1 and accompanying text & note 152.
551. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 512 (1969) (quot-
ing Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967)) (citation omitted) (emphasis
added); see also supra note 7.
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[i]t is... essential that legislation aimed at protecting children
from allegedly harmful expression-no less than legislation en-
acted with respect to adults-be clearly drawn and that the
standards adopted be reasonably precise so that those who are
governed by the law and those that administer it will under-
stand its meaning and application.5 z
If there is to be a climate of respect for freedom of expression, it
must begin with the young, with students. Only through an uncensored
student press can young people experience and grow to respect the real
meaning of free speech.1
53
Jeri Christine Okamoto*
552. Baughman v. Freienmuth, 478 F.2d 1345, 1349 (4th Cir. 1973) (quoting Interstate
Circuit, Inc. v. Dallas, 390 U.S. 676, 689 (1968)). As the Supreme Court advised, "'[to do
otherwise is to leave administrators adrift upon a boundless sea.'" Id. (quoting Joseph Bur-
styn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 504 (1952)).
553. See M. Simpson, supra note 2, at 29; see also N. HENTOFF, THE FIRST FREEDOM 22
(1980) (quoting journalist and press historian Ben Bagdikian) ("If freedom of expression be-
comes merely an empty slogan in the minds of enough children, it will be dead by the time
they are adults.").
* The author is a former Student Press Law Center intern. This Comment is dedicated
to Professor Emeritus C. Herman Pritchett, University of California, Santa Barbara, for his
inspiration.
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APPENDIX A
CALIFORNIA EDUCATION CODE SECTION 48907*
Student exercise offree expression
Students of the public schools shall have the right to exercise free-
dom of speech and of the press including, but not limited to, the use of
bulletin boards, the distribution of printed materials or petitions, the
wearing of buttons, badges, and other insignia, and the right of expres-
sion in official publications, whether or not such publications or other
means of expression are supported financially by the school or by use of
school facilities, except that expression shall be prohibited which is ob-
scene, libelous, or slanderous. Also prohibited shall be material which so
incites students as to create a clear and present danger of the commission
of unlawful acts on school premises or the violation of lawful school regula-
tions, or the substantial disruption of the orderly operation of the school.
Each governing board of a school district and each county board of
education shall adopt rules and regulations in the form of a written publi-
cations code, which shall include reasonable provisions for the time,
place, and manner of conducting such activities within its respective
jurisdiction.
Student editors of official school publications shall be responsible for
assigning and editing the news, editorial, and feature content of their
publications subject to the limitations of this section. However, it shall
be the responsibility of a journalism adviser or advisers of student publi-
cations within each school to supervise the production of the student
staff, to maintain professional standards of English and journalism, and
to maintain the provisions of this section.
There shall be no prior restraint of material prepared for official
school publications except insofar as it violates this section. School officials
shall have the burden of showing justification without undue delay prior
to any limitation of student expression under this section.
"Official school publications" refers to material produced by stu-
dents in the journalism, newspaper, yearbook, or writing classes and dis-
tributed to the student body either free or for a fee.
* CAL. EDUC. CODE § 48907 (West Supp. 1987) (emphasis added).
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APPENDIX B
STUDENT PRESS LAW CENTER MODEL GUIDELINES FOR
STUDENT PUBLICATIONS*
I. STATEMENT OF POLICY
It is undeniable that students are protected in their exercise of free-
dom of expression by the First Amendment to the Constitution of the
United States. Accordingly, it is the responsibility of school officials to
insure the maximum freedom of expression to all students.
It is the policy of the Board of
Education that (newspaper) , (yearbook)
and (literary magazine) , official, school-sponsored publica-
tions of High School have been es-
tablished as forums for student expression. As a forum, each publication
should provide a full opportunity for students to inquire, question and
exchange ideas. Content should reflect all areas of student interest, in-
cluding topics about which there may be dissent or controversy.
It is the policy of the Board of
Education that student journalists shall have the ultimate and absolute
right to determine the content of official student publications.
II. OFFICIAL SCHOOL PUBLICATIONS
A. Responsibilities of Student Journalists
Students who work on official student publications will:
1. Rewrite material, as required by faculty advisers, to improve
sentence structure, grammar, spelling and punctuation;
2. Check and verify all facts and verify the accuracy of all
quotations;
3. In the case of editorials or letters to the editor concerning con-
troversial issues, provide space for rebuttal comments and opinions;
[and]
4. Determine the content of the student publication.
B. Prohibited Material
1. Students cannot publish or distribute material which is "ob-
scene as to minors". Obscene as to minors is defined as:
(a) the average person, applying contemporary community
* STUDENT PRESS LAW CENTER MODEL GUIDELINES FOR STUDENT PUBLICATIONS,
reprinted in STUDENT PRESS LAW CENTER, LAW OF THE STUDENT PRESS 79-82 (1985).
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standards, would find that the publication, taken as a whole, appeals
to a minor's prurient interest in sex; and
(b) the publication depicts or describes, in a patently offensive
way, sexual conduct such as ultimate sexual acts (normal or per-
verted), masturbation, excretory functions, and lewd exhibition of
the genitals; and
(c) the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic,
political, or scientific value.
(d) "Minor" means any person under the age of eighteen.
2. Students cannot publish or distribute material which is
"libelous", defined as a false and unprivileged statement about a specific
individual which injures the individual's reputation in the community. If
the allegedly libeled individual is a "public figure" or a "public official"
as defined below, then school officials must show that the false statement
was published "with actual malice", i.e., that the student journalists
knew that the statement was false, or that they published the statement
with reckless disregard for the truth-without trying to verify the truth-
fulness of the statement.
(a) A public official is a person who holds an elected or ap-
pointed public office.
(b) A public figure is a person who either seeks the public's
attention or is well known because of his [or her] achievements.
(c) School employees are to be considered public officials or
public figures in articles concerning their school-related actvities.
(d) When an allegedly libelous statement concerns a private
individual, school officials must show that the false statement was
published willfully or negligently, i.e., the student journalist has
failed to exercise the care that a reasonably prudent person would
exercise.
(e) Under the "fair comment rule" a student is free to express
an opinion on matters of public interest. Specifically, a student en-
joys a privilege to criticize the performance of teachers, administra-
tors, school officials and other school employees.
3. Students cannot publish or distribute material which will cause
"a material and substantial disruption of school activities."
(a) Disruption is defined as student rioting; unlawful seizures
of property; destruction of property; widespread shouting or boister-
ous conduct; or substantial student participation in a school boycott,
sit-in, stand-in, walk-out or other related form of activity. Material
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that stimulates heated discussion or debate does not constitute the
type of disruption prohibited.
(b) In order for a student publication to be considered disrup-
tive, there must exist specific facts upon which it would be reason-
able to forecast that a clear and present likelihood of an immediate,
substantial material disruption to normal school activity would oc-
cur if the material were distributed. Mere undifferentiated fear or
apprehension of disturbance is not enough; school administrators
must be able to affirmatively show substantial facts which reason-
ably support a forecast of likely disruption.
(c) In determining whether a student publication is disrup-
tive, consideration must be given to the context of the distribution as
well as the content of the material. In this regard, consideration
should be given to past experience in the school with similar mate-
rial, past experience in the school in dealing with and supervising
the students in the subject school, current events influencing student
attitudes and behavior, and whether or not there have been any in-
stances of actual or threatened disruption prior to or contemporane-
ously with the dissemination of the student publication in question.
(d) School officials must act to protect the safety of advocates
of unpopular viewpoints.
(e) "School activity"-means educational activity of students
sponsored by the school and includes, by way of example and not by
way of limitation, classroom work, library activities, physical educa-
tion classes, individual decision time, official assemblies and other
similar gatherings, school athletic contests, band concerts, school
plays, and scheduled in-school lunch periods.
C. Legal Advice
1. If, in the opinion of the student editor, student editorial staff or
faculty adviser, material proposed for publication may be "obscene",
"libelous", or "cause a substantial disruption of school activities", the
legal opinion of a practicing attorney should be sought. It is recom-
mended that the services of the attorney for the local newspaper be used.
2. Legal fees charged in connection with this consultation will be
paid by the board of education.
3. The final decision of whether the material is to be published will
be left to the student editor or student editorial staff.
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III. PROTECTED SPEECH
School officials cannot:
1. Ban the publication or distribution of birth control information
in student publications;
2. Censor or punish the occasional use of vulgar or so-called "four-
letter" words in student publications;
3. Prohibit criticism of school policies or practices;
4. Cut off funds to official student publications because of disagree-
ment over editorial policy;
5. Ban speech which merely advocates illegal conduct without
proving that such speech is directed toward and will actually cause immi-
nent lawless action;
6. Ban the publication or distribution of material written by
nonstudents;
7. Prohibit the school newspaper from accepting advertising.
IV. NONSCHOOL-SPONSORED PUBLICATIONS
School officials may not ban the distribution of nonschool-sponsored
publications on school grounds. However, students who violate any rule
listed under II.B. may be disciplined after distribution.
1. School officials may regulate the time, place and manner of dis-
tribution.
(a) Nonschool-sponsored publications will have the same
rights of distribution as official school publications.
(b) "Distribution"-means dissemination of a publication to
students at a time and place of normal school activity, or immedi-
ately prior or subsequent thereto, by means of handing out free cop-
ies, selling or offering copies for sale, accepting donations for copies
of the publication, or displaying the student publication in areas of
the school which are generally frequented by students.
2. School officials cannot:
(a) Prohibit the distribution of anonymous literature or re-
quire that literature bear the name of the sponsoring organization or
author;
(b) Ban the distribution of literature because it contains
advertising;
(c) Ban the sale of literature.
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V. ADVISER JOB SECURITY
No teacher who advises a student publication will be fired, trans-
ferred or removed from the advisership for failure to exercise editorial
control over the student publication or to otherwise suppress the rights of
free expression of student journalists.
VI. PRIOR RESTRAINT
No student publication, whether nonschool-sponsored or official,
will be reviewed by school administrators prior to distribution.
VII. CIRCULATION
These guidelines will be included in the handbook on student rights
and responsibilities and circulated to all students in attendance.
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APPENDIX C
THE SOCIETY OF PROFESSIONAL JOURNALISTS SIGMA
DELTA CHI CODE OF ETHICS*
The Society of Professional Journalists, Sigma Delta Chi, believes
the duty of journalists is to serve the truth.
We believe the agencies of mass communication are carriers of pub-
lie discussion and information, acting on their Constitutional mandate
and freedom to learn and report the facts.
We believe in public enlightenment as the forerunner of justice, and
in our Constitutional role to seek the truth as part of the public's right to
know the truth.
We believe those responsibilities carry obligations that require jour-
nalists to perform with intelligence, objectivity, accuracy and fairness.
To these ends, we declare acceptance of the standards of practice
here set forth.
* Responsibility: The public's right to know of events of public im-
portance and interest is the overriding mission of the mass media. The
purpose of distributing news and enlightened opinion is to serve the gen-
eral welfare. Journalists who use their professional status as representa-
tives of the public for selfish or other unworthy motives violate a high
trust.
* Freedom of the Press: Freedom of the press is to be guarded as an
inalienable right of people in a free society. It carries with it the freedom
and responsibility to discuss, question and challenge actions and utter-
ances of our government and of our public and private institutions. Jour-
nalists uphold the right to speak unpopular opinions and the privilege to
agree with the majority.
* Ethics: Journalists must be free of obligation to any interest other
than the public's right to know the truth.
1. Gifts, favors, free travel, special treatment or privileges can
compromise the integrity of journalists and their employers. Nothing of
value should be accepted.
2. Secondary employment, political involvement, holding public
office and service in community organizations should be avoided if it
compromises the integrity of journalists and their employers. Journalists
and their employers should conduct their personal lives in a manner
which protects them from conflict of interest, real or apparent. Their
* THE SOCIETY OF PROFESSIONAL JOURNALISTS SIGMA DELTA CHI CODE OF ETHICS
(adopted 1926, revised 1973 & 1984), reprinted in STUDENT PRESS LAW CENTER, LAW OF
THE STUDENT PRESS 83-84 (1985).
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responsibilities to the public are paramount. That is the nature of their
profession.
3. So-called news communications from private sources should not
be published or broadcast without substantiation of their claims to news
value.
4. Journalists will seek news that serves the public interest, despite
the obstacles. They will make constant efforts to assure that the public's
business is conducted in public and that public records are open to
inspection.
5. Journalists acknowledge the newsman's ethic of protecting con-
fidential sources of information.
6. Plagiarism is dishonest and is unacceptable.
*Accuracy and Objectivity: Good faith with the public is the foun-
dation of all worthy journalism.
1. Truth is our ultimate goal.
2. Objectivity in reporting the news is another goal, which serves
as the mark of an experienced professional. It is a standard of perform-
ance toward which we strive. We honor those who achieve it.
3. There is no excuse for inaccuracies or lack of thoroughness.
4. Newspaper headlines should be fully warranted by the contents
of the articles they accompany. Photographs and telecasts should give an
accurate picture of an event and not highlight a minor incident out of
context.
5. Sound practice makes clear distinction between news reports
and expressions of opinion. News reports should be free of opinion or
bias and represent all sides of an issue.
6. Partisanship in editorial comment which knowingly departs
from the truth violates the spirit of American journalism.
7. Journalists recognize their responsibility for offering informed
analysis, comment and editorial opinion on public events and issues.
They accept the obligation to present such material by individuals whose
competence, experience and judgment qualify them for it.
8. Special articles or presentations devoted to advocacy or the
writer's own conclusions and interpretations should be labeled as such.
* Fair Play: Journalists at all times will show respect for the dig-
nity, privacy, rights and well-being of people encountered in the course of
gathering and presenting the news.
1. The news media should not communicate unofficial charges af-
fecting reputation or moral character without giving the accused a
chance to reply.
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2. The news media must guard against invading a person's right to
privacy.
3. The media should not pander to morbid curiosity about details
of vice and crime.
4. It is the duty of news media to make prompt and complete cor-
rection of their errors.
5. Journalists should be accountable to the public for their reports
and the public should be encouraged to voice its grievances against the
media. Open dialogue with our readers, viewers and listeners should be
fostered.
* Pledge: Journalists should actively censure and try to prevent vio-
lations of these standards, and they should encourage their observance by
all newspeople. Adherence to this code of ethics is intended to preserve
the bond of mutual trust and respect between American journalists and
the American people.

